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Thesis Abstract 
By using little known primary sources in Chinese and English, this thesis will discuss 
Australia’s diplomatic relations with China, between 1901 and 1941. In March 1909, Liang 
Lanxun, China’s first consul-general arrived in Melbourne, Australia.  Liang’s mission was to 
promote trade between China and Australia and as well to study the racial relations between 
Chinese and Australians.  In 1921, Edward Little was appointed as Australia’s first trade 
commissioner in Shanghai, China. In 1929, the Chinese consulate moved from Melbourne to 
Sydney, due to the fact that Sydney had become the centre of the Chinese communities in the 
Oceania.  I suggest that the Great Depression and the Second World War forced Australian 
policy-makers to reconsider Australia’s geo-political position in the world. This is the first 
detailed research that treats Chinese diplomats in Australia and Australian diplomats in China 
between 1901 and 1941 as key historical subjects.  In this thesis, I argue that Chinese 
diplomats used trade as a tool to fight against the White Australia policy between 1909 and 
1941. I further argue Australia was more intertwined and connected with Asia, in this period 
than the existing literature suggested.   
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NOTES ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION 
 
All the translations from Chinese to English in this thesis are the author’s unless otherwise 
stated.  
I use the Hanyu Pinyin system of transliteration for Chinese words, names and phrases, 
except in cases where a different conventional or preferred spelling or pronunciation exists, 
e.g. Hsu Mo.  The ordering of Chinese names follows their conventional forms; that is, family 
names first, followed by given names. 
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Dancing with the Dragon: Australia’s Diplomatic Relations with China (1901-1941) 
Introduction 
Little has been said in this introductory chapter regarding Australia’s relations with China 
between 1894 and 1931, because there is little to say. Since the settlement of the immigration 
issue at the beginning of the century Australia has had few political contacts with China 
except as a participant in international conferences and agreements.2 
                                                                                               Jack Shepherd, 1939 
Shepherd suggests there was historically little political contacts between Australia and 
China.3  Shepherd’s view represented the majority of Australians. My thesis however, 
challenges this position, by offering a more complete and complicated picture of the Sino-
Australian diplomatic relations, between 1901 and 1941.  
In this thesis, I argue that between 1909 and 1941 Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to 
fight against the White Australia policy.4  I further argue the decade of 1930s was the first 
time that Australia has turned its attention to Asia (namely China and Japan), both politically 
and economically, at least at the official level.5 I suggest that the Great Depression and the 
Second World War (WWII) made Australian policy-makers reconsider Australia’s geo-
political position in the world. The economic depression and the expansion of Japan in the 
Pacific forced some Australian politicians to realise Australia’s geographical closeness to 
Asia. This is why Australia appointed its first two diplomatic postings in the USA and Japan 
in the 1940. Only one year later, Australia appointed its first minister to China. Frederick 
Eggleston went to Chongqing, China in 1941.6  Australia, therefore, was more dependent on 
Asia in the first half of the twentieth more than the existing literature suggested.7  Further, for 
Chinese policy-makers and diplomats, their priorities were to maintain China’s independence 
and unity.8 Chinese diplomats had to serve this goal when they were working in Australia.  
                                                          
2 Jack Shepherd, Australia's interests and policies in the Far East, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1939, p.22.; Erik M. Andrews, Australia and China: the ambiguous relationship, Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne 
University Press, 1985, p.34. 
3 David Walker, “Naming and locating Asia: Australian dilemmas in its regional identity”, edited by 
Leong Yew, Alterities in Asia: Reflections on Identity and Regionalism, London or New York: Taylor and 
Francis, 2011, p.72. 
4 台湾: 中央研究院近代史档案馆, [Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History, Taipei (hereafter AS: 
IMH)], Diplomatic Archives, 02-13-006-03-024, p.1. I use materials from digital collection of AS: IMH.; AS: 
IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-015-01-015, p.1.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 23 
November 1929, p.5.  (The only exception is during the Second World War (WWII). In WWII, China and 
Australia were allies, as they fought against the Japan together. Thus, neither China nor Australia wanted to talk 
about the White Australia policy during WWII.) 
5 National Archives of Australia (thereafter NAA), A595 BT1923/1195, “Trade with China”; Tung Wah Times, 
14 January 1933, p.4.; Tung Wah Times, 28 January 1933, p.8.; Tung Wah Times, 4 February 1933, p.4.; Tung 
Wah Times, 18 February 1933, p.8.; Tung Wah Times, 15 July 1933, p.8. 
6 National Library of Australia (thereafter NLA), MS 423/9/1-62, Sir Frederic Eggleston, Box 5, “Eggleston 
China Dairies”, p.1.; William Sima, China & ANU: diplomats, adventurers, scholars, Acton, A.C.T., Australia: 
Australian National University Press, 2015, p.35.; See also: Kate Bagnall, The Chungking Legation: Australia’s 
Diplomatic Mission in Wartime China, Canberra and Melbourne: Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade and 
the Chinese Museum, 2015. 
7 Shepherd, Australia's interests and policies in the Far East, p.22.; Andrews, Australia and China, p.34. 
8 W. Y. Tsao, Two Pacific Democracies: China and Australia, Melbourne: Brown Prior Anderson Pty Ltd, 
1941, p.77.; Hong Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: 
Wenhai chubanshe, 1930, p.17. 
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They worked hard to protect China’s national interests in Australia between 1909 and 1941, 
in three areas.  They tried to protect the rights of Chinese citizens in Australia; they 
encouraged Australia to buy more goods from China in the 1920s and 1930; after 1931, they 
tried to explain China’s position towards Japan, while trying to gain support from Australian 
government and public.  In the 1930s, Chinese policy-makers for the first time took Australia 
seriously. This is because China viewed Australia as one of few nations which could provide 
China assistance during its military and political struggle against Japan.  This fresh view of 
Sino-Australian relations only comes to light if we pay attention to Chinese language sources 
and how they challenge existing conceptions of Australian history.  Similarly, reading 
Australian sources in the context of Chinese history in this period challenges canonical 
readings of Chinese foreign policy in this period, particularly as it related to Australasia. 
In this thesis, I wish to address two central questions.  First, how did China maintain its 
diplomatic relations with a semi-independent state like Australia between 1901 and 1941?  
China at this time was a middle (or a regional) power, but it was in the process of becoming a 
great power. At the end of the WWII, China became one of the five permeant members of the 
United Nations’ Security Council.9  Australia was a middle power and still is a middle power 
today.10  Second, to what extent, did the Australian government have its independent foreign 
policies in the first half of the twentieth century?  I wish to use the history of Australia’s 
diplomatic relations with China to answer that question.  
Summary of Sino-Australian diplomatic relations in the period 
When Chinese people encountered Europeans in Australian colonies in the nineteenth 
century, they faced strong discrimination. Racial discrimination mainly occurred in the 
following ways: Chinese people did not have the rights to vote, they were excluded from 
participating politics. Chinese people did not have the freedom to choose their occupation, 
either.  Since 1901, Chinese people were the victims of the anti-humanitarian White Australia 
policy, this resulted a significant decline of the Chinese population in Australia.11 The 
English-language newspapers in Australia published discriminatory or insulting words 
against Chinese people.12  Chinese people would face insulting behaviours daily when they 
were walking on the streets, occasionally Chinese people were beaten by the Caucasian.13    
In the late nineteenth century, Charles H. Pearson—a liberal politician as well as a scholar—
published an extremely influential book and predicted the expansion of Chinese population, 
and the rise of China.14 Yet when scholars study the Sino-Australian relations, they have paid 
                                                          
9 Jiang Yongjing (蔣永敬), 抗戰史論 (The Anti-Japanese War and a historical commentary), Taipei: Dongda 
tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1995, p.3. 
10 James Cotton, and John Ravenhill, “Middle Power Dreaming: Australian Foreign Policy during the Rudd-
Gillard Governments”, in Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010, edited by James 
Cotton and John Ravenhill, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2012, p.1. 
11 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 17 March 1923, p.2.; Yong, The New Gold Mountain, 
p.5.; Argus (Melbourne, Vic.: 1848 - 1957), 7 June 1855, p.5.; Adelaide Observer (SA: 1843 - 1904), 26 
October 1878, p.21.; Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate, 16 May 1881, p.2. 
12 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 7 January 1911, p.2. Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 
1902; 1911 - 1936), 11 March 1911, p.7. 
13 Ibid.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 24 March 1923, p.2.   
14 Charles H. Pearson, National Character of Life: A Forecast, London: Macmillan, 1894; Marilyn Lake and 
Henry Reynolds, Drawing the global colour line: White Men’s Countries and the Question of Racial Equality, 
Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2008, p.3. 
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little attention to the book. In this thesis, I will explain the significance of Pearson’s impacts 
on Sino-Australian diplomatic relations.  Despite the Australian governments’ strong support 
of the White Australia policy, China had official relations with Australia between 1909 and 
1949.15 The domestic political affairs within China and Australia as well as the global 
situations influenced the diplomatic relation between China and Australian between 1909 and 
1941.  
The Chinese policy-makers viewed Australia, New Zealand and Southern Pacific Islands 
such as Fiji as a region together, when the Chinese government appointed diplomats in the 
1900s.  In 1908, China appointed its first consul—Lin Runjian in Western Samoa (it was 
ruled by the Germans at that time), to look after the Chinese coolies.16  Lin was in charge of 
China’s diplomatic affairs with this Pacific Island.  In 1909, two Chinese diplomats arrived in 
Wellington and Melbourne, respectively, in order to represent the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912).  
Huang Rongliang (黄荣良)17 was a Chinese diplomat in New Zealand and Australia between 
1909 and 1913. Between February 1909 and May 1911, Huang served as the first consul for 
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), in Wellington, New Zealand.  He then served as the Qing’s 
last consul-general and immediately became the Republic of China’s first consul-general in 
Melbourne, Australia.18  
In March 1909, Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) arrived in Melbourne.  Liang’s mission was to 
promote trade between China and Australia and as well to study the racial relations between 
Chinese and Australians.19 According to Ching-Fatt Yong, a pioneer on Chinese Australian 
studies, during his 17 months in office, Liang had close contact with the Australian 
Department of External Affairs.20 Thus, since 1909, China had established official diplomatic 
relations with Australia, New Zealand and Western Samoa.21  Since Chinese consul-general in 
Melbourne was the highest-ranking Chinese official in Oceanic; thus, Chinese consul-general 
not only in charge of Sino-Australian relations, but also had a say on China’s official 
relations with Pacific Islands such as Fiji.22  
The Chinese consulate in Australia formed an alliance with the local Chinese business 
community.  Chinese diplomats used their diplomatic status to protect the rights of Chinese in 
                                                          
15 AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-014-02-018, 18 May 1909.   
16 Liu, Weiping (刘渭平), History and Historiography of Chinese people in Australasia (大洋洲华人史事叢稿), 
Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2000, p.107. 
17 AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-014-01-033, 20 May 1908, p.2.; AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-
12-015-01-023, 5 July 1911. 
18 Kuo Mei-fen, Making Chinese Australia: Urban Elites, Newspapers and the Formation of Chinese Australian 
Identity, 1892–1912, Melbourne: Monash University Publishing, 2013, p.208. 
19 Ching Fatt, Yong, The New Gold Mountain: The Chinese in Australia 1901-1921, Richmond, South Australia: 
Raphael Arts, 1977, p.22. and p.25. 
20 Ibid.,  
21 AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-12-014-01-033, 20 May 1908, p.2.; AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-
12-014-02-018, May 1909. 
22 Archives of Chinese Consul-General, Melbourne (thereafter ACCG), Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 
522: 0040 015-03 F, “Official Letter from the Acting Consul-General for China in Melbourne, Victoria to 
Colonial Secretary’s Office in Suva, Fiji”, on 14th April, 1915; ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 
522: 0041 015-04 G, “Official Letter from Tseng Tsung Kien, Esquire, Consul-General for China in Melbourne 
to Governor-General’s Office in Melbourne”, on 31st March, 1915; ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of 
Melbourne, 522 0056 016-06 F, Official Letter from Alfred Sao-ke Sze施肇基, (China Ambassador in Britain) 
to Chinese Consul-General Zeng in Australia”, in 1915; ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522 0316 
146-01, in June 1944, p.75.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 13 February 1926, p.6.; Tung 
Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 29 January 1927, p.7.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 
1911 - 1936), 8 April 1933, p.8. 
10 
 
Australia; local Chinese business communities supported the Chinese consulate financially. 
The Chinese consulate in Australia struggled financially in the 1910s, and 1920s. In 1929, the 
Chinese consulate moved from Melbourne to Sydney, because Sydney had become the centre 
of the Chinese communities in the Oceania region. Song Faxiang (宋发祥), the then Chinese 
consul-general in Australia, made this important decision. Chinese local community in 
Australia (especially those located in Melbourne and Sydney) “were partly responsible for the 
financial maintenance” of the Chinese consulate.23 The official relations between Australia 
and China became especially positive during the Second World War (WWII), when Dr Hsu 
Mo (徐谟) was the first Chinese extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador in Australia. 
Hsu was one of the most senior Chinese diplomats in the 1940s. Appointing him as China’s 
first minister24 in Australia suggests the importance of Australia for China during the WWII. 
Representing China during the WWII, Hsu was in Australia between 1941 and 1944. Hsu 
came here with his family, and embraced Australian social and cultural life.  China was allied 
to Australia and New Zealand in the WWII.  
Meanwhile, Australians travelled to China, in order to seek job opportunities or promote the 
Sino-Australian relations. George Morrison (1862-1920), an Australian, went to China and 
spent significant time there.  Morrison was one of the most extraordinary people among the 
Sino-Western histories, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Morrison was 
worried about the expansion of the Chinese population, even though Morrison had close 
relations with influential Chinese politicians like Yuan Shikai (1859-1916).25 Billy Hughes, 
Prime Minister of Australia in 1921, appointed Edward Little (1864-1939) as Australia trade 
commissioner in Shanghai, China. This was a significant post because, for the first time, 
Australia had established direct official contact with China. However, the Australian 
government terminated Little’s post in 1923, as he could not receive enough support from the 
British diplomats in Shanghai nor the Melbourne business community back in Australia.26  In 
1922, the Australian government appointed Egbert Thomas Sheaf (1869-1948) as Australian 
trade commissioner in the East.  Although Sheaf’s office was based in Singapore, he was 
responsible for Australian trade with all the Asian nations, including China.27  The 
appointment of Sheaf suggests that Australian government wanted to improve its commercial 
relations with its Asian neighbours.28   
Between 1925 and 1935, the Australian government relied on British diplomats to look after 
Australia’s interests in China, as Australia no longer having any official representative in 
                                                          
23 Yong, The New Gold Mountain, p.193. 
24 On modern world diplomacy in the first half of the twentieth century, Minister is one level below 
Ambassador.  Since Australia was still a British dominion in 1941, it could only appoint a Minister in China. 
Eggleston was the highest-ranking Australian official/diplomat in China. 
25 State Library of New South Wales (thereafter: SLNSW), “George E. Morrison Visiting Cards”, MLMSS 
312/276, p.3b.; SLNSW, “George E. Morrison Visiting Cards”, MLMSS 312/276, p.12d.; SLNSW, “George E. 
Morrison Visiting Cards”, MLMSS 312/276, p.22.; see also: Kuo Mei-fen, Making Chinese Australia, 2013, 
pp.2-3. 
26 NAA: A11804 1924/255, “Trade Commissioners China and the East-Trade Commr. Australian”, Official 
Letter from Governor-General Foster to Lord Duke, 30th November 1923.  
27 NAA: A11804 1924/255, “Trade Commissioners China and the East-Trade Commr. Australian”, Letter from 
Official Secretary to the Governor-General to the Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 30th May 1922.  
28 NAA: A11804 1924/255, “Trade Commissioners China and the East-Trade Commr. Australian”, Secretary, 
Prime Minister’s Department to The Official Secretary to the Governor-General, 22rd May 1922.  
Unfortunately, Australian government did not renew Sheaf’s posting while it expired in 1925. 
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China nor Singapore.29  At the same time, Australian government (under Joseph Lyons) had 
increasingly realised the importance of trading with China in the 1930s. In 1932, Alexander 
Clifford Vernon Melbourne (1888-1943), an academic from the University of Queensland, 
visited China and Japan, in order to deepen Australia’s economic connections with these two 
Asian nations.30 Melbourne tried to build a financial connection between Australian banks 
and Chinese banks.31 Two years later, John Latham (1877-1964), then Australia’s Minister 
for External Affairs, also visited Netherlands East Indies (modern-day Indonesia), China and 
Japan. His mission was to enhance Australian government’s understanding of these Asian 
nations, but also promoted the commercial relations between Australia and China and Japan. 
Although Latham was keen to promote the trade with Asian neighbours, he was increasingly 
worried about whether the British navy would have the ability to protect Australia if Australia 
was under attack by a foreign power, such as Japan.32  Thus, it was useful for Australia to 
maintain its trading relations with China. Vivian Gordon Bowden (1884–1942), was 
Australia’s trading commissioner in Shanghai, China between 1935 and 1941. During this 
time, since he was Australia’s highest official in China, he was not only acting as a trade 
commissioner, but also acted as a diplomat trying to improve the relations between the two 
nations.  Further, Bowden also reported the economic and political situations in China, back 
to politicians in Australia so that they knew what was going on in East Asia.  William Henry 
Donald (1875—1946), an Australian newspaperman, was a political advisor to Sun Yat-Sen 
(1866-1925), Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), as well as Zhang Xueliang (1901-2001).  Like 
Morrison and Donald, Rewi Alley (1897-1987), a New Zealander, also met powerful Chinese 
leaders, including Mao Zedong (1893-1976) and Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997).   
Robert Menzies (1894-1978) appointed Sir Frederic Eggleston (1875-1954), to be the first 
Australian Minister to China in 1941, as he realised that Australia’s destiny was increasingly 
intertwined with Asia-Pacific. Eggleston saw his posting in China as a big opportunity for 
him.33 Eggleston and his staff were based in China’s wartime capital of Chongqing, and he 
was a popular diplomat in China during the Second World War.34  Eggleston was one of the 
most influential thinkers in Australia in the 1920s and 1930s.35  His ideas not only shaped 
Sino-Australian relations, but also had profound impacts on Australia’s foreign policies in the 
1930s.  According to James Cotton, one of the particular concerns of Eggleston was likely 
what would be determined the development of the Asia-Pacific region and on the future 
direction of Australia.36 Eggleston realised the global situation was changing radically in the 
                                                          
29 NAA: A981 TRAD 191, “Trade. China-Commercial Policy-Consular Invoices”, Letter from The Secretary, 
Department of External Affairs (Canberra) to Department of Commerce (Melbourne), 12 April, 1933.  
30 James Cotton, “A. C. V. Melbourne in Australian International Thought: Nationalism and Appeasement 
Between the World Wars”, in Australia and the World: A Festschrift for Neville Meaney, 2013, p.145. 
31 NAA: A981 TRAD 191, “Trade. China-Commercial Policy-Consular Invoices”, Letter from Prime Minister’s 
Department to H. E. Governor-General, British Government’s Representative, on 25th and 26th August, 1932.; 
NAA: A981 TRAD 191, “Trade. China-Commercial Policy-Consular Invoices”, External Affairs, CHINA New 
Consular Invoice System, p.2. 
32 NLA, MS 1009/82/26-62, Sir John Latham, “Japan and Australia-SEVEN PART II-The Defence of Australia, 
Imperial Defence in 1935”, pp.2-3. 
33 NLA, MS 423/9/1-62, Sir Frederic Eggleston, Box 5, “Eggleston China Dairies”, p.1. 
34 Kate Bagnall, The Chungking Legation: Australia’s diplomatic mission in wartime China, Melbourne: 
Museum of Chinese Australian History Inc., 2015, p.32. 
35 James Cotton, “Chapter 3 Frederic Eggleston: The Empire and the Pacific”, in The Australian School of 
International Relations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.53. and p.61. 
36 Ibid., p.50. 
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1930s and 1940s, and Australia as a middle power, had to embrace this change as it was the 
best way to protect Australia’s national interests globally.37 
Between 1901 and 1941, both British diplomats and Australian diplomats looked after 
Australian interests in China.  However, what was an Australian diplomat in the first half of 
the twentieth century?  Who can be an Australian diplomat in China at this time?  Both 
people who had official status or those without official status can be an Australian diplomat 
in China.  For example, George E. Morrison, had close contacts with both Australian and 
Chinese government in the early of the twentieth century.  Morrison was closely associated 
with Yuan Shikai (the President of Republic of China between 1912 and 1915) and other 
senior Chinese politicians.38 Although Morrison was not an Australian official, he had 
significant impacts on promoting the understandings between China and Australia.  
Alexander Melbourne, also acted as an Australian diplomat while he was visiting China in 
1932. He was trying to enhance the economic as well as financial ties between Australia and 
China.  Melbourne met senior Chinese politicians while he was in Shanghai, to discuss the 
trading between Australia and China. Once he returned to Australia, he served various roles 
on the advisory committees for the Australian government, in order to promote Australia’s 
economic connections with China and Japan.39  An Australian diplomat can also be a trade 
commissioner.  For example, Edward Little and Vivian Bowden were Australia’s trade 
commissioners in China, at various times.  Little was China in the 1920s and Bowden was in 
the 1930s. While he was in China, Bowden was helping refugees from Russia to come to 
Australia, through China in the late 1930s. John Latham was the most senior Australian 
politician/diplomat that ever visited China in the first half of the twentieth century. Finally, 
since 1941, Australian government appointed senior diplomats (e.g. Eggleston), to look after 
Australia’s interests in China.  Thus, various kind of Australians acted as Australian 
diplomats in China, between 1901 and 1941.  
There was a considerable amount of trade between Australia and China through Hong Kong, 
in the 1920s and 1930s.40 Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats and/or visitors’ 
contributions before 1941 laid the foundation of the exchanges of the ministers between the 
two countries in 1941. Further, though the Australian government did not recognise People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) as the official regime in China in 1949, Australia continued to trade 
with PRC in the 1950s and 1960s.  
                                                          
37 James Cotton and John Ravenhill, “Middle Power Dreaming: Australian Foreign Policy during the Rudd-
Gillard Governments”, in Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010, edited by James 
Cotton and John Ravenhill, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2012, p.2. 
38 SLNSW, “George E. Morrison Visiting Cards”, MLMSS 312/276, p.3b.; SLNSW, “George E. Morrison 
Visiting Cards”, MLMSS 312/276, p.12d.; SLNSW, “George E. Morrison Visiting Cards”, MLMSS 312/276, 
p.22. 
39 NAA: A981 TRAD 191, “Trade. China-Commercial Policy-Consular Invoices”, Letter from Prime Minister’s 
Department to H. E. Governor-General, British Government’s Representative, on 25th and 26th August, 1932.; 
NAA: A981 TRAD 191, “Trade. China-Commercial Policy-Consular Invoices”, External Affairs, CHINA New 
Consular Invoice System, p.2.; W. Y. Tsao, Two Pacific Democracies: China and Australia, Melbourne: Brown 
Prior Anderson Pty Ltd, 1941, p.92. 
40 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 16 August 1902, p.6.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, 
NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 24 October 1931, p.8.; NAA: A981 TRAD 190 PART 2, “Trade-China-Commercial 
Policy from January, 1933, Part II”, Economic Report-CHINA AND HONG KONG,1938-andcoveringthe year 
1938, p.12.;  A. C. V. Melbourne, Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan and China, 1932, p.68.; NAA: 
A1838 493/3, “China-Economic-Trade-General”, Letter from Patrick Shaw, Secretary to The Minister for 
External Affairs, 27th April 1950.   
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Historiography 
William Kirby’s bold statement in 1997 that “nothing mattered more” than China’s foreign 
relations in the Republican era of 1911–49 is entirely justified by the ways in which China’s 
politicians, scholars and revolutionaries of the time viewed the problems faced by the young 
republic.41 I agree with William Kirby that China’s foreign policies in the Republican era of 
1911-1949 are extremely important when it comes to understanding modern China.  
However, Chinese diplomatic historians tend to study China’s relations with Japan, Europe, 
Russia and Britain, and the USA, while they study China’s foreign relations, in the first half 
of the twentieth century.42 This is partly because these powerful nations made greater impacts 
on Chinese society, partly because more primary sources regarding China’s relations with 
these ‘great powers’ are available to them. Compared to Europe, Russia, Japan, the USA and 
Southeast Asia, Chinese scholars have generally paid little attention to the diplomatic 
relations between China and Australia. 
Due to a lack of language ability and archival resource, scholars in both Australia and China 
focus on one-side of the story only, and leave the other side of the story behind. Scholars in 
Australia tended to mainly use English language sources. For example, in the Preface of his 
book: Australia and China—the ambiguous relationship, from the outset, Eric Andrews 
admits: he is not a China specialist and have no Chinese linguistic skills.43 In Andrews’s own 
words, “this book is built on English-language sources”.44 Similarly, other scholars like David 
Walker and William Sima also fit in with this category (though Sima is an expert of China 
and able to read Chinese, he mainly uses English sources in his book).45  
As far as I know, no Chinese historian has written extensively about China’s official relations 
with the Southern Pacific region46 in Chinese, especially on the prior-1949 period.  Partly 
because these islands are too far and too small for Chinese historians, partly because they 
may not have the primary sources available to them in China.47 In addition, scholars in China 
and Australia tend to focus on post-1949 narrative, particularly after 1972, when People’s 
Republic of China officially established the diplomatic relations with Australia and New 
                                                          
41 Isabella Jackson, “Chinese Colonial History in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of Colonialism and 
Colonial History, Volume 15, 2014; please see https://muse.jhu.edu/article/562299, last accessed on18 May 
2016; William C. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the 
Republican Era”, The China Quarterly, No. 150, Special Issue: Reappraising Republic China (June, 1997), 
p.433. 
42 William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984; Zuo 
Shuangwen and Wang Jie (左双文、王杰 ),  Research on Diplomatic history of the Republic of China era: 
looking backward and forward (中华民国外交史研究: 回顾与前瞻), in Xu Xiuli et al (徐秀丽主编), Past 
experiences and several possibilities in the future (过去的经验与未来的可能走向), Shanghai: Shehui Kexue 
chubanshe, 2010, please see: http://jds.cass.cn/Item/21409.aspx, last accessed on 6th May 6, 2016. 
43 Eric M. Andrews, Australia and China: the ambiguous relationship, Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University 
Press, 1985, Preface Xi.  
44 Ibid., 
45 David Walker, Anxious Nation; Australia and the rise of Asia 1850-1939, St. Lucia, Qld.: University of 
Queensland Press, 1999; William Sima, China & ANU, 2015. 
46 I mean islands such as Fiji, Samoa and Tonga.  In China, political scientists have studied of these islands. For 
example, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Fiji in 2014, he met a number of leaders of other islands. See 
also:  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-22/chinese-president-xi-visits-fiji-to-strengthen-economic-
ties/5911144, last accessed on 29/08/2017; however, historians in China have not paid enough attention to these 
islands.  
47  Political scientists in China have studied PRC’s contemporary relations with these islands. 
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Zealand.48 Billy Griffiths’s The China breakthrough provides us a detailed study on Gough 
Whitlam (1916-2014)—then Labour Party Leader’s visit to China in 1971.49 James Reilly and 
Jindong Yuang’s Australia and China at 40, is a classic study on Sino-Australian relations 
post-1972.50 James Kember and Paul Clark’s edition China and New Zealand: a thriving 
relationship thirty years on is a key study on Sino-New Zealand diplomatic relations post-
1972.51  
Scholars in China, however, faced other difficulties. Their access to primary sources in 
Australia can be quite challenging. Although both Yeung Wing On and Zhang Qiusheng have 
tried to engage with historical debates in Australia, I still feel they could engage more with 
scholars in Australia, in their works.52 Chinese scholars focus on Chinese diplomats’ 
experiences in Australia, and largely ignore the Australian diplomats’ experiences in China. 
Australian scholars focus on Australian diplomats in China and ignore the Chinese diplomats’ 
experiences in Australia. Thus, the lack of Chinese language abilities for Australian scholars 
and lack of accessing primary sources and secondary sources for scholars in China (including 
Yeung Wing On in Hong Kong53) make their stories incomplete, as they tended to be either 
Euro-centric or Sino-centric.  
My research however, aims to connect Australian historiography and Chinese historiography 
together, by using little know primary sources in both Chinese and English. This is the first 
detailed research that treats Chinese diplomats in Australia and Australian diplomats in China 
between 1901 and 1941 as the key historical subjects in the writings. Existing historiography 
focuses on the post-1949 Sino-Australian diplomatic relations.54 
Chinese Historiography: 
Chinese historians viewed China’s foreign policies between 1900 and 1949 as a failure. Hong 
Junpei and Shi Yuanhua represent this view. Hong Junpei’s Diplomatic history on Republic 
                                                          
48 Wang Yi, Australia-China Relations post 1949: Sixty Years of Trade and Politics, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2012. 
49 Billy Griffiths, The China breakthrough: Whitlam in the Middle Kingdom, 1971, Clayton, Victoria: Monash 
University Publishing, 2012.  
50 James Reilly and Jindong Yuan, Australia and China at 40, Sydney: University of New South Wales 
(UNSW) Press, 2012. 
51 James Kember and Paul Clark, edit, China and New Zealand: a thriving relationship thirty years on, 
Auckland, N.Z.: New Zealand Asia Institute, University of Auckland, 2003. 
52 Yeung, Wing On (楊永安), 長夜星稀—澳大利亞華人史 1860-1940 (Lonely star on lone nights, A history of 
the Chinese Australians 1860-1940), Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2014; Zhang Qiusheng (张秋生), 
Aodaliya Hu qiao Huaren shi. It does not mean these two scholars never engage with scholars in Australia. For 
example, they both mention C. F. Yong’s The New Gold Mountain in their writings.  Zhang even mentions 
Neville Meaney’s work.  
53 Yeung, Wing On (楊永安), 長夜星稀—澳大利亞華人史 1860-1940 (Lonely star on lone nights, A history of 
the Chinese Australians 1860-1940), 2014. 
54 Stephen FitzGerald, “Impressions of China's New Diplomacy: The Australian Experience”, The China 
Quarterly, 1971; James Reilly and Jingdong Yuan, edit, Australia and China at 40, Sydney: UNSW Press, 
2012; Billy Griffiths, The China breakthrough: Whitlam in the Middle Kingdom, 1971, 2012; Timothy Kendall, 
Ways of Seeing China from Yellow Peril to Shangrila, Fremantle, Western Australia: Curtin University Books, 
2005; Laksiri Jayasuriya A.M., The Australian-Asian connection: retrospect & prospect, Sydney: H. V. Evatt 
Research Centre, 1988; Henry S. Albinski, Australian policies and attitudes toward China, Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965; Zhang, Jian, “Australia and China: The Challenges to Forging a ‘True 
Friendship’”, in Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010, edited by James Cotton and 
John Ravenhill, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp.71-93.  
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government was published in 1930.55  Hong views China’s modern diplomacy as a total 
failure; then he tries to offer reasons that explains Chinese diplomacy was unsuccessful.56  
Hong suggests that Chinese people have paid close attention on China’s foreign relations 
since the founding of the Republican of China (1911), and Chinese ordinary people were 
unhappy with Chinese diplomatic policies.57 In other words, the Chinese public thought 
Chinese diplomats were too gentle towards the Western powers and Japan. Hong’s book is 
important, because it gives people a sense of how Chinese people might view China’s foreign 
policies at that time. In this sense, Hong’s position represents Chinese educated people’s 
viewpoints in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, Chinese elites were frustrated of the weakness of 
China.58  They felt China was isolated as a nation, and had no real friends that they could rely 
on.   
Shi Yuanhua is one of the leading scholars on China’s diplomatic history on the Republic era 
(1911-1949) in mainland, China today. His major book—Diplomatic History on the Republic 
of China era is a general history text, and is a good starting point for anyone who wants to 
know China’s foreign policies during the Republican era.59  Shi believes China’s foreign 
policies had huge impacts on Chinese society, on modern Chinese history.60  Like other 
scholars in mainland China, Shi adopts a Marxist approach when he tries to explain China’s 
diplomacy. He suggests that modern China foreign policies are an interaction between the 
traditional and back-warded China, and the strong and aggressive imperialist powers.61   
One of the impacts that the Western societies had on China was to make Chinese people 
realise their position in the world. China was no longer in the centre of the world affairs.62 
The Sino-centric view was dramatically disappearing, among Chinese elites. Since the late 
Qing period, Chinese elites increasingly frustrated by China’s weakness and its position in 
the world.  However, the Western influence on China also led to the rise of Chinese 
nationalism. Since the late Qing period, one of the agenda that Chinese diplomats wanted 
from other nations was: respect. Chinese leaders like Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), desperately 
wanted China to become an equal state to the West. Throughout the late Qing and Republic 
era, one of the biggest goals for Chinese politicians was to make sure the survival of Chinese 
regime, as an independent nation for Chinese people in the world. Despite China’s weakness, 
I think they achieved this goal.   
Shi Yuanhua views China mostly as a victim of the Western powers and Japan in the first 
half of the twentieth century. I see China not only as a victim, but also as an active player 
internationally; Chinese diplomats advocated China in the world.  In other words, I believe 
                                                          
55 Hong Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: Wenhai 
chubanshe, 1930.   
56 Ibid., p.1., “中国外交之失败…” and p.5. 
57 Ibid., Preface, p.1., “我国外交, 自国民政府成立, 标榜革命外交取消不平等条约以来, 大为国人所注
意…”.  The originally text written by Hong was published in (semi)-classical Chinese.   
58 Ibid., Preface, p.1. 
59 Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994. 
60 Shi, Preface, p.1., “外交, 不再是王朝政治的附属品, 而是决定着, 主宰着中国社会发展的历史进程.” 
61 Ibid., “所谓 ‘近代中国外交’ 指的就是古老的, 落后的中华民族与强大的侵略成性的帝国主义列强
间的交涉往来.” 
62 Hong Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: Wenhai 
chubanshe, 1930, p.9. 
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China had more historical agency than scholars like Shi Yuanhua have suggested.  China was 
still a weak nation in the 1920s; but the status of China was slowly rising. Chinese public 
viewed China as a winner of the WWI, but the Western powers did not treat China equally, as 
a victor of the war.  Chinese diplomats like Wellington Koo (1888-1985) did an excellent job 
in Paris in 1919, to argue the Chinese rights in Shangdong, but the Chinese public in China 
did not understand what was going on, and they heavily criticized the Chinese diplomats, 
partly because Japan gained Qingdao (a strategic naval base in Shangdong Province) from 
Germany. The Chinese public thought Chinese diplomats did not protect Chinese interests in 
France, during the Paris Convention of 1919.  The May 4th movement was a result of the rise 
of the nationalism in China.  Mao Zedong (1893-1976) was radicalised during this process, 
and it eventually led him to convert to Marxism/Communism.  
In Research on the Diplomatic history during Republic era, Zuo Shuangwen and Wang Jie 
provide an overview on the scholarship on Republic of China’s foreign policies.63 Zuo 
Shuangwen and Wang Jie also adopt Marxist approach. On the one hand, they view China as 
a victim of the imperialist powers.  On the other hand, Zuo and Wang suggest that China 
engaged with the “outside world” in the Republic era more deeply than ever before.  Zuo and 
Wang believe Shi’s work Shi Yuanhua’s Diplomatic History on the Republic of China Era is 
a representative book on Republican of China’s era foreign policies.64  Zuo Shuangwen and 
Wang Jie think historians should pay attention to people like Hsu Mo (who was China’s 
Minister in Australia during the Second World War)—the ones who were senior officials, but 
not at the highest level. Zuo and Wang also suggest that scholars in China mainly deal with 
China’s foreign relations with more powerful nations, particularly Russia, the USA, Japan, 
Britain, France and Germany. In other words, they focus on China’s foreign relations with 
these global powers.  
My research however, is focusing on China’s relations with a middle (or a regional) power—
Australia.65  Scholars in mainland China also like to show how weak China was during the 
Republic of China (1911-1949), and by contrast, they could show how strong China’s foreign 
policies are today, under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party.66  In doing so, they 
want the Chinese readers (or Chinese citizens) to believe that the PRC is the regime that truly 
protecting China’s national interest, and the Chinese people therefore should support the 
current Chinese regime. Shi represents this dominate narrative in the mainland, China.  In 
general, scholars in China have paid little attention to Chinese diplomats in Australia and 
                                                          
63 Zuo Shuangwen and Wang Jie (左双文、王杰 ),  Research on Diplomatic history of the Republic of China 
era: looking backward and forward (中华民国外交史研究: 回顾与前瞻), in Xu Xiuli et al (徐秀丽主编), Past 
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New Zealand, particularly in the late Qing and Republican period.  In my thesis, I would like 
to fill these gaps. I wish to show how China tried its best to fit in with this world order, even 
though China may not like the world system at that time.   
Unlike scholars based in mainland China, scholars in Taiwan tend to use more English 
sources and other non-Chinese language sources, while they study Chinese diplomatic 
histories. Zhao Guocai, a scholar based in Taiwan, is an expert on Hsu Mo. His article The  
First Chinese Judge Hsu Mo (1893-1956) of the International Court of Justice: His Life and 
Contribution, is a detailed and biographical study of Hsu. However, in his writing, Zhao only 
briefly mentioned Hsu’s time in Australia.  Tang Qihua, another scholar bases in Taiwan, is a 
leading authority on the foreign policies on the Republic era. His book, Treaty Revision 
Campaign of the Beijing Government, 1912-1928: Out of the Shadow of the “Abrogation of 
Unequal Treaties” challenges the traditional view on Chinese foreign policies, and suggests 
that China had outstanding diplomats in the Republic era.67 Disagreeing with Shi Yuanhua, 
Tang argues that the failure of Chinese diplomacy was because China was a weak nation in 
the 1910s and 1920s, we should not blame on the Chinese diplomats.  In fact, Tang suggests 
China had extremely talented diplomats like Wellington Koo (1888-1985), and these 
diplomats tried their best to protect China’s interests.68  My research is an expanding of 
Tang’s viewpoint. Tang and I have one in common: both of us use more English primary 
sources than Chinese scholars based in mainland, China.69 Of course, we use Chinese primary 
sources as well. What is different from my research and Tang is, Tang tends to use English 
primary sources in Britain and other European nations, and I use primary sources in 
Australia.70    
Chinese scholars have studied the history of Chinese communities in Australia. Liu Weiping 
was one of these scholars. Although Liu Weiping taught at University of Sydney, his writing 
on Chinese histories in Australia is in Chinese.71  Before Liu entered the academic world, Liu 
was a Chinese diplomat.  In 1945, he was China’s vice consul-general in Sydney and then he 
was promoted to be the Chinese consul in Perth.72 Thus, he not only witnessed the Sino-
Australian relations in 1940s, but also played a diplomatic role himself.  His experience made 
his writing unique in its own way. Though Yong published the New Gold Mountain in 1977, 
Liu only published his book in 1989; Chinese in Australia thought Liu as a pioneer on 
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Chinese histories in Australia.73  This is because his writing is in Chinese, and therefore more 
easily to appeal the Chinese public in general.   
Unlike Yong and Liu, other Chinese historians based in China.  Zhang Qiusheng’s A History 
of the Chinese Emigrants to Australia is a study, which covers the early relations between 
China and Australia, although Zhang also deals with the early Chinese immigrants in 
Australia.74  Zhang further argues the diplomatic relations between China and Australia 
improved slowly between the WWI and WWII, largely due to two factors. First, Australian 
governments were following the British governments closely, and Australian governments 
did not have independent foreign policies.75 Second, Australian governments failed to realize 
the importance of China.76 Since the WWI, Japan expanded its influence in East Asia. 
Meanwhile, Britain’s influence in the Pacific region was diminishing. As a result, Australia 
did not dare to challenge the aggressive Japan.   
From his writing, we can see Zhang was extremely disappointed in Australian government’s 
action towards Japan. Zhang thinks that the Australian government should do more to help 
people in China before 1941. However, here is an interesting question: did Australia have the 
military ability to intervene?  In fact, Australia was in no position to militarily support China. 
It lacked both the necessary power and influence to do so. One thing is important here, since 
1937, the difference between Australian workers and Australian government’s official 
policies became evident. This is worth exploring more.   
Australian Historiography:  
Geographically, Australia is far away from Britain and much closer to the Asia.  Australia is 
the only nation in the world that controls almost an entire continent; however, with relatively 
little population, particularly compared to its Asian neighbours.77 As David Walker and 
Agnieszka Sobocinska have reminded us that, since the late nineteenth century, people in the 
colonies carried the idea that ‘Asia’ would have a “determining influence on Australia’s 
future”.78 Further, Neville Meaney reminds us that majority of people in the Australian 
colonies “in this nationalist era” thought themselves primarily as British people.79 Meaney 
argues that the significant geo-political divide between Australia and Britain (the heart of the 
British Empire) created a tension “between the community of culture and the community of 
interest”.80 Indeed, in the first half of the twentieth century, Australia has special difficulties 
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in searching its own place in the established discourse regarding nation and nationalism.81 For 
these reasons, Anglo-Saxon Australians might feel insecure diplomatically since 1901. I 
further suggest this insecurity was the result of their cultural heritage and Australia’s 
geographical position in the world.  New Zealand, although it did not join the Australian 
federation in 1901, shared similar views with their Australian cousins. “Yellow Peril” 
ideologies influence Europeans in both Australia and New Zealand.  
This anxiety led to the anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese attitudes in Australian and New 
Zealand, including the formal adoption of the White Australia policy in Australia and poll tax 
against Chinese in New Zealand.  Further, after Japan defeated China in the first Sino-
Japanese in 1894-1895, and Japan defeated Russian in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, 
Japan became the dominant power in East Asia. For Australian scholars like Neville Meaney, 
the foreign relations between Japan and Australia were important to Australia between 1901 
and 1941.82  This is because Japan was Australia’s major trade partner in Asia in the 1920s 
and 1930s.  In 1935, for example, Japan was Australia’s second largest trading partner, only 
behind Britain.  My research, however, suggests Australia wanted to trade with both China 
and Japan in the 1920s and 1930s.  
In the Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939, David Walker explains 
Australia’s perceptions of Asia and Australia’s nervous attitudes towards its Asian 
neighbours, such as China and Japan.83 Walker argues that Australia came to nationhood at a 
time when the growing power of the East (especially Japan) was provoking increasing 
concern.84  Japan was the most powerful nation in East Asia, between 1900 and 1939. Thus, 
Australia paid greater attention to Japan than China.  
Thanks to the works of Kate Bagnall, we now know that the (Australian) wives of Chinese 
men also travelled to China (especially southern China) to visit their husbands and children in 
the 1920s and 1930s.85 In other words, not only Chinese travelled to Australia to seek job 
opportunities, but Anglo-Saxon Australians also went to China.  Thus, the White Australia 
policy did not stop Australia’s connection with the China.  
Some historians believe that the adaptation of the White Australia policy was a result of the 
development of the British nationalism in Australia in the 1890s, spurred by do with the 
arrival of the Chinese goldminers in the nineteenth century. For example, Eric Andrews 
suggests the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was the natural outcome of growth of 
racialism and racial theorise, of the nineteenth-century Australian-Chinese relations, and of 
British imperials commitments, especially her alliance with Japan, over its interests in Far 
East.86  Similarly, Neville Meaney points out that, the adoptation of the White Australia 
policy was not only a racial problem, but also a form of fear of other peoples.87  By the time 
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of federation in 1901, Australia had a population of only 3 million compared to China’s 415 
million.88 Thus, Meaney argues for people in 1901, it was important to exclude other coloured 
people, especially the Chinese, in order to keep the British heritage in Australia.89 In other 
words, both Andrews and Meaney think the adaptation of the White Australia policy was 
inevitable, regardless of the arrival of the Chinese in Australia in nineteenth century or not. 
Further, they believe the White Australia policy of 1901 had little connection with the 
temporary anti-Chinese policies that adopted by various states earlier on (in the late 
nineteenth century). Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds believe the White Australia policy 
was part of a global anti-Chinese movement, although Australia might take this policy a step 
further than other Western nations.90  
However, some scholars in Australia refute this interpretation. For example, Keith 
Windschuttle suggests Australia is not, and never has been, the racist country Australian 
academic historians have condemned.91 He further blames the leftist universities-based 
historians to mislead the Australian public. Instead, he promotes the following argument: the 
White Australia policy of 1901 had connections to the earlier anti-Chinese restrictions in the 
gold-fields in the 1860s and 1880s. It was because of the Chinese were culturally not capable 
of accepting the British values, such as liberty and equality. In other words, there was a 
cultural tension between the Chinese and Europeans in Australia. The Chinese, according to 
Windschuttle, were the lower class, and could not appreciate the English/Australian values. If 
they allowed more Chinese to arrive in Australia, they would even lower the wages and living 
standards of the Australian people. Thus, according to Windschuttle, it was for cultural and 
economic reasons, that led to the adoptation of the White Australia Policy in 1901.92 The 
White Australia policy had nothing to do with race.  
Others soon pushed Windschuttle’s approach back. In Big White Lie, John Fitzgerald argues 
against Windschuttle, by suggesting that the White Australia policy was about race and 
nationalism, rather than cultural and economic factors.93 Fitzgerald reminds his readers 
Chinese in Australia were not slaves; and China was not a slave society in the nineteenth 
century, either.94 Therefore, Chinese were not lower class of people, and they appreciated 
those progressive British values, such as liberty and democracy. Similar to Fitzgerald, 
Gwenda Tavan argues racial determinism also shaped the complex emotional identifications 
of people in Australia in the beginning of the twentieth century.95 Thus, both Fitzgerald and 
Tavan strongly disagree with Windschuttle’s position. Because they believe that the White 
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Australia policy was indeed a racist policy, targeted on coloured people, particularly the 
Chinese. 
In this thesis, I suggest that the White Australia policy, trade and “recognition” (recognition 
means which regime Australian government regarded as an official and legitimate 
government in China) were the three dominant themes in the Sino-Australian relations, 
between 1901 and 1921. Chinese official representatives used trade as a tool to argue that 
Australian governments should relax its White Australia policy, and recognise the regimes 
they represented. On the one hand, Chinese in Australia suffered during this era, and although 
Chinese diplomats tried their best to improve the living conditions of Chinese, they usually 
achieved little. On the other hand, Chinese diplomats were able to persuade the Australian 
governments to recognise the regimes they represented. China eventually became an equal 
nation to the West in the 1940s, just like Charles Pearson had predicted in National Life and 
Character, in the late nineteenth century.96 The Sino-Australian relations was part of the 
Sino-Western relations, China wanted to ‘fit in’ with the Western ruling world; when 
Australian politicians and diplomats wanted to establish Australia’s independent voices in the 
world stage, in order to protect its own interests.  
Sophie Couchman and Kate Bagnall point out that the field of Chinese Australian history is 
comparatively young. It emerged in the 1960s and 1970s out of a desire by historians to 
understand Australia’s White Australia policy.97 
Ching-Fatt Yong’s The New Gold Mountain is a classic study on Chinese in Australia.98 
Adopting social history approach, Yong explains the difficulties that Chinese had to face in 
Australian society, in the period between 1901 and 1921. Yong suggests that, as Chinese 
people faced strong discrimination in Australia, the determination to play in China’s destiny 
was perhaps an indirect outcome of the White Australia policy.99 Because Chinese in 
Australia believed that only a strong and independent China would come to their rescue in 
time of need.100  The White Australia policy affected not only Sino-Australian relations, but 
also Australia’s relations with Asian nations generally, in the first half of the twentieth 
century.101 The White Australia policy had impacts not only within Australia, but also outside 
the nation. Yong reminds us that Chinese were  different from their white contemporaries, the 
language they spoke, their clothes, their habits, their customs and traditions, as well as their 
living styles, were foreign to and different from the people of their host nation.102  Yong 
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shows how Chinese people struggled to fit in in Australia. Yong’s book was published in 
1977, although some of his ideas are out-dated103, his writing is important to my research.  In 
my thesis, however, I would like to focus more on the diplomatic and economic aspects of the 
stories, while I try to provide a more updated research, with new primary sources in Chinese 
and English.   
In Making Chinese Australia, Kuo Mei-fen argues the period from the late 1890s to the early 
1900s was a critical time in the shaping of Chinese communities and identities in unique 
ways “in a variety of local, national and transnational contexts”.104 The rise of an educated 
Chinese class in Sydney was unique.  Using little known Chinese primary sources, Kuo 
argues that the narratives and interpretations of educated journalists and editors of Chinese-
Australian newspapers played crucial role in shaping the social identities and historical 
awareness of Chinese communities in Australia.105 However, the Chinese in Australia were 
carrying different political views. One group was still loyal to the Qing regime, though they 
believed the regime should reform fundamentally. They therefore supported Kang Youwei 
and Liang Qichao (whom visited Australia in 1900-1901).106 These Chinese believed China 
should keep its Emperor, and adopt a parliamentary system, and China therefore could adopt 
either the British or the Japanese model. The other group argued Chinese people should 
overthrow the Qing regime, and created a republic. Local Chinese newspapers, as a result, 
mainly reflected these two major political views: reform the Qing regime or support a 
revolution, to replace completely the Manchu-led Qing dynasty. These people were 
supporters of Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). Further, how does the rise of the nationalism in 
China as well as Australia may contribute the Sino-Australian relations in the period between 
1901 and 1941? 
Sophie Loy-Wilson, has written intensively on Australia’s connection with China, during the 
1930s. Her work, Australians in Shanghai provides an important update to Australians’ 
experiences during and after the Great Depression.107 Loy-Wilson details the commercial 
relations between China and Australia, and explains the social and cultural interactions 
between Australia and China, by tracing through the experiences of Chinese-Australians (e.g. 
Daisy Kwok).108           
In this project, I wish to connect the Chinese historiography to Australian historiography.  
Based on reading James Cotton’s writings, we can see Australian political elites increasingly 
realized the fact that Australia needed independent foreign policies in the 1920s. Cotton 
argues a unique ‘Australian school’ of international relations thinking emerged during the 
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1920s.109 John Latham and Frederick Eggleston represented this Australian school, as they 
were both ‘Empire-nationalists’.110  Further, Australia wanted other nations to hear its 
independent voice on the international stage. This was actually similar to Chinese’s foreign 
policies, except China wanted to be a global power.  Given the fact there were only seven or 
eight million people living in Australia, global powers like US, Russia, China and Britain 
would regard Australia as an advanced middle power. Because it was still an age of power 
determines world order. Then a question occurs, how might the White Australia policy 
impact Australia’s foreign policies towards China in the period between 1901 and 1941? 
Kate Bagnall, Stuart William Greif, Sophie Loy-Wilson, Mei-fen Kuo, James Ng, ing Ip and 
Ching Fatt Yong, all study Chinese histories from social, cultural and/or economic 
perspective in Australia and New Zealand.111 These are all key scholars in the field, and their 
researches have influenced my thesis. Ng and Ip have also written extensively on Chinese 
miners in the Otago region in the nineteenth century.   
British and American historians influence Australian historians, partly because Australia was 
part of the British Empire, and is still part of this English-speaking world. Australian 
historians tend to have deeper understanding of European histories as well, compare to their 
knowledge of Chinese histories. Chinese historians, however, tend to focus on China’s 
connection with more powerful nations, like Britain, other Europeans, the United States, and 
Russia. Further, as the modern Chinese history is closely intertwined with Japan (whether it 
impacted China positively or negatively is another question), Chinese historians have paid a 
lot attention to the Sino-Japanese relations.  Further, Chinese historians have also paid greater 
attention to Southeast Asia (than Australia and New Zealand) because millions of ethnic 
Chinese living there.  
Thesis Approach:  
This study adopts a transnational approach, while focusing on the diplomatic stories.  Chinese 
diplomats like Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) were transnational figures.  These diplomats had 
educations in China and abroad, and were familiar with international situations in the first 
half of the twentieth century. When these Chinese diplomats returned to home from their 
services in Australia, they brought back the latest Western ideas, and therefore they 
contributed to China becoming a modern nation.  
By using previously untouched primary sources in Chinese and English, I wish to reconstruct 
the diplomatic relations between China and Australia/New Zealand/Southern Pacific islands. 
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Chinese scholars suggest China was a victim of the Western powers and Japan.  However, I 
suggest China was not only a victim, but also an active player on the international stage, in 
the first half of the twentieth century. Though China viewed Australia as semi-independent 
nation between 1909 and 1941, Australia had formed diplomatic relations with China.  In the 
1930s, China took Australia seriously for the first time.  Chinese diplomats intended to 
enhance the commercial relations between China and Australia, while other Chinese 
diplomats/visitors returned to China with republicanism and democratic ideologies from 
Australia. When we have known a lot of Western powers’ negative impacts on China, 
between 1901 and 1941; I want to show the positive aspects of Western powers’ impacts on 
China.112   
Primary Sources and Methodology 
By using the following Chinese and English primary sources, I will offer a more updated and 
complete study on the diplomatic relations between China and Australia between 1901 and 
1941.113  In this thesis, I have used primary sources from National Archives of Australia 
(Canberra) and National Library of Australia (Canberra). I also examine the Melbourne 
papers which are currently located at University of Queensland Library. They hold rare and 
valuable primary sources of Dr Alexander Melbourne (1888–1943), who visited China in 
1932. I also use primary sources from State Archives and Records Authority of New South 
Wales and State Library of New South Wales, as well as Australian newspapers. In addition, 
I use Chinese language newspapers such as the Tung Wah Times in combination with archival 
sources from the Kuomintang (KMT) collections in Melbourne, and Chinese Consulate files 
from Academic Sinica in Taipei.  
The Tung Wah Times was a Chinese newspaper, which was published in Sydney between 
1902 and 1936.114 It provides researchers a unique window to study Australia at this time.  
The newspaper had two major parts.  First, it reported or translated local Australian news 
from English newspapers.  Second, it republished newspaper materials from China, and 
supported Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao’s political movement.115 
Based on Tung Wah Times newspapers sources, I would like to make five observations. First, 
I suggest Chinese diplomats tended to use Chinese newspapers like Tung Wah Times as a tool 
to communicate with the local Chinese in Australia.116 Similarly, local Chinese community 
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leaders like William Liu (1893-1983)117, were also using Tung Wah Times as a as tool to 
communicate with various Chinese diplomats.118 Further, Chinese diplomats like Liang 
Lanxun (梁澜勋) and Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) were also using Tung Wah Times to 
communicate with Chinese communities in Australia.119 Second, a shipping company 
operated between Hong Kong and Sydney between 1925 and (at least) 1932.120 The first 
shipping company established in 1925, only one year after the collapse of William Liu’s 
shipping company.121 Another Sydney based company: the Sydney Eastern Australian 
shipping company, opened in Jan 1929. Pang Zijun is the representative of this shipping 
company.122 Wei Zijing (魏子京)—the Chinese consul-general in Australia between 1917 and 
1927, strongly supported this company.123 This is an extraordinary achievement, given the 
fact that the Chinese consulate was under strong financial pressure at this time.124 Thus, the 
shipping routes between Hong Kong and Sydney provided the foundation for the trading 
between China and Australia.125 Third, it was even a financial connection between China and 
Australia.126 Chinese companies chosen to register their companies in Hong Kong; when they 
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were short of money, they would like to sell their shares to local Chinese in Australia, in 
order to expand their business in China.127  The money was transferred through banks in Hong 
Kong, Shanghai and Sydney.128 Fourth, Chinese viewed neither Chinese nor Europeans in 
Australia as Australians in the 1910s and 1920s.129 The Chinese saw themselves as Chinese 
citizens who were living in Australia; they saw Europeans as ‘Westerners’ who lived in 
Australia.130 Fifth, the Tung Wah Times also paid attention to Chinese’ living conditions in 
New Zealand and other southern Pacific Islands as well as China’s relations with these 
areas.131 For example, Chinese consul-general Wei Zijing (魏子京), was in charge of Sino-
Australian diplomatic relations as well as Chinese affairs in Fiji and Sino-Fiji relations.132 
Further research should be done on China’s diplomatic relations with Pacific Islands like Fiji 
at this time. Further, like Australia, New Zealand also exported its flour to China in the 
1930s.133 However, it is also important to address the limitations of the Tung Wah Times as 
primary sources. One of the major weaknesses of this newspaper was that it had a particular 
political view. The publication of this newspaper were anti-communism and pro-
capitalism.134 Overall, the newspaper reports from Tung Wah Times can enhance our 
understandings not only on Sino-Australian diplomatic relations, but also on the Chinese 
views of Australia at this time.   
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Figure 1 [Nanjing Ship operated between China and Australia] 
Source: Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 24 October 1931, p.8. 
Figure 1 is a good example of the Tung Wah Times. The newspaper report shows that the 
Chinese company adopted a new ship; the name of the ship was “Nanjing”. It weighed more 
than 7, 000 tones. There were 50 of large rooms, and 60 medium (or normal) rooms. It moved 
fast, and provided good service. The shipped arrived in Sydney from Hong Kong this 
month.135 A ship weighed more than 7000 tones was a large ship. This provided a basic 
transportation between China and Australia, as Hong Kong was closely associated with 
Canton economically.136  
In addition, I went to visit the Koumintang (KMT) archival sources in Melbourne in 2016. 
These are housed in a building that used to be the Chinese Consulate in Melbourne. I have 
gained a great deal of knowledge from these official sources. Although mainly Koumintang 
officials collected these sources; and the sources therefore represented a particular party or 
political view; they are still of the most reliable primary sources existing today. The 
Koumontang archival sources suggest that Chinese diplomats in Australia like Huang 
Ronglaing (黄荣良), were in charge of Sino-Australian diplomatic relations as well as 
Chinese affairs in New Zealand and Sino-New Zealand relations.137 Here is an example.  
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Figure 2 [Official Letter from Huang Rongliang, Chinese consul-general in Australia, 
regarding the appointment of Chinese consul Zhou in New Zealand]   
Source: ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522 0057 016-07-G, 1911, p.30. 
Based on this source (Figure 2), we now know that Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) was actively 
involving the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations as well as Sino-New Zealand diplomatic 
relations. It was not surprising, given the fact Huang was previously China’s first consul in 
New Zealand, between February 1909 and May 1911.  
This archive has been under-used.138 John Randolph reminds us that it is important for 
historians to understand how the archives created and who created them, as they might 
represent a certain political or culture values.139 Similarly, the online sources from Academia 
Sinica, Institute of Modern History (Taiwan) are also extremely valuable to my research; 
though they were also closely associated with Kuomintang Party (or Chinese Nationalist 
                                                          
138 I am the only one of few people who are fortunate enough to get access to these invaluable primary sources.  
The other person is Mei-fen Kuo, please see: Mei-fen Kuo, Making Chinese Australia: urban elites, newspapers 
and the formation of Chinese-Australian identity, 1892-1912, Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Publishing, 
2013.  In need special permission Koumintang (KMT) archival sources in Melbourne in 2016. Though they 
have  rare and valuable primary sources, the KMT archival sources only have had basic cataloguing, and at least 
half of these primary sources wrote in Chinese.  Due to these two factors, few researchers have used these 
primary sources.  For a more detailed history of the KMT archival sources in Melbourne, please see Mei-fen 
Kuo and Tsebin Tchen, Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, Volume 4, (南方華裔研究雑志第四卷), 2010, 
pp.140-149. 
139 John Randolph, “On the Biography of Bakunin Family Archive”, in Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the 
Writing of History, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005, p.214. 
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Party).140 These government official sources could reveal a great deal of the diplomatic world 
that operated.   
I also use a number of English primary sources, including the relating Chinese Consulate files 
located at the National Archives of Australia and National Library of Australia; the personal 
collections of A.C.V. Melbourne, which locate at Fryer library at University of Queensland; 
as well as a number of political pamphlets and published materials on the topic of Sino-
Australian trade, including the writing of Pao Chun-Jien (保君健), China’s consul-general in 
Australia between 1936 and 1941.141  The primary sources of NSW State Archives and 
Records reveal that there were a number of Australian businessmen wanted to export their 
products to China in the 1920s and 1930s.142 Church records like Diocese of Sydney suggest 
that senior Australian Christian leaders were also keen to improve the relations between 
China and Australia.143 After critically reading these little known primary sources in Chinese 
and English, this thesis reveals how Chinese diplomats took advantage of a new Australian 
interest in the China trade to question the fundamental tenents of the White Australia policy, 
between 1909 and 1941.  After 1941, Australia and China exchanged the official diplomatic 
representatives. In the Second World War (WWII), Australia and China were allies, as they 
fought together against the common enemy—Japan. Throughout the twentieth century, 
Australia had never been more important to China than it was during the WWII.144 
Limitation of the thesis 
There are two major weaknesses of this thesis. One of the limitations of this thesis was there 
was a lack of female diplomats in the first half of the twentieth century. The majority of 
Chinese diplomats in Australia between 1909 and 1941 were men. Similarly, the majority of 
Australian officials visited or worked in China were also men. The lack of female diplomats 
in this period was a problem that historian may confront. However, it does not mean women 
disappear in the stories.  Chinese diplomats brought their wife and children when they served 
in Australia. The wives of Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) and Song Faxiang (宋发祥), both had 
close relations with Chinese communities when their husbands served as consul-generals in 
Australia. Newspapers provided an opportunity/space for these educated Chinese women to 
communicate with the local communities.145 Further research needs to be done on the partners 
of Chinese diplomats in Australia. Another weakness of this thesis is that my key historical 
subjects are elites. Although it is not my intention to study elites of China and Australia, the 
majority of Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats that I deal with in this thesis were 
extremely well educated and had close associations with the governments they represented. 
Chinese diplomats like Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) and Hsu Mo (徐谟) had American 
                                                          
140 AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 02-13-006-03-024, p.1.  
141 A. C. V. Melbourne, Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan and China, Brisbane: Government Print, 
1932; Chun-Jien Pao, A Century of Sino-Australian Relations, Sydney: John Sands, 1938.; http://press-
files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p332713/html/ch01.xhtml?referer=&page=10, last accessed on 2rd June 
2017.;  Malcolm I. Thomis, 'Melbourne, Alexander Clifford Vernon (1888–1943)', Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, please see: 
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/melbourne-alexander-clifford-vernon-7552, last accessed on 6th June, 2017.   
142 NSW State Archives and Records (thereafter: NSW SAR), Series 14511, Item 19/4110 
143 Please see: Sydney: Church of England in Australia, Diocese of Sydney, 1st December, 1934, p.5.; Daily 
Examiner (Grafton, NSW: 1915 - 1954), 1 July 1933, p.5 
144 W. Y. Tsao, Two Pacific Democracies: China and Australia, Melbourne: Brown Prior Anderson Pty Ltd, 
1941, p.73., p.77. and p.91. 
145 Madeleine Herren, “Gender and International Relations Through the Lens of the League of Nations (1919-
1945)”, in Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500, edited by Glenda Sluga and Carolyn 
James, London and New York: Routledge, 2016, p.185. 
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educations. While George Morrison, Alexander Melbourne, John Latham and Frederick 
Eggleston were also Australian elites. Thus, the lack of female diplomats at this time and my 
thesis’s elite based nature are two major limitations of this research.   
Structure and Argument of the thesis:  
This research is divided into three major chapters.  In the Chapter One, I wish to address the 
early official contacts between China and Australia, between 1840 and 1901. The year 1840 
is a key turning point in Chinese history. Because China lost to Britain during the First 
Opium War (1839-1842), and as a result Britain gained Hong Kong as a colony from China. 
Australia became a federation in 1901, the six colonies decided to form a commonwealth.  In 
the Chapter Two, I will then discuss Sino-Australian relations between 1901 and 1921. I will 
study Chinese diplomats like Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋), Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) and Zeng 
Zhongjian (曾宗鉴).  In Chapter Three, I will discuss the Sino-Australian relations between 
1921 and 1941. This chapter is the core part of my thesis.  I argue the Great Depression and 
the WWII forced Australian politicians to realise Australia’s geographical closeness to Asia 
for the first time. I will also briefly discuss Sino-Australian relations in the WWII in Chapter 
Three, as I think it reached its warmest point during the wartime.  Finally, I will conclude my 
research by suggesting Australia was/is an Asia-Pacific nation, since 1930s. Despite the fact 
that the majority of Australians strongly supported the White Australia policy between 1901 
and 1941, Australia, as a polity, never separated itself from Asia. 
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Chapter One: Early Contacts of the Two Peoples (1840—1901) 
Introduction 
Historians tend to focus on the social and cultural aspects of Chinese histories in Australia, as 
they study the nineteenth and twentieth century Australian histories. When they write about 
the diplomatic relations between China and Australia, they usually focus on the post-1949 
period.1 This thesis, however, is on China’s diplomatic relations with Australia between 1901 
and 1941. I will demonstrate how economic power and political power were entwined in 
Sino-Australian relations. This chapter is about the early contact between the two peoples 
between 1840 and 1901.  It is trying to set the scene for the official Sino-Australian relations 
in later chapters, which are the core of this thesis.  In this chapter, I argue that in order to 
acknowledge the significance of the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1901 and 
1941, as well as the challenges both Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats face in the 
twentieth century, it is necessary to understand the early Sino-Australian contacts and British 
colonialism in China in the nineteenth century.   
Mai Tianshu and Wang Xianming suggest that, the British policy-makers used war as tools to 
open the Chinese market (or maintain/protect their commercial interests in China).2 However, 
the racial tensions (between Chinese and Europeans) in Australia created challenges for both 
the British politicians and Chinese scholar-officials.  In the nineteenth century, although 
Sino-Australian diplomatic relations were part of the Sino-British relations, ‘the Chinese 
problem’ in Australia could also affect the Sino-British relations.  The discrimination that 
Chinese confronted in Australia led them to ask the Qing government to appoint an official 
representative, to protect their rights.  The early official contacts between the two peoples 
therefore eventually led China to appoint its first consul-general in Australia in 1909. 
This chapter is divided into three major parts.  The first part is about British colonialism in 
China in the nineteenth century.  It highlights the trade and wars between the British Empire 
and the Qing Empire.  Indeed, China was one of the biggest economies, if not the biggest in 
the world in the 1840s.  British strategists wanted to trade with China.  However, the 
misunderstandings and miscalculations between China and West eventually caused British 
soldiers (including several thousand soldiers from Australian colonies) and Chinese soldiers 
to fight against each other during the Chinese Boxer Rebellion (1900-1901) in Northern 
China.3  The British government sent Australian soldiers to China to fight against the Chinese 
boxer rebellions.4 In this sense, China and Australia were enemies in 1901. The Opium War 
and the Boxer Rebellion were two examples, showing that the British Empire was willing to 
                                                          
1 Billy Griffiths, The China Breakthrough: Whitlam in the Middle Kingdom, 1971, Clayton, Victoria: Monash 
University Press, 2012.; Henry S. Albinski, Australian policies and attitudes toward China, New York: 
Princeton University Press, 1965; Nicholas Jose, “‘The Web That Has No Weaver’: Observations on Australia-
China Cultural Exchange since 1979”, edited by Don Grant and Graham Seal, in Australia in the World: 
perceptions and possibilities, Perth: Black Swan Press, 1994; Nicholas Thomas, edited by, Re-orienting 
Australia-China relations: 1972 to the present, Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004.  
2 Mai, Tianshu (麦天枢), and Wang Xianming (王先明), Zuotian: Zhong Ying Yapian zhanzheng jishi (昨天: 
中英鸦片战争纪实), Beijing : Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 1996, p.38.; Qi, Sihe (齊思和), Lin Shuhui (林樹
惠), Shou Jiyu (壽紀瑜), edit, The Opium War (鴉片戰爭), Shanghai: Xin zhishi chubanshe, 1955, p.19.; Jean 
Chesneaux, Marianne Bastid, and Marie-Claire Bergere, China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution, 
translated from the French by Anne Destenay, New York: Random house, p.9 
3 Jiang Yongjing (蔣永敬), 抗戰史論 (The Anti-Japanese War and a historical commentary), Taipei: Dongda 
tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1995, p.5. 
4 Robert Macklin, Dragon & kangaroo: Australia and China's shared history from the goldfields to the present 
day, Sydney, NSW: Hachette Australia, 2017, p.110. 
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use military pressure to protect its commercial interests in China.  The second part of the 
chapter is about race and nation.  In this part, I suggest in order to develop Australia’s 
economy, Anglo-Saxon people needed Chinese immigrants as cheap labour to work in 
Australia. After the discovery of gold in Victoria, thousands of Chinese moved to Australia, 
to seek opportunities.5  However, Chinese people did not fit in with Europeans’ nation-
building narrative.  Therefore, the Europeans (mainly the British) wanted to exclude Chinese 
people in Australian colonies.6  Chinese people were needed, but not wanted in the Australian 
colonies.  The third part of the chapter is on diplomacy and the early official contacts 
between China and British Empire regarding the establishment of a Chinese consulate in 
Australia.  Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), a powerful provincial leader in China, sent Wang 
Ronghe and Yu Xie, to investigate the Chinese living conditions in Australia in the 1887.7  
This was the first time that Chinese officials ever visited Australia.  In Melbourne, Wang 
Ronghe and Yu Xie met Duncan Gillies (1834-1903)—then Premier of Victoria, and 
requested the Victorian government to abolish its tax on the Chinese people. Although Gillies 
refused to remove the poll tax against the Chinese people, their meeting suggests China and 
Victoria had direct official meeting as early as 1887.8 
In this chapter, I use two publications as key primary sources to evaluate perceptions and 
understandings between people in China and people in Australian colonies in the nineteenth 
century. Wei Yuan (1794-1857), compiled the Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms 
(海國圖志) in 1843.9  In Chinese modern history, Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime 
Kingdoms is the first detailed and systematic collection and introduction to the history and 
geography of the world.  It even included a small section on Australasia.  Although scholars 
have paid great attention to the well-known text in general, they paid little attention to Wei 
Yuan’s collections and/or commentary about Australasia.  Similarly, Charles H. Pearson’s 
National Character of Life: A Forecast, is the first book that commented on the Sino-
Australian relations from a Melbourne perspective (rather than a London viewpoint), and is 
one of the few books that predicted the rise of China in the nineteenth century.10 The National 
Character of Life had huge impacts on Australian politicians in the turn of the twentieth 
century. However, when scholars study the Sino-Australian relations, they also paid little 
attention to this important text.  
These two important texts and other primary sources like Chinese newspapers in Australia, 
reveal that both people in Australia and China had limited knowledge about each other in the 
nineteenth century.11  This limited knowledge of the other culture caused European people’s 
racist behaviour towards Chinese in Australian colonies and Chinese people’s anti-British 
attitudes in China (e.g. the Boxer Rebellion).  Indeed, Chinese in Australian colonies were 
also victims of the European impressions of Asian people, as their imaginations associated 
with the “Yellow Peril” ideologies.   
                                                          
5 Some of them came from California.   
6 Robert Macklin, Dragon & kangaroo, 2017, p.45. and p.81. 
7 Zhang, Zhidong (張之洞), The completed works of Zhang Zhidong (張之洞全集), edit by Zhao Dexin, Wu 
Jianjie, and Feng Tianyu, Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 2008, Volume 1, p.373.; The South Australian Advertiser, 
31 May 1887, p.5., “The Chinese Commissioners in Melbourne”. 
8 The South Australian Advertiser, 31 May 1887, p.5., “The Chinese Commissioners in Melbourne”. 
9 Wei Yuan, Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms (海國圖志), originally published in 1843, Taipei: 
Chengwen chubanshe, 1967; Liu, Weiping (刘渭平), History and Historiography of Chinese people in 
Australasia (大洋洲华人史事叢稿), Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 2000, p.4. 
10 Charles H. Pearson, National Character of Life: A Forecast, London: Macmillan, 1894. 
11 Yong, The New Gold Mountain, p.11. 
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1. British Colonialism in China: Trade, Wars and Resistance 
The British colonialism in China affected the Sino-Australian relations in the nineteenth 
century. The First Opium War (1839-1842) was a significant event in modern Chinese 
history. The war forced China to join the European-dominated system, and opened China to 
greater interaction with an expanding British Empire.12 China’s modern diplomatic relations 
with the British Empire began in the First Opium War. Chinese scholar-officials (士大夫), 
viewed that the world order (ruled by Britain and other Western powers) was politically 
unfair to China.  Despite this feeling, they also knew China had to join this system, in order 
to protect its own interests. More importantly, for Chinese scholar-bureaucrats like Lin Zexu 
(1785-1850), Zeng Guofan (1811-1872) and Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), their major task was 
‘how to transform the old and backward China into a modern and open state?’ China had to 
learn from the West, in order to achieve this goal.13  Wang Gungwu further points out that the 
British wanted to trade with China, but not take land from China (except Hong Kong and 
several concessions in China).14 There was a strong sense of Sino-centric world-views in 
China, particularly among the educated elites, before the First Opium War (1839-1842). 
Traditionally, relations with other countries (or polities) were a logical outgrowth of China’s 
political and philosophical system.15 In other words, China did not have equal relations with 
other states for centuries, as China considered itself superior to all of its Asian neighbours.  
However, China was facing huge challenges while the British ‘rediscovered’ China in the 
nineteenth century.16  China then gradually formed official relations with these Western 
powers and other states.17  
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, Hong Kong played a significant role affecting the 
trade and diplomacy between China and the British Empire (including Australian colonies). 
The British introduced the Chinese to modern warfare and the Chinese ruling class realised 
the need for China to have its own navy, to defend the coastal parts of the nation.18  Chinese 
elites felt that the British navy humiliated China.19  As a result, China had to cede Hong Kong 
                                                          
12 James L. Hevia, English lessons: the pedagogy of imperialism in nineteenth-century China, Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2003, p.4. 
13 Yen-P’ing Hao and Erh-Min Wang, “Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840-95”, in The 
Cambridge History of China, edit by Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, Volume 10, Late Ch’ing, 1800-
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14 Wang, Gungwu, Anglo-Chinese Encounters since 1800: War, Trade, Science and Governance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.18-19. 
15 Jean Chesneaux, Marianne Bastid, and Marie-Claire Bergere, China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 
Revolution, translated from the French by Anne Destenay, New York: Random house, 1975, p.9. 
16 Mai, Tianshu (麦天枢), Wang Xianming (王先明), Zuotian: Zhong Ying Yapian zhanzheng jishi (昨天:英鸦
片战争纪实), Beijing : Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 1996, p.38. 
17 Liu, Ruifen (劉瑞芬), Yangyun shangzhuang wen shi chao (養雲山莊文詩鈔), Taipei County: Wenhai 
chubanshe, 1971, p.31. 
18 Wang, Gungwu, Anglo-Chinese Encounters since 1800: War, Trade, Science and Governance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.18-19.; James L. Hevia, English lessons : the pedagogy of imperialism in 
nineteenth-century China, Durham, NC : Duke University Press, 2003, p.11. 
19 Wei, Yuan, Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms (海國圖志), originally published in 1843, Taipei: 
Chengwen chubanshe, 1967.; Qi, Sihe (齊思和), Lin Shuhui (林樹惠), Shou Jiyu (壽紀瑜), edit, The Opium 
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to Britain.  As I will show in Chapter 3, Hong Kong played a significant role on Sino-
Australian trade in the 1920s and 1930s.  
The First Opium War also ‘reopened’ China to the outside world, and offered opportunities to 
millions of Chinese to move abroad.  According to Jonathan Spence, the Treaty of Nanking 
in 1842 fundamentally changed the structure of Qing relations with foreign powers, and 
ended the long cycle of history in which China’s rulers had imposed effective controls over 
all foreigners residing on their territory.20 Article 1 of the Treaty of Nanking stipulated peace 
and friendship between Britain and China, and it gave full security and protection for their 
subjects and property within the dominions of the other.21 Thus, although China lost the war, 
at the social level it offered Chinese people the opportunities to travel to places such as 
Australia and New Zealand (both British colonies).  
Chinese policy-makers generally had limited knowledge of Australian colonies in the 
nineteenth century. One of the consequences of the First Opium War was that it forced 
Chinese elites to gain more knowledge of the international situations.  Partly based on Lin 
Zexu’s initial research, Wei Yuan’s edition Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms     
(海國圖志) is one of the first major works that a Chinese scholar has produced on the West 
(and other parts of the world).  The book was a response to the First Opium War, and 
represented Chinese scholar-officials’ understandings of the world at this time.  In the book, 
Wei included commentaries on Australian colonies.22 He stated that Australian colonies had  
lakes, massive forests and rich mining resources.23  He further suggested that the indigenous 
people still practiced cannibalism.  More importantly, Chinese had trading relations with 
Australasia, even before the European arrival.24  Since the Dutch arrived in Australian 
colonies, they wanted to promote trade between Australian colonies and Asia (as well as 
other parts of the world).  However, due to its geographical remoteness, the colonies’ 
economy developed slowly.25  Further, Wang Tao (1828—1897), a newspaper publisher, 
translator, political columnist, and fiction writer, was arguably the first Chinese person that 
wrote about the Aboriginal people in Australian colonies.26  In his writings, he commented 
that the natives were backward and stupid people.27  According to Wang, the Aboriginal 
people had dark skins and wore little clothes.28  Overall, Chinese scholar-officials’ limited 
knowledge of Australian colonies left  Chinese people into difficult positions, as the Chinese 
officials had neither the ability nor resources to protect them in the nineteenth century.29   
                                                          
20 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999, p.141. 
21 Ibid., p.160. 
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Anglo-Saxon people from Australian colonies travelled to China as British subjects in the 
nineteenth century. One of the most interesting people was Alexander Marks who, since his 
youth had had a long-time relationship with East Asia. In 1859, at the age of 20, he had went 
to China where he joined Major-General Charles Gordon (1833-1885)’s forces to help the 
Qing regime to suppress the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), in the Southern China.30 Thus, 
Europeans from Australian colonies were involved in the internal Chinese political and 
military conflicts.  Marks was a British colonist in Australian colonies, but he also helped the 
Manchu regime to fight against its rebels.  Marks returned Victoria in 1875, and he continued 
to be interested in Australia’s trade with Asia.  In 1879, he became Japan’s first (Honorary) 
consul in Australia.31  His story suggests that people travelled frequently between Australian 
colonies and China in the nineteenth century.  
If Marks’s involvement in Taiping Rebellion (the Chinese civil war) was an individual action, 
then the Australian soldiers’ involvement in the Chinese Boxers around 1900-1901 was 
certainly an action at the national level.  The Chinese Boxer Movement showed the resistance 
of ordinary Chinese people to the growing influence that foreigners had in China, and the 
event reinforced the negative perceptions of China to Anglo-Saxon in Australian colonies. 
Robert Hart (1835-1911), a British diplomat, who also worked for the Chinese government, 
believed Chinese boxers were patriotic, irrational, and not well trained.32  In addition, the 
Boxer movement was extremely anti-Christianity.  Among the foreigners “of all those who 
ventured to China” in the nineteenth century, as Paul Cohen questions, “was it the missionary 
who inspired the greatest fear and hatred”?33 The majority of the boxers were ordinary 
Chinese peasants, and they encouraged the use of violence to fight against the Westerners.  
The movement gained support from those whom felt that the foreigners mistreated them in 
China.  The Qing ruling-class, under Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908), made a huge 
mistake, while they decided to support the Boxer movement and declared war on the eight 
imperialist powers, including Britain, France, Russia and Japan.34 There is a large literature 
on the Chinese boxer rebellion in both Chinese and English.35 Wang Gungwu comments: 
“when the Boxer rebellion of 1900 provoked the foreign powers to send an international force 
to lift the siege of the legations in Peking, there followed a number of clear demonstrations of 
the Qing army’s inability to fight at all”.36  China eventually lost the war.  As a result, Britain 
                                                          
30 Meaney, Towards a new vision: Australia and Japan across time, Sydney: UNSW Press, 2007, p.94. 
31 Meaney, Towards a new vision: Australia and Japan through 100 years, 1999, p.57. 
32 Diana Preston, The boxer rebellion: the dramatic story of China’s war on foreigners that shook the world in 
the summer of 1900, New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2000, p.335. 
33 Paul A. Cohen, “Christian missions and their impact to 1900”, edit by John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge 
History of China, Volume 10, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 
p.543. 
34 Hong, Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: Wenhai 
chubanshe, 1930, p.3. 
35 Joseph W. Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, p.78.; 
Paul A Cohen, History in three keys: the Boxers as event, experience, and myth, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997, p.15.; Lanxin Xiang, The origins of the Boxer War : a multinational study, London; 
New York : RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 
36 Wang Gungwu, Anglo-Chinese Encounters since 1800, p.22. 
36 
 
gained even more privileges in China, as it had bigger impacts on Chinese politics.37  Indeed, 
China paid a huge price.38 
The Boxer Movement also received a huge amount of international interests and 
engagement.39  Newspaper reporters in Australian colonies closely followed the Chinese 
Boxer movement, partly because of the colonies’ involvement in the war.40  George Morrison 
(1862-1920), witnessed the Boxer movement in China, and Chinese boxers even injured 
him.41  Commenting the Boxer movement, Morrison wrote in Shandong province: “A new 
chapter of far Eastern history had opened”.42  In Chapter Two, I will discuss in detail 
Morrison’s influence on affecting the Sino-Australian in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century.  People in Australian colonies depended on Morrison to understand what was going 
on in China.43  Morrison was a key figure of Sino-Australian relations as well as the Sino-
Western relations.44 He was also a perfect example showing that foreigners could strongly 
influence the course of Chinese history.45 Chinese people viewed Morrison as British, not as 
an Australia.46  Another reporter in Australian colonies suggested in 1900, that China should 
restore the Guangxu Emperor, and push Empress Cixi out of power.47 
2. Chinese in Australia: Race, Trade and Nation 
The Chinese problem in Australian colonies also shaped the relations between the Qing and 
the British Empire.  Since the beginning of the European colonization in 1788, immigration 
has “dominated narratives of Australian national identity and belonging”.48 At the social 
level, since 1840, millions of Chinese people moved out of China, in order to seek better job 
opportunities or flee from the Chinese civil wars.49 Yet the pressures on the land in China 
continued to be unrelenting.50  Jonathan Spence estimates: the population of China had 
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probably reached 430, 000, 000 by 1850, and even though it must have declined sharply in 
1860s [because of the Chinese civil wars], it began to increase once more in the 1870s.51  
Ching-Fatt Yong reminds us that during the gold rushes, Chinese people came under a credit-
ticket system.52  While Chinese legally moved to Australian colonies in the nineteenth 
century, they faced strong discrimination.53  In 1857, during the hearings of the Victorian 
Legislative Council on Chinese immigration, one-third of the Chinese immigrants who came 
to Victoria were paying their own passages.54 In other words, Chinese arrived in Australian 
colonies freely and legally in the 1850s.  In Big White Lie, John Fitzgerald provides some 
useful numbers; he shows the population of the Chinese in the colonies: around 100 000 
people entered Australian colonies from China between the 1840s and Federation in 1901.  
Benjamin Mountford believes that between 1800 and 1875, about 70, 000 Chinese made the 
journey to Australasia.55  At the time of federation 30 000 Chinese immigrants and their 
descendants were entitled by right of travelling to and from China, albeit with discriminatory 
certification.56  Fitzgerald further suggests, almost half of the Chinese population stayed in 
Australian colonies after the ending of the gold rushes.57  Thus, there was always a Chinese 
population in Australian colonies since the 1840s.58 In the nineteenth century, Chinese people 
were mainly living in Victoria and New South Wales.59  A minority of Chinese people started 
their local furniture business in NSW.60  Since the British people were the majority, and 
Chinese people were the minority, the Anglo-Saxon men might generally feel a stronger 
sense of belonging in Australian colonies than their Chinese contemporaries.  Their lack of 
English language skills made it difficult for Chinese people to express themselves. Their 
labour intensive work, terrible living conditions, gambling and opium-smoking style of 
livings further separated them from the rest of the people in the Australia in the nineteenth 
century.61 
Yong further points out, the nineteenth century goldfields laid the foundations of the White 
Australia policy as the influx of Chinese diggers on the goldfields caused alarm, fear, 
mistrust, and mis-understandings in the Anglo-Saxon mining community.62 The Chinese 
practice of sending gold to China, which expressed their intention of ultimately returning 
home, created dissatisfaction and jealousy among the European diggers.63 Eric Andrews 
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argues the source of opposition to the Chinese was a mixture of racialism, economic fear, and 
ignorance.64 For people in Australia in the nineteenth century, their knowledge of China was 
quite negative and limited.  
 
Figure 3 [A Notice from Royal Family] 
Source: English and Chinese Advertiser (Vic. 1856-1858), 7 August 1858, p.2. 
As we can see from this English and Chinese Advertiser report in 1858 (Figure 3), the Chinese 
viewed European Australians as British, and they viewed themselves as Han Chinese (Tang 
Ren).65  The title of this notice is called “huangjia gaoshi”.  If we translate it into English, it 
means “a notice from royal family”.66  In the 1850s, Chinese in Australian colonies came 
from Guangdong province; they usually supported the Taiping rebellions.67  They therefore 
viewed themselves as Chinese subjects, because they wanted to keep their distance from the 
Manchu-regime.  Kuo Mei-fen has reminded us, English and Chinese Advertiser, 
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“established on the Victorian goldfields in the 1850s”, was the first bilingual Chinese-English 
language newspaper in Australia.68 Although the newspaper only survived a short period, its 
existence suggests that Chinese in Australian colonies used newspaper to communicate with 
each other from an early time.  These newspaper sources also reveal two things.  First, the 
Chinese newspapers had a literate audience in Australia.  This indicates that an educated 
Chinese community existed or at least emerged in the middle of nineteenth century.69  It is 
unusual, as we could not see similar patterns in Canada nor New Zealand colonies at this 
time.  Second, Chinese people in Australian colonies started to form business ideas from a 
relatively early time.  Chinese people used newspapers like English and Chinese Advertiser to 
advertise to each other about the business opportunities available.70  The Chinese business 
communities had roots in both China and Australian colonies.  They used their connections as 
a business advantage.  As I will show in Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this thesis, these 
early Chinese settlers and their descendants would shape the Sino-Australian commercial and 
diplomatic relations in the decades to come.  
The fear of a Chinese migratory invasion from China was another factor that contributed to 
the discrimination Chinese people faced in Australian colonies in the nineteenth century.71 
The Chinese problem in Australian colonies created tensions between the Qing regime and 
the British Empire. Neville Meaney reminds us that: from the 1880s to the First World War, 
the fear of an Asian invasion, whether migratory from China or military from Japan, was a 
major theme in Australian literature as it was in Australian politics.72 Historians generally 
agree that the year 1888 was not only an important year for Chinese histories in Australian 
colonies, but also a significant year for racial relations within the Australian territory.73  
Henry Parkes, a long time Premier of New South Wales, along with other politicians of the 
state, passed the Chinese Restriction Bill in 1888, though the Chinese population was 
declining in Australia in 1880s.74  For example, the Chinese population in New South Wales 
dropped from 1.4 per cent in 1881 to 1.2 per cent in 1891.75  Other states except Tasmania 
soon followed this move. Thus, the Chinese Restriction Act became a national policy.76  
Moreover, this is part of a global anti-Chinese movement in Western societies, as the USA 
and New Zealand also had similar Chinese restriction policies against the Chinese at that 
time. Thus, though Chinese people were a minority in these societies, it showed they could 
influence the majorities of the population, and this was a transnational phenomenon.   
However, people realised the potential of Chinese people in the late nineteenth century.  
Charles H. Pearson wrote one of the most influential books on China, in Australia.  In 
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National Character of Life, Pearson suggests that if China could have an excellent leader, to 
lead the nation, China had the potential to be a great power.  Further, for Pearson, the history 
of Singapore, “immediately to the north of Australia”, demonstrated what the Chinese race is 
capable of.77  He was therefore worried about the potential expansion of Chinese, given its 
vast population.  In other words, white “men were not destined to rule the world forever”.78  
Pearson also mentions Chinese in Australia, he states: 
The expansion of China towards the south and south-west seems most probable, because there 
is here most natural wealth to develop, and because the circumstances are specially 
favourable: administrations guided by commercial principles, and populations too weak to 
resist immigration.  Nothing but the vigilant opposition of the Australian democracies has 
kept the Chinese from becoming a power on that more remote continent; and at one time 
within the last forty years the Chinamen actually in Victoria numbered thing like 13 per cent 
of the adult male population.79  
Clearly, as an Englishman who was living in Australian colonies, Pearson feared the 
increasing Chinese number in the Victoria. Importantly, Pearson saw the world from 
Melbourne, not from London.80  He further predicted “China’s emergence as a global in the 
context of world history” in the late nineteenth century.81 Indeed, Australia certainly has a 
strong historical connection with Europe, especially Britain. However, geographically, 
Australia is much closer to China than Britain. This anxiety and frustration explains the 
tension between Australia’s history and geography, and National Character of Life is a 
classic text of expressing insecurity of Australian colonies.82 Pearson believed that Australian 
colonies needed a united central government. As a historian, Pearson questioned “the racial 
determinism that dominated historical thinking” in the West in the nineteenth century.83  
Unfortunately, this book further increased the fear of Chinese people in Australia.  
The National Character of Life was a huge succuss globally. The book was not only popular 
among the ruling-class in Australia, but also was among American politicians, including 
Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919), the President of the United States between 1901 and 
1909.84   
Pearson was not alone. William Lane (1861-1917), a radical journalist and labour activist, 
whom was based in Queensland, commented in 1888, that “all-out race war just a generation 
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away”.85  Lane further imagined Australian colonies fighting to determine whether it would 
have a ‘white’ or a ‘yellow’ future.86 
However, not everybody in the Australian colonies was opposing Asian immigrations in the 
nineteenth century.  David Walker provides us an excellent example: as early as 1829, 
Edward Wakefield (1796-1862), a well-known exponent of systematic colonization, 
predicted that Asia’s vast populations would present Australia with undreamt trading 
opportunities. In Wakefield’s eyes, Asian markets and Asian immigrants would be the future 
of Australian colonies.87 Thus, we can see that a minority of Europeans welcomed Chinese 
immigrants in the nineteenth century. 
Ironically, his Chinese contemporaries shared Pearson’s fear of the other race.88  Chinese, 
especially the educated scholar-officials were carrying the similar kind of fear towards to the 
more powerful Western states.89  Chinese gentry-class or the scholar-officials, include Li 
Hongzhang (1823-1901), believed that China had to speed up their development, in order to 
maintain an independent polity.90 If Pearson had ever travelled to China, and talked to the 
Chinese gentry-scholars, he would have been be surprised by their worldviews.  
Australia was federated in 1901. The formation of Australian federation was partly because 
the Anglo-Saxon people in Australia felt that they needed to protect their own interests, as 
their interests were not always as same as the people in Britain.  From 1901, according to 
David Walker, Australia became infamous for its White Australia policy around the world.91  
The White Australia policy was not only a racial policy, but also an economic and political 
one.92  Walker further suggests that the powerful masculinizing in Australian nationalism 
would have been a good deal less intense, had it not been for the geo-political threat attached 
to awakening Asia from the 1880s.  Indeed, since the late nineteenth century, there was a 
growing belief that developments in Asia would have an increasing impact upon Australian 
colonies.93  
George Pearce, an Australian Senator from 1901 to 1937, and a government minister for 
years, explained the tension between Australia’s history and geography in 1922: 
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The [British] Far East is our far-North. We are of European race. Our fathers came from 
Europe: we have grown up to think as Europeans, and our interests have been centred in that 
group of nations from which our stock has come. Whilst racially we are European, 
geographically we are Asiatic.94  
If the Australian government was aware of the importance of Asia to Australia, then why 
should they have formally adopted the White Australia policy? John Fitzgerald suggests the 
Chinese people were not fitting well with Australia’s nation-building. Fitzgerald believes an 
ideal of racial purity converged with a triumphalist rhetoric of a self-conscious nation 
building to yield a particular vision of a brand new country able to demonstrate its 
independence by shutting its gates to all but whites, at the turn of the twentieth century.95 
However, we do not know enough of the impact of the policy outside Australia.  What does it 
mean to the Sino-Australian relations?  I suggest the White Australia policy was one of the 
key issues affecting the Sino-Australian relations between 1901 and the Second World War.   
3. Diplomacy: The Early Official Contacts 
Chinese residents felt they faced strong discrimination in the Australian colonies in the 
nineteenth century, and they turned the Chinese government to seek for protection.96  Several 
groups of Chinese officials visited the colonies in the nineteenth century. There were several 
key motivations. First, Chinese government intended to investigate the treatment of Chinese 
here.  Chinese government wanted to protect the rights of Chinese people in Australasia.  
Both Chinese and British government wanted to improve the treatment of Chinese in 
Australian colonies.  Second, they also wanted to improve the Sino-Australian relations.  One 
possibility was to promote the trade between China and Australian colonies.  The third 
motivation was, towards to the end of the nineteenth century, the problem of the ‘survival of 
the regime’ was extremely severe, and the establishment of Chinese consulate in Australia 
and New Zealand might help the Qing government to keep an eye on the Chinese in this part 
of the world.  
Guo Songtao (1818-1891), was China’s first Minister (acting as Ambassador) to be served in 
the West.  Representing the Qing regime, he was China’s Minister to Britain and France 
between 1875 and 1977.  Yen Ching-Hwang reminds us that the sending of the first Chinese 
envoy in Britain in 1876 indicated China’s acceptance of a system of international relations 
based on Western rules and practice, as well as her successful entry into the ‘family of 
nations’.97 Guo was one of the first senior Chinese officials to argue that there was a need of 
appointing a Chinese diplomatic representative in Australia, in order to protect the Chinese 
interests as well as protecting Chinese population in Australia.98  In 1878, Guo sent an official 
letter to Edward Stanley (1826-1893), the British secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Guo 
wrote:  
I have also learned from the newspapers that within the last few months the Chinese residing 
in Australia have had frequent disputes, but I have refrained from troubling your Lordship 
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about this matter, because I am not familiar with all the circumstances.  It would seem, 
however, that a Resident consul is also required there, in order that it may be discovered what 
is advantageous prevented.  This appointment would promise to be a favourable measure.  As 
the accredited Minister of China, I can-not but draw your Lordship’s attention to these matters 
which, in my judgment, ought to be attended to.99   
However, the British refused the proposal.  Because if Britain accepted this offer, it would 
treat China as an equal state to the West.  
The first Chinese officials visited Australia in the 1880s.100 The two Chinese—Wang Ronghe 
and Yu Xie, along with an interpreter, were sent by Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909)—one of the 
most influential officials in the late Qing period, to investigate the Chinese living conditions 
in Australia, to promote the trade between the two, and a potential of creating a diplomatic 
relation between China and Australia.101  Zhang, a senior Chinese provincial leader, cared 
about the living conditions of Chinese people overseas.102  Wang and Yu were the official 
representatives of “his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China”.103  Based on one of Zhang’s 
memorials to Guangxu Emperor (1871-1908) in 1887, we know that Wang was a capable 
person, and he was originally from Fujian province, and had lived overseas for years.104  Yu 
used to be a Chinese consul in Japan.105  Further, Zhang Zhidong combined the Chinese 
problem in Australian colonies to Chinese problems in (modern) Southeast Asia together.106 
While they were in Australia, Wang and Yu met Mei Quong Tart (1850-1903)—a prominent 
local Chinese community leader, to gain deeper understandings of situations in Australian 
colonies.107  If the Manchu regime appointed an official representative in Australian colonies 
in the nineteenth century, Mei would be an ideal candidate.  On June 1887, Wang Ronghe 
(Wong Yung Ho) gave a speech in English when he visited the City Mission Hall in 
Adelaide.  He stated that the purpose of their tour in Australia was “to enquire into the status 
of our countrymen in the western settlements and in these colonies”.108 Yu Xie (U Tsing), 
then gave a speech in Chinese.  Some European Christians attended this meeting.  Francis 
William Cox (1817–1904), was a prominent congregational minister and author.109  He 
commented that the visit of Wang and Yu was unique, as it was the first time that any 
Chinese official came to Australia, and he believed that Australia government should abolish 
the poll tax, because Chinese were law abiding and “steady colonists’.110  It was ironic, that 
while Chinese might carry anti-Christian feelings towards the British and French missionaries 
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in China (as I have shown in the earlier part of this chapter), Christians such as Cox offered 
the Chinese people help to deal with their discrimination in Australia.  Further, Marilyn Lake 
reminds us that business people in Australian colonies also welcomed the visit of Wang and 
Yu.  For example, the Argues (a conservative empire-minded newspaper based in 
Melbourne), as “a believer in free trade and the free movement of peoples”, welcome the 
Chinese commissioners to Melbourne and offered support to their mission to achieve equality 
of treatment for Chinese people in Australia.111  Kuo Mei-fen has suggested, Wang and Yu 
reported that there were 26 major Chinese businessmen and over 4, 000 Chinese dealers and 
labourers in metropolitan Sydney at this time.112  Although Wang and Yu could not persuade 
the Victorian government to abolish the poll tax against the Chinese people, the visit of Wang 
and Yu to Australia was not a failure. First, they could report the anti-Chinese feelings in 
Australian colonies at that time back to China.113  Second, their visit laid foundation for future 
negotiations between Chinese and British/Australian government regarding the establishment 
of Chinese consulate in Australia.  
Unfortunately, Chinese provincial official like Zhang Zhidong could do little to improve their 
living situations.114  Partly because China was so weak, so that it had to focus on improving 
its relations with global powers or the places that millions of Chinese lived in (e.g. Southeast 
Asia); partly because the anti-Chinese feelings in Australian colonies was so evident.  Zhang 
was planning to establish a consulate in Melbourne, to look after the Chinese population in 
Australia.  However, there were several practical problems here. First, money was an issue.  
Chinese government was facing financial difficulties, they had no extra money to spend, and 
Chinese in Australia had no money to donate, unlike the ones in the Southeast Asia. Second, 
China were at a shortage of talented diplomats, they had to appoint their diplomats to more 
powerful states like Britain, France, Russia and the USA, or places such as Southeast Asia.115 
Third, the status of Australia was an issue. The Chinese government had to negotiate the 
establishment of Chinese consulate in Australia with the British government.  Although the 
British government were keen to protect its interests in China, they were not extremely 
interested in the creation of Chinese consulate in Melbourne at that time. Thus, China did not 
appoint a consul-general to Australia in the nineteenth century.  Neither China nor Australia 
was ready for a formal relation between the two in the nineteenth century.    
Liang Qichao (1873-1929) was a well-known Chinese visitor to Australia at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  Liang and his mentor Kang Youwei were closely involved with the Wuxu 
Reform or Hundred Days' Reform in 1898.116 The young Guangxu Emperor (1871-1908) 
supported the movement, and they wanted to reform Chinese political and educational 
systems radically.  However, the Chinese conservative politicians, led by Empress Dowager 
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Cixi (1835-1908) strongly opposed the reform, and it ended as a failure.  Liang had to flee 
from China.  Liang, a political activist, learned a lot from his travel abroad, including 
Australia.   
Editors of the Tung Wah Times, supported Kang Youwei’s political movement, and therefore 
closely followed Liang’s visit in Australia.117 However, he left behind little of his personal 
impressions of Australia.118 Liang had a mixed view of Australia during his stay here. 
According to his own account, the way European men treated women in Australian colonies 
extremely impressed him. He was surprised to learn women have rights to vote in Australia 
and New Zealand.119  Although Liang admired the Western parliamentary system and the 
gender equality between men and women, he was not impressed about the low status the 
Chinese people suffered in the Western societies. Liang also documented how the Anglo-
Saxon people discriminated Chinese in the USA and Canada.120  In 1905, Liang openly 
criticized the White Australia policy. How did the Chinese in Australia view Liang’s tour in 
Australia?  The local Chinese here generally welcomed Liang.121 The Chinese population did 
not ask him to request the Chinese government to send diplomat in Australia, as they knew 
Liang’s political position at this time.  He was able to travel to Australia freely on the eve of 
the formal adaptation of the White Australia policy in 1901; which may suggest there were 
always exceptions to the policy.   
As political activists such as Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) started to offer 
overseas Chinese alternatives of the Chinese polity, the Qing regime realised that they had to 
put more effect to win over the Chinese population outside of China. In 1901, Luo 
Zhongyao122, the acting Chinese consul-general in Singapore, visited Australia on behalf of 
the Qing government. As Kuo Mei-fei has noted, the purpose of Luo’s tour in Australia was 
to investigate the impact of Liang Qichao and the growing network of anti-Manchu reformers 
and revolutionaries in Australia.123 Like Liang, Luo was able to travel to Australia freely and 
legally. However, during his visit to Australia, Luo did little to fight against the White 
Australia policy.   
Conclusion 
As early as the middle of the nineteenth century, British policy-makers realised that they 
needed to trade with China, in order to maintain the British Empire’s global hegemony.  In 
this Chapter, I have argued that in order to acknowledge the significance of the Sino-
Australian diplomatic relations between 1901 and 1941 as well as the challenges both 
Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats face in the twentieth century, it is necessary to 
understand the early Sino-Australian contacts and British colonialism in China in the 
nineteenth century. 
                                                          
117 Yeung Wing On (楊永安), 長夜星稀—澳大利亞華人史 1860-1940 (Lonely star on lone nights, A history of 
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118 Ibid.; Davies, p.1.  
119 Liang, Qichao (梁启超), Xindalu youji (新大陆游记), edit by He Shouzhen, Changsha shi: Hunan renmin 
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Since Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842, it played a major role in China’s trade 
and diplomacy with the British Empire.  I will reinforce this argument in the Chapter Three, 
where I am going to show that there were a considerable amount of Australian goods going 
through Hong Kong to mainland China in the 1920s and 1930s. Further, the Taiping rebellion 
generated millions of Chinese people to move out of China, in order to seek better job 
opportunities or living styles.  Chinese scholar-officials realised China needed to learn from 
the West, to become a modern state.  The Chinese ruling-class therefore sent Chinese 
officials to Europe and the USA, to learn the reasons of their success, or investigate the living 
conditions of Chinese abroad.  Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese 
question in Australian colonies led both Chinese and British authority to realise that China 
should appoint an official representative to look after its people and protect China’s national 
interests in Australia. 
Are Chinese histories in Australia part of Australian or Chinese histories?  Australian 
historians do not include them while they write Australian histories, partly because Chinese-
Australians were not perceived as Australians until recently.124  Similarly, according to John 
Fairbank, the late eminent historian of China, Chinese historians tended to leave ‘foreigners’ 
out, while they wrote Chinese histories, because it was not seen as the proper Chinese 
histories, though even these foreigners may have held important positions within Chinese 
systems.125  Thus, Australian historians treated Chinese as foreigners, and Chinese historians  
treated foreigners (including British and Australians) as non-historical subjects, as they did 
not fit well with the so-called ‘grand narrative’, to borrow a term from scholar Dipesh 
Chakrabarty.126  John Fitzgerald has suggested that, Australians paid little regard to Chinese 
experiences of living under White Australia, or about the part, they played in Australian 
history, before the 1990s.127  However, just because Chinese were a minority in Australia, it 
does not mean they did not shape Australian history.128 The obvious example here is the 
White Australia policy.  It was a policy to keep Chinese people (and other coloured people) 
from entering the nation.  Thus, it is extremely important to study the Chinese in Australia, 
and Australians in China.  Both of these two groups of people are minorities in their host 
nations, though sometimes studying the minorities can tell us more of the majorities.129  This 
thesis is mainly dealing on the Sino-Australian relations.  Why is this topic still so under-
studied?  Diplomats are always minorities in their residing nations, and serving the interests 
of another nation.  In this sense, they are the minorities.  It is important to include the 
histories of Chinese to Australian histories; it is also necessary to view the stories of 
foreigners like Morrison as part of Chinese histories.  
                                                          
124 John Fitzgerald, Big White Lie, Preface, x. “Even today few Australians would concede that it was possible 
to be Chinese and Australian before the advent of multicultural Australia.”; see also, Tony Ballantyne, “Writing 
out Asia: Race, Colonialism and Chinese Migration in New Zealand History”, in East by South, China in the 
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126 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Minority histories, subaltern pasts”, Postcolonial Studies, 1998, p.1. 
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I believe that Chinese histories in Australia are both Chinese and Australian histories. There 
were several well-known Chinese in Australia in the nineteenth century, including William 
Liu, William Ah Ket, and the Sydney tea merchant Quong Tart.130  As John Fitzgerald points 
out, Mei Quong Tart (1850-1903) is the only Chinese-Australian personality to date (2007), 
whom has merited a full-length biography in English.131 Further research needed to be done 
on the influential Chinese individuals in Australia.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
130 Fitzgerald, Big White Lie, p.13. 
131 Ibid.,  
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Chapter Two: Australia’s Diplomatic Relations with China (1901-1921) 
Introduction 
This chapter is about China’s foreign relations with Australia, between 1901 and 1921. The 
White Australia policy, trade and political relations were the three dominant factors affecting 
the Sino-Australian relations.  Indeed, economic power intertwined and connected political 
power within this period.  Chinese diplomats within these periods, they had two important 
tasks: to improve the living conditions of Chinese people in Australia and to promote the 
trading between China and Australia.1  These two tasks were also closely linked.  
This chapter is divided into three major parts.  First, I will discuss the White Australia policy.  
As I have discussed in Chapter One, I suggest it is a direct result of the rise of the British 
nationalism in the late nineteenth century.  It was also the founding policy of the nation. The 
White Australia policy shaped the Sino-Australian relations strongly between 1901 and 1941. 
Second, I will focus on trade between China and Australia, and explain: how Chinese 
diplomats used to trade as a tool to argue that Australian governments should relax this 
discriminatory policy towards the Chinese. Indeed, these diplomats tried to protect the 
interests of Chinese people. Primary sources in both Chinese and English suggest that 
businessmen in both China and Australia would have liked to enhance trading between China 
and Australia in the 1910s and 1920s.2 Third, since China was an unstable nation politically, 
the Chinese central government had limited authority, over provincial leaders or warlords. 
Sometimes there were even two national governments co-existing in China: one in the North, 
and another in the South.  At times there were more than two regimes existing in China 
concurrently. Thus, it was important to the Chinese regime to seek ‘recognition’ as the 
legitimate government from foreign powers, including Australia. 
In this chapter, I argue that in order to understand Sino-Australian diplomatic relations 
between 1901 and 1921, we cannot separate political power from economic power.  Chinese 
diplomats tended to use arguments about the benefit of a two-way trade to pressure Australia 
to relax the White Australia policy and recognise the regime represented by the Chinese 
diplomats.  For example, China, transformed from a dynasty to a modern state in 1912. China 
became the first republic nation in Asia. However, Yuan Shikai (1859-1916)— the 
Republic’s first President believed that China desperately needed the recognition from the 
West, in particular Britain. Further, the White Australia policy had influenced not only the 
Chinese within Australia, but also influenced Australia’s relations with Asia nations, 
particularly China and Japan.3 Since Japan’s victory over Russia during the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1905, Australia was fearful not only of an influx of Asian migrants, especially from 
China, but also of a military invasion from Japan.4 Although Australia sent volunteer soldiers 
in Europe during World War One (WWI), to protect the interest of the British Empire and 
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show support, its political leaders still paid close attention to Japan in the Pacific. Thus, 
Australia also had independent foreign policies.  
1. White Australia policy 
On 1st January 1901, six British colonies formed the Australian federation, when the British 
Parliament passed legislation allowing these six states to govern in their own right as part of 
the Commonwealth of Australia.5 Although the Australians invited New Zealand to join this 
new federation, New Zealand refused and remained as its own polity. However, despite 
Australia becoming a commonwealth, the British government still had profound influence on 
both Australian and New Zealand’s foreign policies. 
Australian politicians, such as Alfred Deakin (1856-1919), carried negative images of the 
Chinese people, and suggested it was important to maintain a white Australia.6 Alfred 
Deakin, Attorney-General of the first Federal government and Australia’s second Prime 
Minister once commented: “No motive power operated more universally on this 
continent…than the desire that we should be one people, and remain one people, without the 
admixture of other races”.7  
In 1901, the Australian federation passed the Immigration Restriction Bill which extended the 
dictation test to include all people of non-European origins, and this act became known as the 
White Australia policy.8 This was one of the first major policies, adopted by the new 
federation.  It soon became arguably its most influential and controversial policy.  
In Anxious Nation, David Walker argues that powerful masculinising and racializing impulse 
in Australian nationalism would have been a good deal less intense, had it not been for the 
geo-political threat attributed to awakening China and Japan from the 1880s.9 Australia’s 
British cultural heritage and its geographical closeness to Asia made Anglo-Saxon people 
especially nervous about its Asian neighbours. However, if one completely accepts this 
argument, then how could we explain the fact that the US had similar anti-Chinese policies in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century?10  The US did not have this tension between 
its history and geography that Australia did. Thus, Walker’s argument only partially 
explained the adoption of the White Australia policy in 1901.  The White Australia policy 
was not only a response from domestic Australia, but also a result of the transnational anti-
Chinese attitudes happening in English-speaking states.11  
This cartoon (show below) suggests Anglo-Saxon people did not welcome the arrival of 
Chinese in Australia, partly because European descendants were worrying about the huge 
                                                          
5 http://www.australia.gov.au/about-government/how-government-works/federation, last access on 6 February 
2017.  
6 The Mercury, 18 February 1910, p.4. 
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Melbourne University Press, 1923, p.119. 
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population of Asian nations, especially China.12  They imagined Chinese would flood into 
Australia, and outnumber them one day; as the Europeans did to the indigenous people or the 
native population of Singapore. The idea of the “Yellow peril” was strong in Australia in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century.13  The population of Chinese in Australia, 
dropped from 35, 000 to 9, 500 by the end of the Second World War.14 
 
                                       Figure 4 [No Yellow Peril At Gosnells] 
                                                Source: Daily News, 17 November 1908, p.5. 
The statistics suggest that the population who were born in China and came to live in 
Australia were decreasing from 1901 (29 907), to 1911 (20 775), to 1921 (15 224) to 1933 (8 
579).15 This was partly because the White Australia policy did not allow more Chinese to 
come to Australia. As the older Chinese were dying out, the population of Chinese in 
Australia was decreasing between 1901 and 1921. However, despite the White Australia 
policy’s powerful impacts on Chinese communities in Australia, there had always a Chinese 
community in Australia, since the Gold Rushes.   
Local Chinese in Australia, however, strongly opposed this anti-Chinese policy. They 
believed it was a racist policy, targeted on Chinese and other coloured peoples.16 For 
example, in October 1901, a petition claiming to represent the Chinese population in Victoria 
was submitted by William Ah Ket (1876-1936), a law graduate from the University of 
                                                          
12 Great Southern Leader, 27 January 1911, p.6. 
13 Telegraph, 26 September 1903, p.8. 
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Melbourne and a local Chinese representative, “appealing to the Federal government not to 
apply the dictation test to the Chinese”.17 According to Yong, the Chinese in Adelaide and 
Perth even cabled the Empress Dowager of China at Beijing, pressing for protection and 
negotiation “with the Australian government over the Act”.18 In addition, the position of 
Chinese people in Australia also made them eager to play their parts in China’s future 
destiny, as I will discuss in Chapter Three.19   
Local Chinese communities in Australia responded actively to the White Australia policy, 
and believed the establishment of a Chinese consulate was the only solution.20  On early 1907, 
Chinese businessmen in Australia sent an official letter to China’s consul-general to Britain, 
explaining the Chinese population’s living conditions and the urgency of appointing an 
official Chinese representative here.21 Chinese community leaders in Australia played active 
roles in formation of the Chinese Consulate in 1909, with help from some Australians, 
including Gerald Piggott, W.H. Calder and George Morrison.22  Piggott and Calder were both 
seeking trading opportunities with China, and they were keen to promote Sino-Australian 
relations. Further, Eric Andrews reminds us that the “spread of Christianity among the 
Australian Chinese may have helped…Australian churches in turn supported the Chinese in 
their struggles against the authorities”.23 Therefore, Anglo-Saxon businessmen, Christians and 
those who lived in China like Morrison, were willing to help the local Chinese in Australia to 
improve their living conditions.  
Due to the Chinese petition seeking a consulate in Australia, the Chinese government 
responded once again.24  As I have discussed in Chapter One, two Chinese officials visited 
Australia in the 1880s.  Chinese officials continued their investigation of Chinese in 
Australasia in the 1900s.  In 1906, Huang Houcheng (known as Hwang Hon Cheng at the 
time), visited Australia and New Zealand.25 Huang Houcheng, outranking Wang Ronghe and 
Yu Xie26 (I mentioned their visit to Australia in 1887 in Chapter One), was the most senior 
Chinese official ever to visit Australia before 1909.  His intention was to improve the 
relations between the two nations, while investigating the Chinese living conditions. Huang 
could not speak English himself, so he toured with Wen Xiang,—his interpreter in Australia 
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and New Zealand.27 Local Chinese in Australia warmly welcomed Huang, during his stay. A 
thousand Chinese attended Huang’s “public lecture at the Masonic Hall in Melbourne”.  
Huang promised the Chinese in Australia that he would “present a report to the Chinese 
government in favour of the establishment of a Chinese Consulate”.28  Huang met Chinese 
community leaders in Melbourne and Sydney, and later went to Tasmania and New Zealand, 
to meet the Chinese population there.29  
In his 長夜星稀—澳大利亞華人史 1860-1940(Lonely star on lone nights), Yeung Wing 
On suggests Huang’s visit to Australia was significant.30 Huang’s tour therefore convinced 
the local Chinese: Chinese government had not forgotten them, and would assist them. They 
expected that once the Chinese government established a consulate in Australia, they would 
be able to improve the living conditions of the Chinese. As officials, Huang and his translator 
were able to travel freely in Australia and New Zealand in 1906. It suggests that although the 
White Australia policy was a law, it was not clear cut. If you were a senior Chinese official or 
high-class person, you could visit Australia freely in the 1900s.  In this sense, the White 
Australia policy was not only a restriction based on race, it was also a policy based on class.  
Although for Anglo-Saxons, the White Australia policy represented what an ideal world 
might be, its practice varied greatly in reality.   
The negotiation between China and Britain over the establishment of Chinese consulates in 
Australia and New Zealand started in 1877, but the two parties only reached an agreement in 
1908.  Zhang Qiusheng argues the negotiation (of establishing a consulate in Australia) 
between Britain and China took so long, partly because the Chinese government had financial 
difficulties and the Chinese population in Australasia was generally small (compared to the 
millions of Chinese were living in the Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century), and partly 
because of the British government’s unfair treatment of the Chinese government during the 
negotiation.31  In other words, Beijing wanted to protect the Chinese in Australia, but they 
were unable to do so, because the British government did not see China as an equal partner. 
Therefore, the British government did not support the Chinese government appointing an 
official representative in Australia in the nineteenth century.  Zhang’s argument is important; 
as he is one of the few experts on Chinese Australian histories in China. Zhang therefore 
represents a unique viewpoint.  Similarly, Yeung Wing On, a scholar from Hong Kong who 
visits Australia regularly, has written that Australia was not a global power.  The Chinese 
government therefore did not feel an urgent need to appoint a representative here, until the 
early twentieth.32 Thus, both Zhang and Yeung think the official Sino-Australian relation 
began relatively late, compared to the Sino-British relations (which began in 1877) and 
China’s official relations with the other more powerful nations (which  began in the 
nineteenth century).  In a sense, Zhang and Yeong’s position is correct.  For the majority of 
                                                          
27 Yeung Wing On (楊永安), Lonely star on lone nights: A history of the Chinese Australians 1860-1940, Hong 
Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2014, p.200.  In this well researched book, Yeung Wing On writes in elegant 
Chinese, focuses on Chinese in Australia between 1860 and 1940.  Further, he explains Chinese communities 
from social, political, economic and cultural aspects.   
28 Yong, The New Gold Mountain, p.22. 
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the Chinese in Australia and New Zealand, however, it was certainly an overdue diplomatic 
move, because they thought the Chinese government should appoint a diplomatic 
representative in Australasia earlier than 1909.  If we consider the fact that Australia only 
formed its federation in 1901, and China had former formal relations as early as 190933, this 
actually made China become one of the first nations to establish official relations with 
Australia. In this regard, the establishment of diplomatic relations was early from an 
Australian perspective. Both Zhang and Yeong are writing Chinese histories, not Australian 
histories. Thus, their work can be understood to be Sino-centric.   
With the approval of the British government, the Chinese government appointed Liang 
Lanxun (梁澜勋) as the first Chinese consul-general in Melbourne, and Huang Rongliang (黄
荣良) as the first Chinese consul in Wellington, New Zealand in 1909.34  Huang previously 
worked in China’s embassy in London, before being promoted to the new posts.  Liang, 
however, had little experience in diplomacy before 1909.35 In January 1909, then Australian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egerton Batchelor (1865-1911), received the official letter of the 
appointment of Liang as China’s first consul-general. Chinese consul-general was the most 
senior diplomat in Oceania. Thus, to some extent, Liang was not only in charge of Sino-
Australian relations, but also had a say in Sino-New Zealand and Sino-Southern Pacific 
Islands relations.   
According to Yong, Liang’s mission was to “promote trade between China and Australia and 
as well to study the racial relations between Chinese and Australians”.36  Due to legacies of 
the Gold Rushes, Melbourne was the centre of the Chinese population in Australia. Liang 
Lanxun—known as Liang Lan-hsun at that time, arrived in Melbourne, Australia in March, 
1909.  Kuo Mei-fen has suggested that, Chinese residents in both Melbourne and Sydney 
warmly welcomed Liang’s arrival.37 His headquarter was in Little Bourke Street in 
Melbourne, at the heart of the Chinatown.38 This was a wise choice, because it allowed 
Chinese diplomats to communicate with their fellow Chinese easily.  As China’s first consul-
general, his arrival in Australia was not only a significant event for the local Chinese, but also 
an important event for Sino-Australian relations. For the first time, China could contact 
Australia directly; previously they had to go through London.  So we can see how Sino-
Australian diplomatic relations started at a low point, in the shadow of the White Australia 
policy, and improved slowly over the next twenty years or so.39  
Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) tried to help the local Chinese.  However, it is important to 
remember that Liang was in a difficult position. Liang was frustrated while he was in 
Australia, as he lacked the resource that he needed to pressure the Australian government, to 
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36 Yong, The New Gold Mountain, p.22. 
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modify the White Australia policy. Liang not only believed that China should develop its 
own economy, but also intended to promote the trade between China and Australia.40  
He used trade as a tool to argue that the Australian government should relax the White 
Australia policy—against the local Chinese population.41 He suggested the White Australia 
policy was negatively affecting the trading relations between China and Australia.42 Liang 
knew that it would be difficult to ask the Australian government to abolish the White 
Australia policy. Instead, he argued that the Australian government should modify it, in 
favour of the local Chinese population. He argued that the Australian government should 
allow the wives of Chinese of ten years’ residence to reunite with their husbands in 
Australia.43  This attempt was unsuccessfully.  However, Liang gained two minor concessions 
from the Department of External Affairs. Firstly, Liang successfully persuaded the 
Department “not to require handprints from Chinese of good repute”.44 Secondly, Liang won 
for Chinese in Australia “a reduction of the fee charged for certificate of exemption from the 
dictation test from $2 to $1”.45 Subsequent Chinese consul-generals in Australia adopted 
Liang’s position: they argued that Australia should modify the White Australia policy, so that 
certain groups of Chinese would be allowed to come to Australia. They were not arguing that 
Australia should completely abolish the White Australia policy [with the exception of consul-
general Song Faxiang (宋发祥) in 1929]. Clearly, Liang wanted to help the local Chinese in 
Australia. He knew the local Chinese were treated as second-class citizens; he tried his best, 
but there was little he could do.46 If we compare Liang’s performance in Australia to other 
Chinese diplomats in English-speaking nations, then one may conclude Liang did a 
reasonable job. No Chinese diplomats could completely remove the anti-Chinese policies, in 
the nations that they resided.  
Tang Entong (唐恩桐), known as Tong Ying-ting, was the second Chinese consul-general to 
Australia.47 He was formerly China’s consul-general to Korea, and worked twelve years in 
Korea.48 Tang was a close friend of Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), one of the most powerful Han 
Chinese politicians in 1910.49 Yuan later became the first President of the Republic of China. 
Tang only stayed in Australia for five months, due to sickness of his mother back in China; 
he had to return to China to look after his mother.50  Like Liang, Tang was not arguing 
Australia should abolish the White Australia policy. Instead, they were both suggesting that 
the Australian government should relax the policy, and give Chinese greater freedom to enter 
the nation.51    
Even Huang Rongliang (黄荣良)52, China’s third consul-general to Australia, almost became 
a victim to the White Australia policy. Huang was China’s first consul in New Zealand, 
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between February 1909 and May 1911.53 Before Huang moved to Melbourne, from New 
Zealand in May 1911, the staff at the Chinese consulate in Melbourne had to contact the 
Australian government and beg them to allow him to travel to Australia freely.54 In the end, 
the Australian agreed to allow Huang, his family and his two servants to “land without 
hindrance”.55 On the one hand, this suggests how weak China was at this point, as the 
Chinese staff at the consulate in Melbourne were worrying about whether a senior Chinese 
diplomat could arrive in Australia, without any humiliation. On the other hand, the fact that 
the Chinese diplomat Huang, his family and his staff were allowed to travel to Sydney, 
Australia indicates that although China was a weak nation this time, its diplomats were 
treated much better than its general citizens.    
In May 1912, Huang submitted an official memorandum to Josiah Thomas (1863-1933), then 
the Minister of External Affairs.56 Huang suggested that three categories of Chinese (with 
official passports) should be allowed to come to Australia. They were students, tourists and 
merchants.57 He believed that if the Chinese businessmen stayed in Australia for more than 
three years, they should be allowed to bring their wives with them.  The Australian 
government, however, was not willing to meet this proposal, “except the Passport Agreement 
of 1912 which allowed Chinese students and merchants to enter Australia on severe 
conditions”.58  
Chinese people were generally unhappy with Huang’s involvement with the Poon Gooey 
case.59 Poon’s family was a victim of the White Australia policy. Mrs Poon came to Australia 
to visit her husband. She planned to stay six months initially, but ended up staying for two 
and half years in Australia. Meanwhile, she gave birth to two children. Due to her personal 
circumstances, and the politically unstable situation in China, she was given permission to 
stay longer in Australia.60 However, her whole family was forced to leave, as the Labor 
Government refused to give her extension to stay in Australia. Though a minority of 
Australians offered sympathy towards her family, the entire family departed to China in May 
1913.61 Huang followed this incident closely, but he thought that as long as the White 
Australia policy existed, it would be impossible for him to challenge it. He was in a dilemma, 
and hoped to end this embarrassing incident as soon as possible.62 This was a realistic 
approach. However, the Chinese Australians at that time thought Huang could have offered 
more assistance to the Poon family.  
Further, Chinese diplomats used Chinese newspapers like Tung Wah Times to communicate 
with the local Chinese in Australia.63  It is unsurprising that Chinese diplomats had to spend a 
lot of their time assisting Chinese to come to Australia or return to China legally. When 
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Chinese citizens had trouble with Australian Customs officials, they usually turned to the 
Chinese consulate for help.64 For example, Wei Zijing (魏子京) was trying to help a local 
Chinese businessman—Lim Sang, to bring his son-in-law—Wong Shao Wing from China to 
Australia, to look after the family business, as Lim was getting old.65  Wei believed that the 
Chinese in Australia were still Chinese citizens, and it was his job to help them.66 Chinese 
diplomats like Wei argued that if the Australian government allowed these Chinese 
businessmen to come to Australia, they would help to develop Australian economy, and 
therefore Australia as a nation would benefit greatly.   
2. Trade 
Although the Australian government officially adopted the White Australia policy in 1901, it 
did not mean that the Australian government planned to cut all the connections with its Asian 
neighbours.  Since 1909, Chinese diplomats had started to study the Australian economy, as 
they intended to increase the trade between China and Australia.  Between 1901 and 1921, 
one of the priorities of Chinese diplomats was to promote trade between Australia and China.  
As early as 1909, Chinese diplomats started to realise the commercial influence of Chinese 
Australians, and their unique roles in shaping Sino-Australian relations.67  For example, Liang 
Lanxun(梁澜勋)encouraged Chinese merchants in Melbourne and Adelaide to organise 
commercial societies.68 In March 1918, Zeng Zhongjian(曾宗鉴), then Chinese consul-
general in Melbourne, stated that China not only wanted to enhance its trading with Australia, 
but also wanted to improve trading with other places in Australasia.69  The Chinese consulate 
in Australia formed an alliance with some of the local Chinese business communities, in 
order to protect their common interests: to improve the living conditions of Chinese in 
Australia, and to promote Sino-Australian trade. The Chinese communities controlled 
economic resources, while the Chinese diplomats had diplomatic status.  After all, it was a 
Chinese diplomat’s responsibility to protect the rights of Chinese people in Australia, in the 
first half of the twentieth century.     
However, the position of the Australian government was more complicated. On the one hand, 
the Australian government had adopted the White Australia Policy, in order to exclude 
Chinese, Japanese and other coloured people. On the other hand, Australia was still seeking 
to trade with China and Japan. For example, according to Australian newspaper Observer, 
some Australians formed a committee in Shanghai in 1905, in order to promote Australia’s 
trading relations with East Asia: 
An Australasian Association of the Far East has been formed at Shanghai. The objects are—
(1) To bring together in the bonds of good-fellowship all Australasians of good reputation in 
the Far East; (2) to promote the welfare of our fellow-country men in the Far East: (3) to 
further the interests of our native land by encouraging the development of its commercial 
relations with the Far East.70   
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While the majority of Australians may not have wanted Chinese to come to live in Australia, 
a minority of Australians realised the importance of trading with Asia in the early twentieth 
century.71  The potential of the Chinese market endured despite economic realities.72  Indeed, 
the Australian government wanted to maintain (if not increase) its commercial relations with 
China and Japan. They realised the vast population in China could potentially be a big market 
for Australia in the future.   
In addition, the British diplomats in China continued to promote trade between China and the 
British Empire (including Australia). In 1907, Sir John Jordan (1852-1925), then British 
ambassador to China, sent an official invitation to the Chinese government—the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, regarding the Australian 
Exhibition of Women’s Work in Melbourne.73 The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce 
decided to send this official invitation to the business associations in various provinces of 
China, and asked the Chinese business communities whether they were willing to participate 
in this world exhibition in Melbourne, Australia.74  A few Chinese provinces decided to send 
their products (through Hong Kong) to Melbourne.75   
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Figure 5 [Sir John Jordan’s Official Invitation to Chinese female textile workers for participating the 
Australian World Exposition] 
Source: Archives on the World Exposition held in Forbiddne City (清宫萬國博覽會檔案), edited by 
China's First Historical Archives (中國第一歷史檔案館编), Yangzhou: Guangling shushe, 2007, 
Volume 5, p.2211. 
In this letter above (Figure 5), Jordan asked whether China could send products from Chinese 
female workers to show in the world exhibition in “the British dominion—Australia”.76  This 
source above reveals three things.  First, the British government regarded Australia as a 
dominion, and had a huge influence on Australia’s foreign policies.  Second, the Australian 
government relied on the British government to deal with the Chinese government at this 
time. The British ambassador in China was sending an official invitation to the Chinese 
government on behalf of the Australian government. Third, the major purpose of the world 
exhibition at this time was to promote the trade in the world.77  Indeed, the Australian 
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government was interested in Chinese products, and was willing to trade with China.  The 
Australian government’s wish to trade with China provided room for Chinese diplomats to 
fight against the White Australia policy, so that they could help to improve Chinese people’s 
living conditions in Australia.  
The Australian government started to promote trade in the early part of the twentieth century.  
John Bligh Suttor (1859-1925), was New South Wales Trade Commissioner in the Far East, 
between 1903 and 1922.78 In one of the reports he sent to the Australian government, Suttor 
regarded “the year 1911 as one of the most momentous in China’s history”.79 Although 
Sutton was based in Japan, he also paid close attention to situations in China.  He believed 
that even though China’s trading with foreign nations was not strongly affected by its internal 
problems in 1911, it was most likely to have more problems in 1912. Suttor further argued 
that the Australian government should remove the White Australia Policy, in order to 
promote trade between China and Australia.80 Suttor was ahead of his time, and one of the 
few Australian officials challenged the White Australia policy in the 1910s.  
He then listed the details of China’s trading with the British world in 1911: 
                                                                        1911 
 Imports Exports 
 
Hong Kong                                                       20, 000, 000                             14, 000, 000 
England                   12, 021, 000                                                                  
 
2, 300, 000
 
India                   5, 000, 000                                                  
  
780, 000 
Straits Settlements                                         1, 000, 000                                       760, 000 
Australasia                       105, 000                                               
                                                             
101, 000 
Canada                                 74, 000                                       172, 000 
South Africa                                                                                                               2, 00081                                                                         
 
    
Based on Sutton’s report, Australasia’s imports from China were greater than Canada’s from 
China, and Australasia’s exports to China were smaller than Canada’s to China. Since 
Australia was the largest nation in Australasia, one could argue that Australia could export 
more to the Chinese market, if China was a stable nation politically and socially. Further, 
Sutton stated he did not want to see an event similar to the Boxer Movement happen again in 
China.82  
Although China changed its regime from a dynasty to a republic, this political transition had 
little effect on the trade between China and Australia.  Here is a report that John Sutton sent 
back to William Ashford (1874-1925), Australia’s Minister of Agriculture in 1914, showing 
the imports and exports from China to Australia, between 1909 and 1913:  
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82 Harold Z. Schoffrin, “Interval during a period of discord”, in The 1911 Revolution in China: Interpretive 
essays, edited by Eto Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schoffrin, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984, p.275. 
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 Imports     Exports 
 
1909 81,330                                     31,269 
1910      88,288                                     83,251 
1911                                  105,151                                         101,658 
 
1912     150,817                                     81,561 
1913                                  106,034                                         81,01083 
 
                                                                                                        
According to these newspapers statistics, between 1909 and 1913, China’s exports to 
Australia reached their peak in 1911, and China’s imports from Australia reached its peak in 
1912. The trade between China and Australia was larger in 1913 than 1909, in both imports 
and exports. Further, Shanghai and Hong Kong were two major trading centres.84 As I will 
discuss in Chapter 3, Hong Kong and Shanghai played major roles as trading centres between 
China and Australia.  
Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋), China’s first consul-general in Australia, realised the importance of 
trade between China and Australia.85 He tried to help China improve commercial relations 
between China and foreign nations.86 He planned to create a commercial organisation 
“functioning as a unifying element to unite business circles and to promote trade” as well as 
improve relations between the two nations.87 However, apart from the Chinese in Adelaide, 
Liang’s idea did not meet with much positive response.88  
Since 1909, Chinese diplomats had continually suggested that the Australian government 
should allow three categories of Chinee to travel freely and legally.89  On 8th March 1915, the 
Chinese consulate sent an official letter to the Department of External Affairs, suggested that 
Chinese merchants and students could come to Australia to do business and/or study.90  Here 
is an example of the official document (i.e. a passport) of a potential Chinese traveller 
wishing to visit Australia in 1920. Wei Zijing (魏子京), then Chinese consul-general in 
Australia, was trying to help a Chinese student study in Australia. There were key details of 
the passport which a traveller must fill in if he or she wished to visit Australia from China (in 
this case, it was from Guangdong province) in 1920 or around this time.  For example, the 
passport includes the following: name; gender; age; place of birth; place of living; place of 
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living in Australia; occupation; move to Australia alone or with the family (e.g. wife and/or 
children); if wife and/or children intend to visit/move to Australia, when would they do it?91 
Wei Zijing (魏子京) was also trying to help Chinese in Australia travel to other places. For 
example, Zheng Qilu, a local Chinese businessman in Sydney, Australia, asked Wei to assist 
him when he intended to travel to New Zealand.92  Zheng needed to gain a passport from 
Wei, so that he could travel legally from Australia to New Zealand and return to Australia. 
Wei was willing to help local Chinese in Australia, to promote trading between not only 
Australia and China, but also trading between Australia and New Zealand.   
  
Figure 6 [Official Documents of Chinese citizen travelling to Australia, in 1920] 
Source: ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522: 0051 016-01 A 
Further, Chinese diplomats actively pushed to play a role in Sino-Fijian relations. For 
example, in March 1915, Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴)93—then Chinese consul-general in 
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Melbourne—sent an official letter to the governor-general of Australia, demanding the extent 
of his “jurisdiction as Consul-General for China in Australia, to include the Fiji Islands.”94   
 
Figure 7 [Letter from the Acting Consul-General for China to the Department of External Affairs in 
Melbourne, on 8th March 1915] 
Source: ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522: 0039 015-02 E 
Based on this official letter (Figure 7) from the Chinese consulate in Melbourne to the 
Department of External Affairs, it is clear that Chinese diplomats had carefully studied the 
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White Australia policy and its impacts on the Chinese people.95 The Australian government 
accepted this suggestion from the Chinese consulate.96  It indicates that the community of 
culture (the White Australia policy) would trump the community of interests (Australia’s 
trading with its Asian neighbours).  
The First World War (WWI) had significant impacts on Sino-Australian trade.97 The trade 
decreased at this time for two major reasons. First, Australian governments reduced the 
trading relations with China. China was officially a neutral nation until 1917. As a result of 
the war, Australia no longer exported certain products to China.98 This negatively affected the 
trading between the two nations. However, Chinese consul-general Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴) 
was trying to help local Chinese and Anglo-Saxon businessmen to continue their business 
with China.99 
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Figure 8 [Commentary from Ministry of Agriculture (in China) on Zeng Zhongjian’s earlier 
suggestions regarding the Sino-Australian trade] 
Source: ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522 0056 016-06 F, p.103. 
This official document (Figure 8) reveals that Zeng was suggesting Chinese businessmen to 
approach the British consuls in Shanghai, Canton, Fuzhou and Xiamen, so that they could 
continue to trade with Australia. This also indicates that the Australian government was 
basically relying on British diplomats to look after Australian interests in China in the 1910s. 
Moreover, German trading ships became unreliable and risky. Prior to WWI, the British and 
German companies owned the majority of ships moving between Australia and China.100 It 
was easy to conclude that WWI damaged the trading between China and Australia. The 
Chinese business communities in Australia suffered during WWI, since the majority of them 
had business connections with China. 
This was partly because the Chinese in Australia did not control any trade route or own any 
large trading ship. This further contributed to the development of Chinese shipping 
companies in Australia.  Sydney Chinese businessmen such as Thomas Yee Hing and Ping 
Nam approached the Chinese officials of Guangdong province as early as 1906, for “for 
official and financial support for the establishment of a shipping company”.  It was however, 
only after the outbreak of the WWI that the idea of forming a shipping line was revived, 
when local Chinese business community felt the “shortage of ships travelling between Hong 
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Kong and Australia”.101 Yong suggested that the formation in 1917 of the China-Australia 
Mail Steamship Line, “was a thrilling episode in the history of Chinese in Australasia and the 
South Pacific”.102 Chinese in Australia played vital roles in generating and maintaining Sino-
Australian trade at this time.103  The creation of the China-Australia Mail Steamship Line 
united the Chinese community in Australia over a single issue of common interest—to 
protect the trading routines between China and Australia.104  Its collapse, however, revealed 
the general “disunity prevailing in Chinese communities in Australia”.105 
George E. Morrison, China’s Presidential advisor106, also argued that Australian businessmen 
should increase trading between China and Australia. For example, he sent a letter to William 
Watt (1871-1946), Australia’s Minister of Trade and Customs, in September 1918, urging his 
countrymen to realise the importance of trading with China, and its massive potential.   
I would again point of the necessity of sending to China a commission or a High Commissioner 
with diplomatic rank to inquire into the conditions of China. There seems to be a complete 
misconception in Australia of the importance of the China market…Two or three times I have 
written to the Chairman of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce pointing out to him the 
possibilities for the sale of Australian products in China. Australian lead is used in China tea 
chests. For Australian silver there is a demand which ought to be met by direct purchase between 
China and Australia and not by the round about way that the sale is now conducted, giving profits 
to middlemen which ought to go to the producer. There is a great demand in China for cloth of all 
kinds…Chemists in Peking tell me that they have great difficulty in getting foreign medicines, 
even American medicines. I have written to the Chairman of the Melbourne Chamber of 
Commerce telling him that the tooth paste I obtain from Melbourne costing me landed here 1/6 
per tube is in my opinion much superior to the American tooth paste for which I have to pay 
2/10…China produced a tough silk which is well adapted for use in Australia in the summer in all 
parts and in the tropical part of Australia throughout the year, yet the trade in this silk with 
Australia is comparatively unimportant, though the bartering of commodities is the most lucrative 
trade as regards revenue.107 
Indeed, Morrison played a significant role in Sino-Western relations.108 George Morrison was 
not the only one trying to promote trade between Australia and China.  Sir Edward Own 
Cox109 (known as Owen Cox) was another prominent Australian who worked hard “securing 
ships for trading with China, and other matters”.110 In March 1919, the representatives of 
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BIRT and COMPANY LIMITED sent an official letter to Wei Zijing (魏子京), regarding to 
increase Australia’s trading with China.111 These Australian businessmen suggested: 
Now that the war is over we are looking forward to larger trade relations with China and my 
object in writing is to ask if you can furnish us with the names of reliable Firms-at the 
principal Chinese ports-with whom we could open business negotiations for the sale of 
Australian products. We are largely interested in several Meat Works-particularly in 
Queensland-both frozen and canned- and are prepared to initiate business with Merchants in 
China who would be interested in the products from our own Works, including frozen and 
canned Meats, Tallow, Skins, Hides, Bones, Gluepieces, and all other bye-products from 
Meat Works, etc, etc. We are also in a position to deal largely with other Australian products 
such as Rabbits-frozen or canned-Flour, Butter, Cheese, Wool, Skins, Timber, Canned Fruit, 
Jams, Tinned Vegetables/Tinned Milk-in fact e description of Australian produce and we 
shall much appreciate it if you can give us the names of people with whom we could 
correspond or place us in the way of obtaining the names of such Firms.112   
We can see that some Australian businessmen realised the importance of trading with China, 
almost immediately after WWI. They asked Chinese consul-general Wei Zijing (魏子京), to 
help them find potential trading partners in China, especially in the coastal cities.  Further, the 
letter reveals the Australian products selling to China in the 1910s and 1920s.  These 
included: wool, wheat, flour, frozen meats, timber and jams.  In addition, since there were 
about 300 000 Westerners living in China (mainly in Shanghai, Tianjin, Canton, Hong Kong 
and other “principal Chinese ports”), the Australian business community promoted products 
to these people. For example, some Australian businessmen intended to sell butter, cheese 
and jams to these Westerners.  The majority of Chinese did/do not consume these products, 
and therefore would not produce them in China.   
Zhou Ziqi (Chow Tsu-chi)113, Minster of Agriculture and Commerce in China, sent an official 
letter to Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴), then Chinese consul-general in Australia, requested Zeng 
promote the wheat trade between the two nations.114   
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Figure 9 [Official Letter from Zhou Ziqi, Minster of Agriculture and Commerce in China to Zeng 
Zhongjian, Chinese Consul-General in Australia, in 1915) 
Source: ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522 0056 016-06 F, p.56. 
In the letter (Figure 9), Zhou Ziqi stated that there were major factories in the Northeast of 
China, and he wanted Zeng to investigate whether wheat or flour companies in Australia 
would be keen to cooperate with Chinese companies in China.   
When Chinese diplomats established the consulate in Melbourne in 1909, it is safe to say the 
consulate had financial difficulties as it did not even have money to buy the furniture they 
needed.  Although Chinese diplomats like Huang Rongliang (黄荣良), Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗
鉴) and Wei Zijing (魏子京), tried their best to promote trading between Australia and China, 
the diplomats usually faced strong financial pressure.115 Huang Rongliang (黄荣良), the 
Chinese consul-general in Australia, stated in July 1911 that the Chinese consulate in 
Melbourne desperately needed new furniture (see the official document below).116  So he had 
to use the budget for the following financial year to buy basic furniture for the consulate.   
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Figure 10 [The budget of Chinese consulate in Melbourne, in 1916] 
Source: ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522 0056 016-06 F, pp.80-81. 
The salaries of the Chinese diplomats was a problem that they had to deal with.  Chinese 
diplomats had little financial support from the Chinese government.  There were three major 
reasons.  First, the Chinese government (Beijing government at this time) had to spend most 
of their budget to buy weapons so that they could compete with other warlords in China.  
Second, the Chinese government had to repay the money it owned to Western powers, as 
China had lost a number of military conflicts (e.g. Opium Wars and the Boxer Rebellion). 
Third, there was a corruption within the Chinese government.  Thus, Chinese diplomats tried 
to improve the Sino-Australian relations in the 1910s with little resources or support from the 
Chinese government in Beijing.   
From 1909, Chinese diplomats realised that they had to promote Sino-Australian trade first, 
so that they could use the trade as a tool to fight against the White Australia policy.  Chinese 
diplomats requested the Australian government allow Chinese merchants, students, and 
tourists to travel to Australia.  The Australian government generally accepted this proposal, 
as they wanted to maintain (if not enhance) Australia’s commercial relations with China. 
Between 1909 and 1921, Chinese diplomats worked closely with Chinese local business 
communities in Australia and Anglo-Saxon businessmen, in order to enhance trade between 
Australia and China.117  WWI forced Australian policy-makers to realise Australia’s 
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geographical proximity to Asia, and its remoteness from Britain, the heart of the British 
Empire.   
3. Political Relations and Recognition of the Chinese Regime  
The problem of recognition was another major theme that shaped Sino-Australian relations, 
between 1901 and 1921. There were two major issues of recognition here. First, China 
wanted to be treated as an equal power to the West, an equal member of the international 
community.118  Second, Chinese diplomats had to encourage the Western governments (in this 
case, the Australian government) to recognise the regimes that they represented.  
Between 1911 and 1949, China was an unstable nation politically. The political centre of the 
state shifted from Beijing to Nanjing, to Chongqing, to Nanjing and back to Beijing.  For 
China’s provisional President Sun Yat-sen, the unity of the nation was a priority.119 After the 
1911 Revolution, according to Chinese historian Xu Guoqi, “nationalism became a defining 
and most powerful political force in China”.120 The British watched this historical event 
closely. Though the British were continuing their neutral policies towards China at this time, 
they were worried that there could be another Boxer Movement in China.121  
Shi suggests China naturally adopted the so-called “Yiyi Zhiyi”122 policies, similar to the 
Western balance of power policies.123  Shi adopts a Marxist approach, and suggests Chinese 
public also impacted China’s foreign policies.124  The Republic of China was officially 
established in Nanjing on 1 January 1912. Sun Yat-sen became China’s first provisional 
President.  According to Shi, Sun was familiar with Chinese affairs overseas, as he had lived 
outside China for a while.  Thus, one of the first things that he did was to try to protect 
Chinese people’s rights abroad.125  On 10th March 1912, Yuan Shikai became the President of 
the Republic of China, and he desperately needed foreign powers to recognise his regime 
diplomatically. However, the majority of foreign powers hesitated to do so.  Shi argued that 
Yuan had to compromise Chinese interests in regions like Tibet and Mongolia, in order to 
gain support from the foreign nation-states like Britain.126  Britain decided to recognise the 
regime on 6th October, 1912, after Yuan promised to protect British interests in Tibet.127  In 
other words, it took several months for Britain to recognise the Yuan Shi-kai regime.  Then 
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the question occurs, how did Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) manage diplomatic relations 
between China and Australia when these were no official relations between Beijing and 
London? 
Huang Rongliang (黄荣良), China’s consul-general in Australia, had mixed feelings about 
the revolution. On the one hand, he knew China needed to change dramatically, in order to 
compete with other nations. He knew the Qing dynasty was corrupted and backward. On the 
other hand, he was a representative of the regime abroad and had grown up in the late Qing 
period. Further, he had to stay loyal to the rulers in Beijing.  However, the regime collapsed 
in 1911. Thus, Huang may have carried complicated views of the revolution.  On 12th 
February 1912, at the Chinese consulate in Melbourne, Chinese diplomats “hauled down the 
Dragon flag and replaced it with the triangular Republican ensign”.128  Huang Rongliang, 
gave the task to their popular sixteen-year-old—William Liu, a clerk and translator of the 
consulate.129 Despite Huang’s mixed views towards the political situation in China, he 
believed that the most important thing for China was unity. Thus, Huang would like to work 
for the new regime in China—the Republic of China.  
The Chinese consul-general was not only in charge of the Sino-Australian official relations, 
but also had a say on China’s relations with other states in the region. Huang Rongliang (黄
荣良) was the highest ranking of Chinese official in Australasia.  For example, Huang 
suggested Zhou Ling to replace him, and become the new consul in Wellington, New 
Zealand.130  Huang was China’s first consul in New Zealand, between February 1909 and 
May 1911. Therefore, he was familiar with Sino-New Zealand relations as well as Chinese 
living conditions in New Zealand at this time.131 Further, Huang was assisting Chinese 
citizens in Australia and New Zealand, giving them Chinese passports so that they could 
travel back to China if they wished.132 In addition, Chinese diplomats were also closely 
watching the living conditions of Chinese in Netherlands East Indies as they were comparing 
the situations for Chinese communities in Australia and Netherlands East Indies.133  
Chinese newspapers in Australia followed the Revolution of 1911 closely. For example, on 6 
January 1912, Tung Wah Times published a reported of Wu Tingfang (1842-1922), then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, as he requested foreign powers recognise the new Chinese 
regime.134  Wu Tingfang also “begged the most powerful journalist in the North America” to 
report on his requests to the outside world.135 Chinese in Australia believed only a strong and 
stable China could improve their living conditions overseas.136  In November 1911, a minority 
of Chinese population were still supporting the Qing regime. This group of people was based 
at“158 George Street, Sydney” and was called the “Chinese Empire Reform Association”.137 
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They believed that China should remain as an empire, but should reform its political 
structure.  They were supporters of Kang Youwei.   
As we have learnt from Sutton’s report previously, he suggested that a stable China might 
best serve Australia’s interests in the East Asia region.138  Sutton believed that “[once] all her 
[China] trouble past, the Chinese will prove [to be] our best customers.”139  Australians 
expected to continue to trade with China, despite their belief that China was a weak and 
backward nation.140 
The First World War (WWI) shaped the histories of Australia and China, although both 
nations were minor players.141 As a result of WWI, European powers had to pay greater 
attention to the political and military affairs in Europe.  Further, the great powers had not 
established the new international order yet. Thus, Chinese historian Xu Guoqi argues that the 
WWI offered new opportunities for Chinese diplomats, and improved China’s international 
status.142 Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), China’s President, approached John Jordan, then the 
British ambassador to China, to discuss whether China and Britain should fight together in 
Shandong province, in order to regain the territory, which was occupied by the Germans in 
Qingdao.143 However, Jordan rejected this proposal. George Morrison, the Times 
correspondent in Beijing, thought Jordan did not consider this proposal carefully, and the 
rejection was stupid.144  The British rejection of the Chinese proposal once again showed that 
British did not recognise China as an equal partner, though China and Britain had been allies 
in the war. Chinese officials tended to view Morrison as British, not an Australian.145 
Moreover, Chinese officials still viewed Australia as part of the British Empire, between 
1901 and 1921. 
In addition, Chinese diplomats also informed Chinese politicians in China what was going on 
in Australia.  One of the major debates in Australia during WWI was conscription. Billy 
Hughes, then Prime Minister of Australia, wanted to send more Australian soldiers into the 
battlefield. However, thoughts of conscription caused a huge divide within Australian society 
in 1917 and 1918.  Although Hughes remained the Prime Minister of Australia, he did not get 
enough support from the Australian public to pass the referendum (the referendum was 
narrowly rejected in 1917 and 1918). Wei Zijing (魏子京), then Chinese consul-general in 
Australia, sent an official report to the Ministry of Chinese Affairs in Beijing in February 
1918, in order to explain the internal divisions within the Australian government and public 
at this time.146 
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Figure 11 [Wei Zijing’s report of Conscription and newly Cabinet of Australian Government, 
February 1918] 
Source: AS: IMH, Diplomatic Archives, 03-36-016-01-029 
This report (Figure 11) is rare because it includes a list of the members of the Australian 
Cabinet. It suggests that Chinese diplomats like Wei Zijing paid close attention to Australian 
internal politics, and were reporting it back to China.  However, what Wei did not comment 
on was: how this internal struggle within the Australian government might effect Sino-
Australian relations.  Billy Hughes accepted Japan’s unreasonable demands in Shangdong, in 
the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.  George Morrison, however, worked with Chinese 
diplomats in Paris to protect Chinese rights in Shangdong, e.g. to take back the control of 
Qingdao port.147   
Conclusion 
The White Australia Policy, trade between the two nations and the problem of “recognition” 
were three dominant themes in the Sino-Australian relations. Chinese diplomats tended to use 
trade as a tool to persuade Australia to relax its White Australia policy and recognise the 
regimes the Chinese diplomats represented. Between 1901 and 1921, Chinese diplomats’ 
priority was to enhance trading between China and Australia.  This was because they knew 
the more Australia traded with China (or benefited from the trading with China), the easier it 
would be for the Chinese diplomats like Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋), Huang Rongliang (黄荣良) 
and Wei Zijing (魏子京), to fight against the White Australia policy. Chinese diplomats 
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managed to ensure Australian governments recognised the Chinese regimes (e.g. 1911-1912), 
but the British (and indeed the Australians) did not recognise China as an equal partner. 
Further, for the same reasons, Chinese diplomats achieved little in relaxing the White 
Australia policy, although they were capable diplomats and tried their best to help the 
Chinese in Australia.  
China and Australia formed official relations in 1909, as the first Chinese consul-general, 
Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) arrived in Melbourne, and established the consulate. There were 
several key motivations for the Chinese government to appoint a diplomatic representative in 
Australia. First, to look after the Chinese population in Australia, and protect their rights. 
Second, to promote trade between the two nations, and deeper knowledge of Australia in 
China. Third, to maintain warm diplomatic relations between the two nations. These can also 
be the key factors to evaluate whether or not Chinese diplomats were effective, during their 
postings in Australia.  
Chinese diplomats knew that it was hard for them to persuade the Australian government to 
abolish the White Australia policy. Therefore, these diplomats took a realistic approach.  
From 1909, Chinese diplomats argued that the Australian government should allow three 
categories of Chinese to come to Australia, namely students, businessmen and tourists. China, 
transformed from a dynasty to a modern republic in 1912.  The Australian federal 
government followed the British government in recognising the new regime in Beijing, as 
Yuan Shikai promised to retain all British privileges in China. Huang Rongliang (黄荣良), 
the Chinese consul-general in Melbourne in 1912, failed to modify the White Australia 
policy, but was able to manage trade between the two nations during a difficult time.148 
Morrison, on the other hand, was living in China, and he played a crucial role within Sino-
Australian relations during this time. Morrison realised the importance of trading with China, 
and worked hard to promote mutual understanding between the two nations. Although 
Morrison was not an official diplomat, one could argue he played an even larger role in 
connecting China and Australia. Though Australia’s foreign policies were still influenced by 
the British government, this chapter has shown that Australia performed an independent 
policy. The experience of John Bligh Suttor, NSW’s trade commissioner in the Far East, was 
a good example, as it indicated that the Australian government wanted to promote its own 
trade with China and other Asian nations. Further, WWI made Australian businessmen (like 
Owen Cox) realise Australia’s geographical distance to Britain, encouraging him and others 
to explore new markets in Asia, especially China.  Sino-Australian relations were also a story 
of Australia’s growing awareness of its own geo-political interests in the Asia-Pacific region.   
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Chapter 3: Australia’s Diplomatic relations with China (1921-1941) 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on a Chinese policy shift towards Australia between 1921 and 1941.  I 
argue that the Sino-Japanese conflict (after 1931) in East Asia made Chinese policy-makers 
pay more attention to Australasia, as they were trying to gain support from people (especially 
the ethnic Chinese) in this region. Chinese policy-makers and diplomats generally believed 
that their priority were to maintain China’s independence and unity.1  This chapter also 
discusses the Australian policy shift toward the Asia-Pacific region during the Great 
Depression and in response to Japanese expansion. Furthermore, I suggest that it was Chinese 
diplomats working hand in hand with Chinese business leaders who worked collaboratively 
to advance Chinese-Australian trade relations. While the White Australia policy remained 
prominent during the period, interested parties in China recognized that the policy could 
potentially be relaxed if the economic benefits and security issue (e.g. the expansion of Japan 
in the Pacific) were made clear to Australia. However, while the economic benefits of 
Chinese-Australian trade offered a strong incentive for Australian policymakers to ease the 
White Australia policy, and those incentives occasionally led to improved relations, the 
policy stayed largely intact, contributing to continually strained Sino-Australian diplomatic 
relations between 1921 and 1941. 
This chapter comprises into three major parts. The first part focuses on the White Australia 
policy. The policy affected the entrance of Chinese immigrants and their living conditions in 
Australia. It decreased the Chinese-Australian population dramatically and therefore damaged 
the Sino-Australian relations.  I will use newspaper reports from the Tung Wah Times, to 
show how the Chinese community might have viewed the White Australia policy in the 
1920s.  For example, an old Chinese man, possibly a reader of Tung Wah Times, published 
two detailed reports of Chinese people’s experiences under the White Australia policy in 
1923.2  The discrimination that Chinese people faced in Australia led Chinese diplomats’ to 
fight against the White Australia policy. The second part of the chapter highlights the trade 
between China and Australia. While the White Australia policy might have been a negative 
factor in Sino-Australian relations, trade between the two nations would certainly have been a 
positive factor.  Evidence suggests that Australian goods went through Hong Kong to 
mainland China in the 1920s and 1930s. Wheat and wool were two of the most popular 
products that Australia sold to China.3  The potential of Sino-Australian trade was even 
greater, once China could resume peace. The third part of the chapter discusses security 
issues, namely the expansion of Japan in the Pacific, and its impacts on Sino-Australian 
relations.  General Cai Tingkai’s visit to Australia in 1934 showed how the internal political 
conflicts within China may have influenced the Sino-Australian relations at this time.  For 
Chinese politicians such as Chiang Kai-shek, China’s independence and unity were key and 
China’s foreign policies had to serve these two goals. Chiang wanted to diminish the role of 
the Chinese Communists first.4 However, for Cai, it was more important that all the Chinese 
should cooperate and fight together against the Japanese.   
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Between 1921 and 1941, Chinese diplomats in Australia had three major tasks. First, they 
wanted to promote trade between China and Australia.5  Second, Chinese diplomats had to 
protect Chinese people’s rights in Australia.  Third, they had to compete with the Japanese 
diplomats in Australia, in order for China to gain support from Australia in its military 
struggle against Japan. 
Two prominent Chinese figures visited Australia in the 1930s; one of their goals was to gain 
support from Chinese people in Australasia, in order to fight against Japan.  Ernest Koh has 
suggested, ethnic Chinese across the world who identified politically and emotionally with 
China played a significant role in “public displays of patriotism and support in the war 
against Japan”.6 Lin Sen (1868-1943), a senior Kuomintang party official, as well as the 
Chairman of National Government of China between 15 December 1931 and 1 August 1943, 
visited Australia in 1931.7 His visit is significant as this was the first time that a head of 
China (an official at the highest level) had ever visited Australia.8 Cai Tingkai (1892-1968), a 
Chinese military general, visited Australia as a tourist in early 1935. While Lin Sen received 
a warm welcome from Australia politicians and Chinese diplomats, Cai Tingkai received a 
warm welcome from local Chinese communities in Australia.9  Cai’s visit to Australia might 
have harmed the official Sino-Australian relations, as the Chinese consulate in Sydney was 
critical of his arrival.  Chinese diplomats believed that Cai’s popularity have damaged the 
authority of Chiang Kai-shek and his regime because Chiang and Cai held different political 
views regarding the Japanese invaders and the Chinese Communists. Thus, the internal 
political divisions within China could also have affected Sino-Australian relations in the 
1930s.  In the later part of this Chapter, I am going to examine these two trips in further 
detail.  
As in the previous two decades, the White Australia policy and trade were still the dominant 
factors affecting Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1921 and 1941, although the 
expansion of Japan in the Pacific was becoming an increasingly important factor shaping the 
relations of the two nations.10 The international situation eventually led China and Australia 
to exchange official diplomatic representatives in 1941. While Chinese diplomats tended to 
argue that China and Australia should cooperate economically and militarily against Japan, 
Australian politicians were hesitant to do so.11 In this period, Australians increasingly realised 
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the importance of trading with Asia.  In Towards a New Vision, Neville Meaney has 
documented Australia’s trade with Japan, but historians have paid little attention to 
Australia’s trade with China in the 1930s (except Loy-Wilson).12 My research suggests that 
Australia wanted to trade with both China and Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, though the trade 
between Australia and Japan was bigger than Australia’s trade with China.  For Australian 
politicians, Japan was a more reliable trading partner than China, as China suffered internal 
military conflicts.13  However, Australian politicians were concerned about the expansion of 
Japan in Asia.14  
Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to fight against the White Australia policy, as 
Australia paid more attention to the Asia-Pacific region in the 1930s, due to the Great 
Depression (1929-1932) and the expansion of Japan.15 As early as 1921, William Morris 
(Billy) Hughes, then Prime Minister of Australia, one of the supporters of the White Australia 
policy, appointed Edward Little as Australia’s first trade commissioner in Shanghai, China.  
The status of Edward Little in China was a perfect example of Australia’s geo-political 
dilemma. On the one hand, he was an Australian official, and his job was to promote trade 
between Australia and China (and the East more generally). He was Australia’s first official 
representative in China as well as one of Australia’s first diplomats.  On the other hand, he 
was not welcomed by the British diplomats in China (neither the ones in the Beijing legation 
nor the consular staff in Shanghai), as the British officials believed that they could protect 
Australian’s interests in China, and therefore there was no need of such postings.16 
The Australian government terminated Little’s postings in 1923, partly because Australia’s 
trade with Britain resumed after WWI.  However, the Great Depression forced Australians to 
seek new markers once again. Two influential Australians visited China in the 1930s, in order 
to enhance Australia’s understandings of the East and promote the trade between Australia 
and Asia, particularly China and Japan. They were Alexander Clifford Vernon Melbourne 
(1888–1943) and John Latham (1877-1964).17 Melbourne was an academic based at the 
University of Queensland.  The university sent him to visit China in 1932, in order to study 
China and Japan as well as to promote trade between Australia and these two Asian nations.18 
As David Walker has suggested, Melbourne “was prominent among the intellectuals of the 
1930s” who wanted Australia to develop a closer relationship with Asia.19 Two years later, on 
behalf of the Australian government, John Latham—the Minister of External Affairs and 
Deputy Prime Minister, paid an official visit to Netherlands East Indies, China and Japan.20 
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Latham was the leader of the Goodwill Mission to Asia’ and the ‘Australian Eastern 
Mission’.21 Chinese leaders showed great respect to the Australian government. Lin Sen (who 
visited Australia in 1931)—then Chairman of the National Government of the Republic of 
China—and Wang Jingwei (1883-1944)—then Premier of the Republic of China, both met 
Latham and welcomed his visit to China.22  Latham reported to Prime Minister Joseph Lyons 
(1879-1939) that “the Chinese politicians treated the Australian delegation with great respect, 
and he was satisfied”.23  
When Latham returned to Australia in 1934, he advised Lyons that not only should Australia 
increase its trading with China and Japan, Australia should also prepare to relax the White 
Australia policy, in order to negotiate better economic deals with China and Japan.24  Latham 
had a mixed view of Japan.  On the one hand, he was an admirer of Japan, as he respected 
Japan’s modern economy and its clean environment. He was therefore extremely keen to 
promote Australia’s trading with Japan.  On the other hand, he was increasingly worried 
about the Japanese expansion in the Asia-Pacific region, and he worried about Australia’s 
security in the region.25  When Latham visited China, he stayed within Australian and British 
communities in Shanghai, and was not impressed with China’s development.26  Melbourne, 
however, had a more positive view of China than Latham, as he believed both China and 
Japan to be important trading partners to Australia.   
1. The White Australia policy 
This part of the chapter is mainly focusing on the White Australia policy. I suggest that, 
between 1921 and 1941, the White Australia policy continued to be a major factor negatively 
affecting Sino-Australian diplomatic relations.27  Between 1901 and 1941, the Chinese 
became of the biggest victims of the White Australia policy. Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats 
continued to work with local business leaders to promote trade between the two nations, in 
order to fight against this racist policy.28  Although the majority of white Australians strongly 
supported the White Australia policy at this time, Chinese people challenged the policy at 
cultural, social and diplomatic levels.29   
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Between 1901 and 1947, the population of Asian people in Australia decreased from 47 014 
to 13 000.  The White Australia policy partly contributed to this decline.  The majority of 
Asian people in Australia were Chinese.30 At the beginning of the twentieth century, there 
were around 30, 000 Chinese in Australia, compared to only 3, 000 Japanese.31 Further, 
Yeung reminds us that the low status of China as a state was another major factor in the 
discrimination that Chinese faced abroad, because Chinese government could not protect its 
people overseas.32 However, I also wish to point out that, although Japan was a powerful 
nation at this time, Japanese people were also victims of the White Australia policy. In 1937, 
the West Australian newspaper provides statistics to show us the decline of the Chinese 
population in Australia:  
A pronounced decrease in the number of Aslatics [Asiatics] in Australia, and particularly of 
Chinese, is recorded. The Chinese population of the Commonwealth at the time of the census 
was only 7,792 per sons [persons], a decrease of 6,007 compared with the number at the 
previous census.33 
Furthermore, Chinese expatriates in Australia decided to move to live in larger cities such as 
Sydney and Melbourne in the 1920s and 1930s.  This allowed them to form association and 
help each other. 
On 17th March 1923, the Chinese newspaper Tung Wah Times published a rare commentary 
on racial tensions within Australia. The report is an old, educated Chinese man’s response to 
the White Australia policy, as well as his views on Chinese people’s position in Australia. In 
Making Chinese Australia, Kuo Mei-fen reminds us that Chinese newspapers like Tung Wah 
Times “not only reported on community events”, but also were significant historical agents in 
their own right “in the shaping of communities and patterns of urban leadership” in 
Australia.34 
                                                          
30 Zhang Qiusheng, Aodaliya Hu qiao Huaren shi, p.136. 
31 Yeung, Lonely star on lone nights, p.444. and p.480. 
32 Ibid, p.482. 
33 West Australian, 20 April 1937, p.14. 
34 Kuo Mei-fen, Making Chinese Australia, 2013, p.6. 
79 
 
 
Figure 12 [Chinese under the White Australia policy] 
Source: Tung Wah Times, 17 March 1923, p.2. 
This writer stated in the beginning of the article that if anyone has a basic understanding of 
Australian history, then he or she should know that the land of Australia belonged to 
Aboriginal (and Torres Strait Islander people of Australia) originally.  The Dutch people 
discovered Australia in the eighteenth century.  Then Britain replaced the Netherlands as the 
dominant maritime power.  The British subsequently sent more and more convicts to 
Australia, and the Bairen (white European Australians) gradually outnumbered others and the 
colonisers eventually became the ruling people of the colony.  According to the author, this 
had only happened within the previous fifty years.  Meanwhile, since China had such a huge 
population, Chinese moved to Australia to live, in the latter half of the century. 
Unfortunately, China was an extremely weak nation, and Chinese people had to live under 
foreign rule.  Thus, they suffered discrimination.  As a result, the Chinese population in 1923 
was only one-tenth of the population at its peak. The author, who calls himself “the old 
[Chinese] man”, then stated that Chinese settlers also contributed to the development of 
Australia, and they therefore deserved to get recognition.35 Then he listed three major 
discriminations that Chinese people faced daily under the White Australia policy.36 They 
were: 
1. Chinese people did not have the freedom to choose their occupation; 
2. Chinese people could not participate politics; they did not have the rights to vote; 
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3. Chinese people were the victims of the anti-humanitarian White Australia policy, this resulted 
a significant decline of the Chinese population in Australia.37 
Clearly, for him, Chinese people were the second-class citizens in Australia at this time.  
One week later, the same author—“the old Chinese man”—published a follow-up 
commentary in Tung Wah Times, to continue his resistance against the White Australia 
policy, by documenting the racist treatment that Chinese people confronted in Australia.38  
Based on his personal observation, he argued that Chinese received unequal treatment in 
Australia. They did not enjoy the equal opportunity to compete economically with white 
people in Australia.39  If the Chinese had more freedom to do business in Australia, they 
could promote the trade between Australia and China, as well as contributing to the 
development of the Australian local economy. The English-language newspapers published 
discriminatory or insulting words against Chinese people. Chinese people would face 
insulting behaviours daily when they were walking on the streets.40  However, Chinese people 
in Australia formed various associations and parties; they had different interests and political 
views.  As a result, they could not work together to protect their common interests. Further, 
he believed the weakness of China, as a nation was a factor that Caucasian people in 
Australia would dare to discriminate against the Chinese.  Therefore, he suggested that 
Chinese people overseas needed to help China to become a stronger nation, because once 
China was capable of protecting its citizens abroad, it would improve the living conditions of 
the Chinese people in Australia.  Thus, the fate of Chinese people in Australia was closely 
intertwined with the destiny of China.41 The White Australia policy reinforced this.    
While Australian politicians were not ready to give up the White Australia policy, sometimes 
they were willing to relax it, if they could get economic benefits in return from China.42 For 
example, James Scullin (1876-1953), Prime Minister of Australia in 1930, sent a report to 
then Chinese consul-general Song Faxiang (宋发祥). Scullin told Song that the Australian 
government would consider allowing the relatives of well-off Chinese businessmen to come 
to live in Australia, as these Chinese businessmen were getting old.43 In this regard, this 
would be positive news for local Chinese people in Australia.44 However, the Australian 
government rejected other proposals made by Song. Song proposed tolerance of Chinese 
traders, but the Australian government was not prepared to give up its border control policies. 
Song also suggested that the Australian government abolish the fingerprint policies, as 
Chinese people viewed the practice as humiliating and discriminating. Scullin replied to Song 
that, although his government felt sympathy towards the Chinese people, they would not give 
up this discriminating policy. However, those who carried legal Australian passports/permits 
would not be the victim of this policy.45 The Australian government was willing to give 
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concessions to three types of Chinese people, who would not need to print their fingers when 
they went through the Australian customs. The three categories of Chinese people were: 
1. Chinese merchants who owned business in Australia or abroad. 
2. Those Chinese who had lived in Australia before, have done finger-prints previously and 
travelled with legal permits. 
3. Those Chinese who visited New Zealand, Fiji, or Solomon Islands; and wanted to returned 
to Australia.46   
Thus, the Australian government allowed certain categories of Chinese people to stay in 
Australia.  If you were a businessperson or had lived in Australia previously, you could stay 
in Australia legally despite the White Australia policy.  Further, Scullin stated, although these 
policies could not be changed or abolished now, it was not his government’s policy, as the 
policies had existed since 1901.47 This is because between 1921 and 1941, the majority of 
Australians still held strong racial prejudice against the non-European people, as they “would 
not have wished to see the end of the White Australia policy”.48 For example, scholar Eric 
Andrews reminds us that the “Round Table in 1921 produced a long defence of the White 
Australia policy”.49 Round Table, an Australian newspaper, published an article that refused 
the non-white immigrants to move to Australia, and it therefore reinforced the White 
Australia ideology.50  This ideology represented the view of the majority of European 
Australians at this time.  
Chinese historian Yeung Wing On argues that the White Australia policy was not only a 
result of racism, but also a tool to protect the white people’s interests in Australia.51 Yeung 
suggests the white working-class tended to dislike the arrival of the Chinese workers, as they 
feared the Chinese might lower wages, while employers tended to welcome the Chinese as 
cheap labourers. In their writings, one thing is common: both Andrews and Yeung realised 
the importance of the White Australia policy, and its negative impacts on Chinese people’s 
ordinary lives in Australia.  My research, however, is focusing more on the diplomatic 
relations between the two nations. 
This treatment of the Chinese in Australia severely strained Sino-Australian relations.52 
Chinese diplomats tried to use their diplomatic status to improve the treatment of Chinese 
people in Australia.53  Since 1909, Chinee diplomats had argued that Australia should allow 
three categories of Chinese come to Australia.54 In 1929, the then Chinese consul-general, 
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Song Faxiang (宋发祥) received several complaints from Chinese passengers when they 
boarded a ship.55 Song, was educated at the University of Chicago, and had strong scientific 
background. Song also spoke fluent English, and was critical of the White Australia policy.56 
Among all the Chinese diplomats between 1909 and 1941, Song was the most critical of the 
White Australia policy. On behalf of the Chinese consulate, he sent an official letter to the 
Department of Home Affairs, complaining about the ill-treatment of Chinese in Australia, as 
follows: 
The Consul-General [Song Faxiang] stated that complaints had reached his office that 
Chinese passengers were treated in a rather discourteous manner at Queensland Ports, 
particularly at Cairns, Townsville and Thursday Island. He also mentioned that his 
predecessor, Mr. Quei, when returning to China last October, had desired to visit one at 
Cairns but that the Customs Officer on duty had refused to recognise him as a representative 
of China…He stated, however, that his Government had urged him to make special 
representations with a view to his countrymen being treated with respect, and as he is desirous 
of promoting good feelings between Australia and China and of fostering trade, he is anxious 
to effect the removal of any possible causes for complaint as regards the treatment of Chinese 
in Australia.57 
This incident, however, was not unique. As this thesis has shown above, Huang Rongliang     
(黄荣良), then Chinese consul-general in Australia, had also had difficulty moving from New 
Zealand to Australia, back in 1911.58  The mistreatment of Chinese diplomats in Australia 
was alarming. In addition, given the fact many Chinese in Australia could not speak English, 
they suffered even more in their everyday lives.59 Chinese people in Australia were begging 
Chinese diplomats to ask Australian government to abolish the White Australia policy.60 On 
the one hand, this shows how weak China was, as the Australian government did not show 
much respect to China’s officials. On the other hand, it shows the racial prejudices that 
Anglo-Saxon Australians exhibited towards Chinese people.  Ordinary Chinese people as 
well as Chinese diplomats could be victims of the White Australia policy.   
Chinese diplomats like Song Faxiang tried to help Chinese people in Australia to deal with 
the White Australia policy.61 One of their major task was to help the Chinese to travel 
between China and Australia legally and freely. For example, Henry Manpo Chiu, a second-
generation Chinese Australian, was sent to China to be educated, as his father wanted him to 
learn Chinese language and culture.62  However, he had difficulty returning to Australia in 
1930, as his mother was a Chinese citizen, not an Australian. Thus, Chiu became a victim of 
the White Australia policy. His father went to the then Chinese consul-general Song Faxiang 
                                                          
55 NAA: J2773, 616/1929, “Complaint from Chinese Consul General re treatment of Chinese passengers”, p.2. 
56 Jian Zhaoming and Guan Nayi, Pound’s Encounter with Song Faxiang (NiXiangErxing—Pangde Yu Song 
Faxiang de xiehuo he zhuangji), in Foreign Literature (Waiguo wenxue), 2011, p.123.  
57 NAA: J2773, 616/1929, “Complaint from Chinese Consul General re treatment of Chinese passengers”,                  
pp.2-3. 
58 This was partly due to the unstable political situations in China in 1911. 
59 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 21 June 1924, p.7.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 
1902; 1911 - 1936), 28 March 1925, p.7. 
60 Ibid.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 11 October 1924, p.7.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, 
NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 20 December 1924, p.7. 
61 ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522-0062-016-12-M, p.17. 
62 NAA: A1 1930/9098, “Chinese Consul General domiciliary rights of children born of Chinese parents on 
exemption of the commonwealth”, pp.4-5. 
83 
 
(宋发祥)63, to seek help.64  The consul-general Song actively campaigned on behalf of 
Chinese Australians, and tried to negotiate with the Australian government regarding this 
case, so that Chiu could be reunited with his Chinese father in Australia.65 It is clear that 
Australian government did not allow Chinese Australians to move freely in and out of 
Australia.  Chinese diplomats like Song had to act on behalf of the local Chinese, in order to 
protect the rights of Chinese in Australia.66  
Chinese diplomats used the decline of the Chinese population in Australia to argue against 
the legitimacy of the White Australia policy.67 The question of admission of Chinese citizens 
to Australia was closely intertwined with the White Australia policy.68 For example, then 
Chinese consul-general, Chen Weiping (陈维屏), argued that the Australian government 
should relax its White Australia policy, and allow certain groups of Chinese to travel and 
settle in Australia. In 1934, Chen contacted the Australian government: 
The Consul-General for China has made strong representations from time to time on behalf of 
aged Chinese, who have fairly substantial business or garden interests in Australia which they 
cannot continue to look after, but which they do not wish to sacrifice. The Consul-General 
states that these men wish to return to China to spend their last days, but desire permission for 
a son or other relative to be admitted into Australia to take their place and carry on the 
business…The Consul-General points out that to grant the concession sought would not 
endanger the White Australia Policy, as it would probably not apply to more than a dozen 
cases. He stresses the fact that the Chinese population is steadily declining-that the Census of 
1921 showed a decline of 5, 596 Chinese residents as compared with 1911, and that the 
excess departures for 1932 over arrivals numbered 360. In 1933 there were excess 
departures.69 
Consul-general Chen used the decline of the Chinese population in Australia, to gain 
sympathy from the Australian government and public. He further argues that Australia should 
relax or modify the White Australia policy. This is because Chen believed the White 
Australia policy was the key factor contributing to the decline of the Chinese population, as 
Chinese were barred from travelling to Australia, while older generations of Chinese were 
dying out.70  However, there was a major difference between Consul-Generals Song and Chen 
regarding to the White Australia policy. Song argued that Australia should completely 
remove the White Australia policy; in contrast, Chen argued that Australia could modify the 
White Australia policy. Both of them were trying to improve the living conditions of Chinese 
people. Chen’s approach, however, was more realistic, given the fact that it would have been 
almost impossible to abolish the White Australia policy in Australia in the first half of the 
twentieth century.  
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The White Australia policy harmed Australia’s international reputation.71 Both Chinese and 
Japanese diplomats in Australia shared a common goal: to fight against the White Australia 
policy.72 This was because both Chinese and Japanese people faced strong discrimination in 
Australia.73 For example, in February 1933, then Chinese consul-general and Japanese 
consul-general both attended a conference to promote the trade between Australia and East 
Asia.74 The Japanese representative remarked: “I can see no hope of further trade being 
fostered with Australia unless the Commonwealth displays a greater measure of goodwill 
towards our nationals in this country”.75 The Chinese Consul-General made a similar 
protest.76 However, although both Chinese and Japanese officials protested against the White 
Australia policy, they could not persuade the Australian government to abolish the 
controversial policy. Further, due to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, it was 
impossible for Chinese and Japanese diplomats in Australia to work together against the 
White Australia policy, even though their fellow compatriots faced similar discriminations in 
Australia.  
Although the White Australia policy was the official position of all the major parties, a 
minority of European Australians actually challenged the legitimacy of the policy.77 They 
tended to belong to one of three groups of people. First, some Christians, and they saw the 
policy as cruel and inhuman.78 For example, Archbishop Howard Mowll, used to work as a 
pastor in Sichuan Province of China. Once he returned to Australia, Mowll worked closely 
with the consul-general for China (Dr. Wei Ping Chen) and William Liu (a local Chinese 
community leader who had close links with the Chinese consulate and the business 
communities in Australia), to not only promote trade between the two nations, but also 
encourage other Australians to learn from China and respect the Chinese cultures.79  Mowll 
even delivered one of the George Morrison lectures.80 The second group was made up of 
Australian businessmen, as they continued to seek trading opportunities with Asian nations, 
especially China and Japan.81 They realised the policy created a negative image of Australia 
in Asia, which they viewed as a key market for Australian goods. The third group which 
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fought against the policy, comprised those who had travelled and/or lived in Asia.82 Once 
they returned to Australia, they therefore argued that the Australian government should 
abolish the policy, or at least relax it. Although these people’s views of the White Australia 
policy might not reflect the views of the majority of Australians at that time, they provided 
room for Chinese diplomats to argue against the policy.   
2. Trade and “Commercial Diplomacy”83  
Between 1921 and 1941, the Australia government wanted to improve its trade relations with 
China.84  Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats used trading between China and Australia as 
leverage in their attempts to have the White Australia policy modified. There were two major 
parts of this policy. First, Chinese diplomats worked along with some of the local Chinese 
business leaders like William Liu (1893-1983) to promote trade between the two nations.  
Second, Chinese diplomats highlighted the importance of this trade to Australian officials. 
The Australian government acknowledged this strategy as “commercial diplomacy”.85  
Further, Chinese diplomats suggested that Australia should buy more products from China, 
and in doing so to make the trade more balanced.86  
Between 1909 and 192987, one of the priorities of Chinese diplomats was to try to promote 
the trade between China and Australia. In 1918, Zeng Zijian (曾宗鉴), China’s consul-
general to Australia, was keen to promote “trade and commercial relations between 
Australasia and the Republic of China”.88 Chinese diplomats in Australia worked closely with 
Chinese people in Australia, as the local Chinese expatriates were also extremely keen to 
promote the trade between China and Australia. Sandra Tweedie argues that Australia 
improved its trading with Asia during the First World War (WWI).89 She further reminds us 
that, despite the Australian government’s “mistrust of the Japanese, wartime conditions 
expanded trading between the two countries”.90 William Morris Hughes (Billy Hughes) was 
Prime Minister of Australia between 1915 and 1923. Despite his personal “mistrust of the 
Japanese and his fierce commitment to White Australia”, Billy Hughes’s political ideologies 
“did not blind him to the necessity for Australia to develop economic relationships with its 
neighbours in East and South-East Asia”.91 “In the immediate post-World War I years”, 
                                                          
82 A. C. V. Melbourne, Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan and China, Brisbane: Government Print, 
1932, pp.32-33.; James Cotton, “A. C. V. Melbourne in Australian International Thought: Nationalism and 
Appeasement Between the World Wars”, in Australia and the World: A Festschrift for Neville Meaney, edited 
by Joan Beaumont and Matthew Jordan, Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2013, p.150.  
83 NAA: A981, CHIN 102, “China-Australia, Visit of General Tsai Ting-Kai”, p.32. “Commercial Diplomacy” 
is the term that Australian officials used in this government report.   
84 Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy: 1938-1965, London or New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967, p.25. 
85 NAA: A981, CHIN 102, “China-Australia, Visit of General Tsai Ting-Kai”, p.32. 
86 John H. C. Sleeman, Australia and Japan: Canberra’s Calamitous Attack on Australian Prosperity, Sydney: 
The Criterion Press, 1936, p.7. 
87 The Chinese consulate was based on Level 2 109 Little Bourke Street Melbourne Victoria, between 1909 and 
1929.  I have collected a lot of extremely valuable primary sources from ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of 
Melbourne. 
88 ACCG, Kuo Min Tang Society of Melbourne, 522-0062-016-12-M, 20th March 1918, p.5. 
89 Sandra Tweedie, Trading Partners: Australia and Asia 1790-1993, Sydney: University of New South Wales 
Press, 1994, p.70. 
90 Ibid.,  
91 Ibid., p.72. 
86 
 
Hughes was convinced that Australia must develop new trading partners in the Asia-Pacific 
region.92  
In 1921, Billy Hughes appointed Australia’s first trade commissioner in Shanghai, China. 
Edward Little was chosen by Hughes to protect Australian business interests in China. 
Little’s appointment suggests that the Australian government wanted to have a more “direct 
communication with China proper”.93 Hughes believed that Edward Little possessed an 
almost unique knowledge of the East, where he “had lived for the last thirty years”, during 
the greater part of which he had been the general manager of Messrs Brunner Mond and Co. 
in China.94 Don Fitch suggests that Little was arguably Australia’s first diplomat. In 1922, 
Hughes appointed Egbert Sheaf as Australia’s trade commissioner in the East, where he was 
based in Singapore.95 Unfortunately, Little’s appointment was terminated on 18th October, 
1923 due to strong opposition from both the Melbourne business community and the 
Australian commercial community in Shanghai.96 Senator Thomas J. K. Bakhap was one of a 
few Australian politicians who supported Edward Little, but it was not enough.97 Similarly, 
the Australian government did not renewed Sheaf’s appointment when it expired in 1925.98 In 
other words, neither of these two posts survived for a long period of time. However, I think 
the Australian government made two important diplomatic moves in the early 1920s, and 
scholars should pay more attention to Australia’s early official representatives in Asia, 
especially when they study Australia’s position in the world. Further, these two appointments 
indicate that, although the Australian government worked hard to maintain its White 
Australia policy so that the country could remain a white British outpost in the South Pacific, 
was willing to trade with its Asian neighbours in order to develop Australia’s economy. 
Between 1921 and 1923, two diplomatic systems co-existed in China, which should have 
protected Australia’s political and economic interests in China together (at least in theory).99 
The first was the British legation in Beijing and the British consul-generals in Shanghai, 
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Tianjin, Canton and Hong Kong.100 The second, Australia’s own official representatives in 
Shanghai, operated under the leadership of Edward Little. The British diplomats and Edward 
Little were supposedly to work together, but this was not the reality. In 1921, one of the key 
reasons that Billy Hughes appointed Little as Australia’s trade commissioner in Shanghai was 
because Hughes felt the British diplomats failed to advance Australia’s own interests in 
China. Thus, when Little was representing Australia in China, his British co-workers did not 
like the existence of his posting, as they felt Australia (as a British dominion) did not need to 
appoint a trade commissioner in China. The British diplomats thought they were perfectly 
capable of protecting Australia’s commercial interests in China. The hostility of the British 
diplomats in China made Little’s job difficult, while he was serving in his role as Australia’s 
trading representative. Little’s time in China was not too successful, as he was lacking 
support from both British officials and the Australian business community in Shanghai at this 
time. However, he was Australia’s first official in China. The posting suggests that the 
Australian government was paying greater attention to Asia, and laid the foundation for the 
promotion of the future Sino-Australian trading relations.   
Australian politicians also realised the importance of trading with China. Australian Senator 
Thomas J. K. Bakhap (1866-1923) argued that Australia should increase its shares in the 
Chinese market, as the British and Americans were profiting from their trade with China. 
Thomas Bakhap was the adopted son of a Chinese immigrant, and his personal experience 
made him identify strongly with Chinese people.  He thought that if Australians could benefit 
more from trade with China, it could help to improve Chinese living conditions in Australia.  
For example, Bakhap sent a report to Arthur Rodgers (1876-1936), then Australia’s Minister 
for Trade and Customs in 1922.101 He commented: 
I think that Australia should endeavour to completely gain the wheat and flour trade of 
Southern China, and of Canton province in particular… Flour of a particularly good and 
glutinous kind is desired by Cantonese cooks, and as the South produces little wheat and as its 
requirements are not likely to be readily supplied from any North China. Surplus, this trade 
should be fought for and permanently retained if possible in the wheat-producing interests of 
the Commonwealth.102 
Thus, as early as the 1920s, Australian politicians such as Senator Bakhap realised the 
importance of the China trade to Australia.   
Similar to Senator Bakhap, other Australian businesspersons tried to export their products to 
China in the 1920s and 1930s. They also realised Australia’s closeness to Asia, and intended 
to promote the trade between the two nations.103 Between 1918 and 1921, there was a 
company located within NSW which intended to sell fruits to China and Japan. The company 
believed Australia should sell more fruits to China and Japan.104 Further, Australian jam was  
popular among the Westerners in China, and they consumed a lot of fruit and similar 
products.105 There were 300, 000 Westerners living in China (excluding Hong Kong), and 
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they mainly settled in the Eastern coastal cities, including Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai.106 
There was a huge potential market for Australian fruiter growers, as the “Australian fruit 
season comes in at a time where there is no competition here, either foreign or Chinese”.107 
From April to August/September, according to The Daily News, neither China nor foreign 
nations in the Northern Hemisphere, could supply fruit. Thus, Australian businessmen were 
partially targeting the Westerners who were living in China at this time.  Here is a diagram of 
the trading statistics between China and Australia in 1930-1931: 
 
Figure 13 [Australia’s Trade with China 1930-1931] 
Source: NAA: A981 TRAD 191, “Trade. China-Commercial Policy-Consular Invoices” 
Sandra Tweedie suggested that: “Australia saw its most successful sales year in China as long 
ago as 1932/33 when, largely through its purchase of depression-priced Australian wheat, 
China accepted 6.4 percent of total Australian exports.”108 Tweedie published her book in 
1994, so I assume her point is that the financial year of 1932 was Australia’s most successful 
export year in China before 1994. However, I wish to add that Australia’s export to China in 
1932 was even bigger than Tweedie proposed. The secret was Hong Kong.109   
There were at least two Australians (who were based in China or had visited China) 
suggesting that a lot of Australia’s exporters went through Hong Kong to mainland China.  In 
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the early 1920s, when Edward Little was Australia’s trade commissioner in Shanghai, China, 
he recorded that a lot of goods went through Hong Kong to mainland China.110  In 1932, the 
University of Queensland sent Alexander Melbourne (1888-1943), a historian, to visit China 
and Japan, in order to study the economic and political situations in these two nations. 
According to Melbourne’s own publication: Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan and 
China, the consuls-general for both China and Japan strongly supported Melbourne’s trip to 
Asia.111 Melbourne visited Shanghai, Canton and Hong Kong. He also intended to visit 
Peking, Tianjin and Nanking, but it became impossible “by the outbreak of hostilities 
between the Japanese and Chinese forces”.112 Once Melbourne came back to Australia, he 
wrote a report regarding his experiences in China and Japan. Melbourne suggested the trading 
between China and Australia was much greater than the official government statistics. He 
wrote: 
In the first place, Australian exports are consigned to Hong Kong, whence they are 
transhipped to China. In Australian statistics, these goods are shown as exports to Hong 
Kong; in Hong Kong statistics, they are shown both as imports from Australia and exports to 
China; in Chinese statistics, they are shown as imports from Hong Kong.113 
Thus, Australian officials knew that there was trade that existed between China and Australia, 
through Hong Kong.114  Ernest Koh even suggests that Hong Kong was the shadow capital of 
China during the republican era.115  This is because almost two-thirds of all war materials 
shipped to mainland China from Australia came through Hong Kong via the rail link between 
the city of Guangzhou and the British colony.116  
Melbourne was an influential Australian public intellectual in the 1930s.  Australian 
politicians and officials read his Report on Australian Intercourse with Japan and China. 
According to James Cotton, on foreign policy, Melbourne “had become something of an 
influence upon Prime Minster Joseph Lyons”.117  In 1933, Melbourne was “elected Chairman 
of the Federal Advisory Committee on Eastern Trade”.  He then served various Advisory 
Committees on Eastern trade in Australia.118 He argued that the future of trade between China 
and Australia would benefit Australia more. In addition, Melbourne suggested that a lot of 
Australian exports to Japan would reach China eventually (after Japan upgraded these 
products, such as wool). Thus, Sino-Australian trade had a significant advantage over the 
Japanese-Australian trade, as China did not have tariff protection.   
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John Latham, Minister of External Affairs visited China and Japan in 1934.119 Once he 
returned to Australia, Latham sent a report to Joseph Lyons, then Prime Minister of Australia. 
In this official report, Latham stated: 
Both China and Japan want trade and other concessions from Australia. After experience of 
both countries I suggest that nothing should be given to either of them without an equivalent. 
In coincidence with this view I sent to you a cable suggesting that the reply to certain Chinese 
requests affecting immigration should be held up for the present. We should not, I think, give 
anything on immigration unless e.g. we get thing on trade.120 
In other words, Latham was suggesting to Lyons that the Australian government should 
consider relaxing the White Australia policy if they could get more economic benefits from 
China and Japan. It indicates that Australia desperately needed to trade with two Asian 
nations, as it was even willing to relax its White Australia policy.   
Other Australian politicians also realised the importance of the trading between Australia and 
its two Asian partners. Robert Menzies, then attorney-general, acknowledged the trade 
between Australia and China.121  Joseph Lyons also realised the importance of Australia’s 
trade with China and Japan. Lyons was in London on 15 May 1937. He gave a speech 
regarding Australia’s defence and trade. Lyons stated: 
Australia’s future, however, is bound up with her primary industries, and the advancement of 
these industries makes vital the extension of our external trade. 
This trade has been found to an important degree within the British Commonwealth, but 
almost every Empire country has become increasingly aware of the need for wider markets 
than even the Empire can supply. Hence, if we able progressively to improve our standards of 
living, it is essential that there should be an increase in world trade.122 
Thus, at the highest level of Australian government, Lyons realised the need to trade with 
markets outside of the British Empire. China and Japan were the future for Australia’s 
economy.  
As early as the 1930s, Australians started to realise the necessity for Australian government 
to appoint a diplomatic representative in China, to protect Australian business interests there.  
As David Walker comments, Sir Herbert William Gepp (whom also visited China in the 
1930s) and Dr Alexander C. V. Melbourne both believed in the importance of Eastern 
markets and the urgent necessity to improve the level and quality of Australian official 
representation in Asia.  Gepp called for the establishment of a standing committee or 
committees to review and promote trade between Australia and Asia.  He also recommended 
‘high class’ diplomatic appointments to China and Japan, backed by suitable commercial 
officials.123  
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The Australian government was largely dependent on the British government to protect 
Australian interests in China, but it became increasingly frustrated by the fact that British 
diplomats put the interests of Britain first.  The Australian government did not appoint any 
official diplomat until 1935. Vivian Gordon Bowden (1884–1942), was Australia’s trading 
commissioner in Shanghai, China between 1935 and 1941.  This appointment was a direct 
result of Latham’s visit to China in 1934. Bowden was working in a Japanese firm in China 
before this appointment.  Thus, it took the Chinese government several months to approve 
Bowden as the trade commissioner in China, because they did not appreciate his connections 
with Japanese firms.  Bowden was an Empire-nationalist.  On the one hand, he was trying to 
promote the trade between Australia and China.124 On the other hand, he would have liked to 
see Australia become an equal partner to Britain within the British Empire. For example, in 
1936, Australia actively participated in the trade fair between the British Empire and China in 
Hong Kong.  Although Bowden worked closely with the British representatives in China, he 
was protecting Australia’s own commercial interests in China at this time.125 
Bowden not only promoted the trade between Australia and China, but also gathered 
information about China and then reported to Australia, so that the Australian government 
would have a better understanding of China.  Bowden paid attention to the Chinese media.  
For example, in one of his official letters, he mentioned a monthly publication called 
“PEOPLES TRIBUNE”.126 It was printed in English and published in Shanghai.  The 
publication had links with Wang Jingwei (1883-1944), the Kuomintang leader.  Prominent 
Chinese contributed to this monthly periodical, including their views of China’s role in the 
trade between China and the British Empire.127 Clearly, Bowden was trying to let the 
Australian government know the Chinese view of the trade fair in Hong Kong.   
Wool and wheat were the most popular goods that Australia was selling to China in the 
1930s.128  However, Australia exported a large variety of products to China at this time.  In 
1937, Australia exported animal products, canned goods, cereals, fruits and vegetables, wines 
and beers, chemicals, soap, timber and coal to China.129 Australia had commercial relations 
with Chinese coastal cities like Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin and Canton, as well as inland 
cities like Hankou (part of modern-day Wuhan). Thus, by 1937, Australia had substantial 
commercial connections with China. Similarly, wheat, beef (fresh), hides and skins, beef 
tallow and sheep’s wool are the most popular products that Australia sold to Japan.130 
Despite Australia’s willingness to trade with Asia, particularly China and Japan, the 
Australian government was not prepared to give up the White Australia policy. For  
Australians, the White Australia policy was almost like a religion at this time, to borrow 
Senator Burford Sampson’s (1882-1959) words in 1928.131  The White Australia policy was 
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an ideology among Australian politicians and the majority of the public. It was what historian 
Neville Meaney would describe as a ‘community of culture’, as it excluded non-British 
peoples. The promotion of trade between Australia and China was a more realistic approach, 
especially during the Great Depression, as Australia needed to export goods to China and 
Japan. The trade between China and Australia linked perfectly with Meaney’s ‘community of 
interests’. Overall, if one studies Sino-Australian relations between 1921 and 1941, from an 
Australian perspective, it is evident that there was a tension between community of culture 
(in this case, the White Australia policy) and community of interest (trade between China and 
Australia). Although the White Australia policy was still a more powerful concept than trade, 
more Australians were realising the importance of trade with China. 
Chinese consul-general, Dr Chen Weiping (陈维屏), highlighted the importance of the 
trading between China and Australia by suggesting trade could be a key factor to promote 
diplomatic relations between the two nations. He explained how Australians benefited from 
this trading. In September 1931, consul-general Chen was surprised to find out that China 
imported more goods from Australia than Australia imported goods from China. The 
Singleton Argus reported: 
The exports to China were worth 8,000,000 taels, and from China to Australia only 1, 000, 
000. Tariffs were responsible for preventing imports such as silk, peanuts, and cork. 
Shippings leaving for Australia [from China] returned almost empty, so that the shipping 
companies had to increase their export rates. High wages, compared with Britain, had much to 
do with the little steel imported from Australia.132 
Chen argued that Australia should modify the White Australia policy by allowing three 
categories of Chinese to come in the nation: students, travellers, and merchants.133 This is an 
example of how the Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to argue that Australia should 
relax its White Australia policy. Then he was critical of the White Australia policy. For 
consul-general Chen (陈维屏), it “was always humiliating to see his countrymen treated like 
animals by customs officers”.134 He fought against the White Australia policy by suggesting 
that the Australian government should allow students, businessmen and travellers to come to 
Australia.  
‘Thirty years ago’, he said, ‘you brought your White Australia policy into being. We did not 
want to flood your country, but now your laws stop our students, travellers and merchants 
coming in. I do not mind if you stop labourers coming in.’ China had 7000 students in Europe 
and America, he said, and practically none here. There were only three University students in 
Australia at the present time. A Chinese merchant’s wife had been allowed to stay only 12 
months. She could not come back in less than six years. ‘You can drive the Chinese away by 
other means than the White Australia policy,’ he said. ‘of the incidence if it is  inhumane.’135 
Thus, Chen Weiping suggested that the White Australia policy affected the trade between 
China and Australia. Chen worked closely with the New South Wales Chinese Camber of 
Commerce.136 Chen also suggested that as the population of China was huge, it was therefore 
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a huge potential market for Australia. Australia could reduce its tariff. He added that 
Australia could sell meat, flour, fruits and other products to China.137  
Another achievement of Dr Chen’s was that he supported the local Chinese-Australians to 
create the “George E Morrison Lectures” in order to improve Sino-Australian relations.  Chen 
himself gave the first George Morrison Lecture.138 Although both Australian and Chinese 
governments supported the establishment of the Morrison Lectures, William Liu, a Chinese 
community leader and businessman in Australia, and Mai Xixiang, a lawyer and another 
prominent Chinese supported the lectures financially.139  Thus, the creation of Morrison 
Lectures suggests that there was also a resistance from the Chinese-Australians, as they 
fought against the White Australia policy.140  
Chen was not the only Chinese diplomat, which used trade as a tool to fight against the White 
Australia policy.  Bao Junjian (保君健), known as Pao Chun-Jien, who was Chinese consul-
general in Sydney between 1936 and 1941, suggested China was a victim of Japanese 
aggression, and he was trying to gain support from the Australian public.141 Pao also tried to 
use the Sino-Japanese conflict to argue for even greater cooperation between China and 
Australia. Like Chinese diplomats at this time, Pao had a strong academic record. Pao 
received a doctor of philosophy degree, and was interested in promoting Sino-Australian 
relations through writing.  
Pao Chun-Jien continued to argue that the Australia government should relax its White 
Australia policy.142 In 1938, Pao published a book called A Century of Sino-Australian 
Relations. According to an article from Telegraph, it was an interesting book.143 He offered a 
brief history of Chinese immigration in Australia, and then he commented on Sino-Australian 
relations. This book is especially valuable to understand Pao and Sino-Australia at this time, 
as it is a rare surviving book, which was written by a Chinese diplomat, on the topic of the 
Sino-Australian relations before. For example, Pao had strong view of the White Australia 
policy: 
It is unnecessary to emphasise the peace-loving character of the Chinese government and 
people, and the Australian government and people know full well that we have no resentment 
against any economic policy which is designed to preserve Australian national homogeneity, 
but we of course deplore the times humiliating procedure of restriction, the nature of which is, 
even in Australians eyes, contrary to the new concept of the international comity of nations. 
The elimination of these restrictions can in no way affect the maintenance of Australian 
domestic economy.144 
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Thus, consul-general Pao argued that Australia should abolish or at least relax this racist 
policy, because it negatively affected Australia’s trade with China. 
In summary, since 1909 Chinese diplomats developed this commercial strategy. Between 
1909 and 1929 was the first period of implementation of this strategy, as Chinese diplomats 
worked hard to promote the commercial connections between China and Australia. They used 
China’s enormous market to attract Australian businessmen.  In 1929, the Great Depression 
occurred, and it damaged Australia’s trading connections with other parts of the British 
Empire. However, this offered Chinese diplomats a great opportunity to promote the trade 
between China and Australia. The Australian government realised the significance of trade 
with China and Japan, especially during and after the economic depression.  As Australia 
became more dependent on its trade with China and Japan in the 1930s, the Australian 
government had to relax its White Australia policy, in order to maintain warm trading 
relations with these two Asian neighbours.   
3. Security, International Diplomacy and Recognition  
Similar to the White Australia policy and trade, security issues and the international situations 
were also key factors influencing the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1921 and 
1941.  The Sino-Japanese War led Chinese expatriates in Australia closer to China, in order 
to support its struggle with Japan, but it did not always mean the Chinese in Australia 
supported the regime that controlled China.  Any major military conflict in Asia could have 
huge implications for Australia’s trading with the rest of the world.  This was because 
Australia’s huge industrial population and primary producers “depended upon sea-borne trade 
for their existence”.145  In other words, after 1931, the Sino-Japanese conflicted affected 
Australia’s trade and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world, including Sino-
Australian relations. Australia’s geography played an important role in the making of the 
Australian foreign policies at this time.   
The Chinese internal political divisions and military conflicts, the Australian internal politics 
and foreign policies (e.g. the White Australia policy), and the international situations all 
played profound roles in shaping Sino-Australian relations. Within this time, the political 
centres of China shifted a few times.  In 1921, Beijing was still the capital of China, and the 
majority of foreign countries recognised Beijing government as the legitimate regime in 
China, though there was another regime based in Canton, which competed with the North. 
Wei Zijing (魏子京) and Song Faxiang (宋发祥), two consul-generals in Australia were 
basically representing the interests of the Beijing government.  In 1931, the political centre of 
China was in Nanjing.  Chiang Kai-shek united China under his control in 1928, and he 
moved the capital of China from Beijing to Nanjing, where he had strong political and 
military support.146 Gui Zhi (桂植), Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏), and Pao Chun-Jien (保君健), 
all served the interests of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government.  In 1941, the political 
centre of China was based in Chongqing, due to the Sino-Japanese War.147  By 1941, Japan 
had occupied both Beijing and Nanjing; it forced the Kuomintang government to shift its 
political capital to Western China. Regardless of these political shifts in China, Australia and 
China maintained their official diplomatic relations. The instability of Chinese internal 
politics posed significant challenges to Chinese diplomats abroad, including those residing in 
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Australia, because they had limited financial resources and little support from the Chinese 
government.  
Similar to internal politics within China, the international situations also had a profound 
impact on Sino-Australian diplomatic relations in the 1920s and 1930s.  The Paris Peace 
Conference at Versailles in 1919 left problems unsolved for both great powers and middle 
powers like China and Australia.148  Historian Chu Pao-chin suggests that one of the 
consequences of the First World War was to shift the balance of rivalry among Great Britain, 
Germany, and Russia (and their colonies) to a new competition between Britain, the United 
States and Japan in the Pacific.149  Germany lost the war.  As a result, Germany lost its control 
of Qingdao—a major Chinese trade port in Shangdong province—to Japan, instead of China.  
Due to its military weakness, China had to rely on Chinese diplomats to maintain its 
autonomy overseas.150  China wanted to remain as an independent nation.  China needed to 
take back control of its tariff autonomy and abolish the extra-territorial rights.151  Billy 
Hughes, the Australian representative at the Paris Peace Conference, had to defend the White 
Australia policy when the Japanese representative criticized the racist policy.  For Hughes, 
the Australian government had to sacrifice China’s national interests in Shangdong, in order 
to please the Japanese government, so that they would not be too critical towards the White 
Australia policy.  The Australian government’s position on the Shangdong issue therefore 
damaged Sino-Australian relations.  However, Hughes’s presence in the Paris Peace 
Conference suggested that Australia had started to form its own independent foreign policies.  
The Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921-1922 reinforced Japan’s status as a global 
naval power.  As I have written earlier, the Australian government (under Billy Hughes) 
appointed its first trade commissioner in China in 1921. This shows that the Australian 
government not only wanted to improve its trade with China, but also wanted to gain more 
knowledge of East Asia in general.  In other words, the Australian government in the 1920s 
wanted to know the political and military situation in the “Near North” better.    
The year 1931 was not only a turning point in East Asia; it also had profound impacts on 
world history.152 Japan occupied Manchuria, China’s northeast. On 18th September 1931, the 
Japanese army attacked Mukden (modern day Shenyang). Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), the 
head of the Republic of China, ordered general Zhang Xueliang to retreat. Thus, the Japanese 
without any major military resistance controlled the Northeast of China.  This was the 
beginning of the Second World War in Asia, although China and Japan did not have a total 
war until 1937. The Mukden Incident had an extremely negative impact, as it encouraged the 
Japanese military to be more aggressive in China, and later in the Pacific.153 Indeed, as 
William Kirby has famously pointed out in 1997, China intertwined with the outside world in 
the 1920s and 1930s, and the international situation made Chinese diplomats more important 
than ever.154  
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Between the two world wars, according to Zhang Qiusheng, one of the key policies for the 
Australian government was to prevent Japan’s invasion of Australia.155  Zhang suggests that 
the Australian government was too gentle towards the Japanese government at the beginning 
of   the Second Sino-Japanese War.156  Further, the Australian government even tried to stop 
the international intervention in the Sino-Japanese conflicts, from the League of Nations. 
After 1937, when China and Japan entered total war, more and more Australians workers 
protested, and asked the Australian government to stop trading with Japan. However, the 
Australian government chose to ignore them.  For Zhang, the position of the Australian 
government on this issue is unacceptable.157  In 1939, the wars in Europe finally broke out, 
and even then, the Australian government’s policies towards Japan were still unchanged.  It 
was only after 1940, when the British government changed its policies towards Japan, that the 
Australian government started to change its official policies towards Japan; although 
Australia felt a more direct threat from Japan.158   
Before I address how security affected Sino-Australian relations, it is necessary to provide 
basic information on China, Japan and Australia in 1941. Here is the population of these three 
nations in 1941: 
Nation Population 
China About 400 million 
Japan About 100 million 
Australia About 7 million 
                                                
Thus, we can see that the total population of Australia was smaller than a major city in China 
or Japan. However, the geographical size of Australia was only a little bit smaller than that of 
China, and much bigger than that of Japan.  It is important to keep this in mind when we try 
to understand Sino-Australian relations.  
The Chinese government needed support from overseas Chinese citizens, in order to fight 
against the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945).159  Chinese 
expatriates in Australia therefore played prominent roles in shaping the Sino-Australian 
relations. Lin Sen, President of the Legislative Yuan, one of the most influential politicians in 
China at this time, visited Australia in 1931.160 In theory, Lin was the second most powerful 
politician in China, only after Chiang Kai-shek. Lin was President of the Republic of China— 
the head figure of China between 1932 and 1944.  His visit to Australia was significant as this 
was the first time that one of the most senior Chinese leaders ever visited Australasia. 
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Figure 14 [Chinese consul-general Gui Zhi hosted two commissioners] 
Source: Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 18 April 1931, p.8. 
This is a rare report from Tung Wah Times about Lin Sen’s tour in Australia. This Chinese 
newspaper report reveals that Gui Zhi (桂植), then Chinese consul-general in Australia, was 
hosting a welcome dinner party for Lin Sen and Chen Yaoheng (then China’s director for 
overseas Chinese affairs) in Sydney.  Prominent people attended this welcome dinner, 
including the Governor of NSW, the representatives of the federal government, the mayor of 
Sydney, and foreign diplomats in Australia. More than 200 people attended this event. We 
can learn from his newspaper source that the Australian government took Lin’s visit  
seriously.161 This should not be too surprising, as Australia was going through severe 
economic depression at this time, and therefore needed to export more goods to China and 
Japan.162  
After 1931, Chinese in Australia were paying increasing attention to the Sino-Japanese 
conflict.163 The majority of Chinese expatriates were still seeing themselves as Chinese 
citizens; they still viewed China as their home country.164 Thus, Chinese expatriates in 
Australia were willing to do whatever it took to help China, in order to fight against the 
Japanese. When the Japanese attacked Shanghai in 1932, Cai Tingkai (1892-1968), known as 
Kai Tsai Ting in Australia at that time, was the overall commander of the 19th Army in 
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Shanghai. His army fought hard against the Japanese in Shanghai; though Cai’s army was 
poorly equipped and trained.165 Chinese expatriates in Australia were donating money from 
banks in Australia to banks in China, so that the Chinese soldiers would get enough financial 
support.166 The Tung Wah Times also shows the amount of money Chinese expatriates in 
Australia donated to support the anti-Japanese war.167  Chinese headquarters received £3134 
from the Chinese in Australia. On behalf of the 19th army, general Cai Ting-kai (蔡廷锴) 
received £1000. Further, general Cai Ting-kai, knew that overseas Chinese were supporting 
him financially. For example, he wrote a letter to the local Chinese in Australia, to thank 
them their financial contribution.168 We can learn three things here. First, this story reinforced 
the idea that there was a financial connection between China and Australia at this time. 
Second, it is fair to say Chinese expatriates in Australia were actively contributing to China’s 
anti-Japanese struggle.  This is because they believed that a stronger China would enhance 
their living conditions in Australia (e.g. Chinese diplomats could help them to deal with 
White Australia policy better). Third, Chinese general like Cai Ting-kai were using Tung 
Wah Times as a tool to communicate with local Chinese in Australia.   
Although Cai and his army failed to defend Shanghai, and they were forced to retreat to 
Fujian province, Cai became a Chinese national hero, as his army showed strong courage in 
the battlefield. Indeed, Chinese soldiers were willing to die to protect China, this was what 
the Chinese civilians were hoping to see at this time. As Jay Taylor has suggested, Chinese 
students, newspapers, temple and business association “demanded all-out war” with Japan.169 
Thus, it is evident that the Chinese public supported Cai Ting-kai.  Cai then toured in Hong 
Kong and Guangdong province, and received warm welcome wherever he went. His story 
received huge coverage in the Chinese newspapers in Australia, like Tung Wah Times.170 
Similar to Chinese citizens in Hong Kong and Guangdong, Chinese expatriates in Australia 
also viewed Cai as China’s national hero. Furthermore, Chinese expatriates in Australia 
expected China to become a united nation, so that all the Chinese could fight against Japan 
together.171 In the end, Cai became a national hero among Chinese ordinary people, both in 
China and abroad.   
However, Chiang Kai-shek and general Cai Tingkai came from different political factions 
within the Kuomintang Party, and had different views towards the Japanese invasion. Chiang 
was a military leader as well as politician. He therefore had to consider both the political and 
military factors when he made any decision. Cai was a general, and his priority was to fight 
against the Japanese and protect the Chinese people.172 This resulted in a key difference 
between these two men. Cai was willing to take his 19th army out of Fujian Province173, so 
that they could actively fight against the Japanese. However, Chiang wished Cai to stay in 
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Fujian, and to attack the Communists in the rural areas of the province. In 1933, relations 
between Chiang and Cai reached their lowest point. In November 1933, Cai rebelled against 
Chiang’s Kuomintang and formed the Fujian People’s Government. Cai did not receive 
military support from the local Chinese communist party, and Chiang’s army easily crushed 
Cai’s rebellion. As a result, Chiang saw Cai as a traitor to Kuomintang and its region, and Cai 
was forced to leave China for several years.174 One of the places that Cai visited was 
Australia.  During his tour, general Cai received warm welcome from the local Chinese in 
Australia.175  Chinese in Australia treated Cai as China’s national hero.  
For the majority of the period between 1921 and 1941, the Chinese consulate would try its 
best to protect the interests of the local Chinese people in Australia. The Chinese consulate 
had political status, and the Chinese local community had economic wealth, so when these 
two groups of people worked together, they could form a strong alliance. For example, when 
the Chinese consulate moved from Melbourne to Sydney in 1929, the consulate lacked 
funding from the Chinese government.176  Chinese expatriates in Sydney donated money, and 
helped the consulate to buy their furniture.177 This indicates that Chinese diplomats and the 
Chinese community were working together to protect their common interest—the rights of 
Chinese people in Australia.  However, general Cai Tingkai’s tour in Australia in early 1935 
increased the tension between the Chinese consulate in Sydney and the local Chinese in 
Australia, because the Chinese consulate in Australia and the local Chinese community in 
Australia had different views of Cai.178  
What was more ironic, Chinese consul-general Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏) was trying to use 
the White Australia policy to argue that the Australian government should not allow Cai to 
tour the nation. Chinese diplomats even used trade between China and Australia as a tool to 
pressure the Australian government to exercise its White Australia policy.  The Australian 
government regarded this as a form of “commercial diplomacy”.179 
Cai Tingkai was not the first Chinese general to visit Australia.  In December 1934, Qiu 
Zhaochen (丘兆琛), a general from the 19th Army under Cai, visited Sydney, Australia. Qiu 
received warm welcome from the local Chinese community.  For example, Zhu Songqing and 
Huang Zhu, two local Chinese business leaders, hosted a warm welcome party for general 
Qiu, on behalf of the Chinese population in Australia.180 Zhu and Huang truly viewed Qiu as 
the national hero of China. Unsurprisingly, no Chinese diplomat showed up to welcome Qiu. 
The Chinese consulate in Sydney represented the will of Chiang, was not welcoming Cai’s 
visit to Australia in 1935, either.181 For example, Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏), then Chinese 
consul-general in Sydney, sent an official letter to the Department of External Affairs in 
February 1935. Chen expressed the official position of Chiang’s government: 
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I have the honour to state that information is to hand that General Tsai Ting Kai [Cai Ting 
Kai], who was in command of the Nineteenth Route Army which was in action against the 
invaders of Shanghai, but which subsequently became traitors to my Government, rising in 
rebellion against Government troops and setting up an independent state in Fukien [Fujian] 
Province, will arrive in the Commonwealth per s.s. [‘]Mariposa[’] on the 25th instant. My 
government has informed me that this man’s tour is being organised for propaganda purposes 
against my Government.182 
Clearly, Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏) was representing the interests of the Kuomintang regime, 
not the interests of China.  For China, the best option would be for all the political parties and 
military groups to work together to fight against the Japanese.  However, for the Kuomintang 
regime, especially Chiang, felt its government needed more time to prepare for a total 
military struggle against Japan.183 Chen Wei-ping, following instructions from the 
Kuomintang government in China, had to distance himself from Cai, and tried to reduce the 
impact of Cai’s visit to Australia.184 This was because the more popular Cai was among the 
Chinese overseas, the more pressure Chiang would face in China. Chiang wanted to diminish 
his internal rival (e.g. the Chinese communists) before he started to rebel against the 
Japanese.185 As Chiang famously said:  
The Japanese are a disease of the skin. The [Chinese] Communists are a disease of the heart. 
Chiang believed that the Soviet Union supported Mao, and he did not feel comfortable with 
the foreign influence on the Chinese Communist Party.186 Thus, Chiang wanted to finish his 
civil war with Mao Zedong (1893-1976) before he started to rebel against the Japanese 
completely. However, this was one of the biggest mistakes that Chiang made in his political 
career, and it made him a less popular leader.  General Cai’s popularity in Australia would 
damage the authority of Chiang in China. Therefore, Chinese diplomats tried to stop Cai’s 
tour in Australia.  
Furthermore, an official Australian report revealed: 
The attitude of Nanking[187] has also been defined and although there is no lack of rumour 
that within the period which has elapsed since Tsai’s defeat as a rebel…that Nanking’s 
present feeling is as it was recently expressed from there to the Consul-General here, since it 
is a common thought amongst Chinese that Tsai, once he has completed his immediate 
objective in making pleasant personal impressions and contacts abroad, will later rally forces 
to himself in China and finally overthrow the National Government as it is today.188 
We can learn from this official document that Chinese diplomats like Chen Wei-ping were 
putting the interests of their party (or the regime he represented) above the interests of 
Chinese expatriates in Australia as well as China’s national interests. What a disappointment! 
Here is the official reply from Canberra to Chen Wei-ping.  
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Since writing the above Dr. Chen has telephoned me desiring that Canberra be advised of the 
coming of Tsai on 25th February. I informed Dr. Chen that this had been done and that Tsai’s 
visit would be regarded similarly to that of Chiu-tourist only.189 
I would like to make two observations here. First, it seems Canberra did not want to choose 
between the interests of the Chinese government and the interests of the Chinese people in 
Australia. In other words, the Australian government did not want to choose one side and 
offend the other one. In fact, a group of Australian politicians believed that if Japan kept 
attacking China, Japan would not have the ability to attack Southeast Asia, and therefore 
Australia would be a safe place.190  Second, it seems the official position of the Australian 
government was closer to the position of the local Chinese in Australia than the position of 
the Kuomintang government in China. This is because the Australian government allowed 
Cai to continue to tour around the nation, as a “tourist”; although this might have offended 
both the Chinese and Japanese consulates in Sydney, given Cai’s strongly anti-Japanese 
position.191 This suggests that the Australian government carried sympathy towards people in 
China, as they were the victims of Japanese aggression.   
The Second World War (WWII) or the Anti-Japanese War, shaped China’s national historical 
memory and identity fundamentally.  It had huge impacts on China domestically and 
diplomatically.  WWII destroyed the old world order, thus providing Chinese diplomats 
excellent opportunity to renegotiate China’s position in the world.  The 1940s is certainly one 
of the most violent decades in modern Chinese history.  China was no doubt one of the 
biggest victims in WWII.192  China suffered tremendously during WWII, as there were 14 
million death, and massive refugee flight during this tragedy.193  As Rana Mitter has reminded 
us China fought against Japan by itself between 1937 and 1941, therefore the West should 
give this forgotten ally—China, some credit for its actions in WWII.194  
Meanwhile, however, China was actually rising on the world stage.  The WWII crushed the 
existing international order, and Chinese diplomats took advantage of this opportunity. By 
1945, for the first time in the modern history, China becomes an equal member in the world 
stage, at least on paper.  This is evident as China becomes one of the founding members of 
the United Nations, and even becomes one of the five permeant member of the Security 
Council.195  While Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Nationalist government might make a 
number of mistakes on Chinese domestic domain and their foreign policies towards Japan; it 
is equally important to remember that Chiang had a reasonable constructive relations with 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, at least between 1941 and 1943.  With the support from the USA, 
China became a global power in 1945.   
To a large extent, Chinese diplomats are the pioneers of Chinese modernity. They had a more 
complete view of the global situation than many other Chinese people, partly because the 
Chinese diplomats were educated abroad, or at least lived or worked for some time overseas; 
partly because these diplomats could speak at least one foreign language. Chinese diplomats, 
including Wellington Koo (1888-1985) and Hsu Mo (1893-1956) were trying their best to 
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protect China’s interests overseas. Further, the Chinese government required Chinese 
diplomats to assist Chinese citizens in abolishing these bad habits (e.g. opium smoking and 
gambling), thereby improving China’s image abroad.196  
Chinese diplomats tried to convince Australian government that China was a victim of the 
Japanese aggression, and needed Australia’s moral support, if not military support.  In A 
Century of Sino-Australian Relations, Pao Chun-Jien (保君健), condemned the Japanese 
aggression in the Pacific. He believed China would not surrender to the Japanese, and he 
suggested that the Australian government should work closely with the Chinese 
government.197 
Australia, whose destiny lies in the Pacific, certainly understands Chinese national outlook 
and Chinese national policy, which is a policy based on the ideals of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. The government and people of the Republic of China fully believe that the 
Australian government and people will assist China to achieve for her overseas sons a true 
dignity of citizenship, based upon equality, thus eliminating needless conflict of opinions in 
regard to the principles of justice and fraternity, which we know the Australian as well as the 
Chinese people respect and wholeheartedly cherish.198 
The Sino-Japanese conflict after 1931 made Australia more important to China 
diplomatically, because China needed support from outside in order to win the war.  Chinese 
policy makers believed that Japan would attack Australia in 1938, if not earlier.199  They 
therefore viewed Australia as a potential ally in the fight against the Japanese.200 Chinese 
diplomats like Pao tried to convince the Australian government that there was a possibility of 
a Japanese attack on Australian soil, and that Japanese troops were gaining territories in the 
Pacific. Thus, Australia should support China during the Sino-Japanese conflict, because it 
was the best way to protect Australia’s interests. As I mentioned earlier, Australia’s 
commercial connections with the rest of the world largely depended on the stability of Asia.  
The Australian government, according to Pao, needed to work closely with the British and 
Chinese governments, in order to resolve the Sino-Japanese conflict.201  
For Australian politicians, however, Australia’s diplomatic relations with China and Japan 
were both important. Australian politicians and diplomats were forming their own foreign 
policies, in order to protect Australia’s own interests.202 Thanks to the work of Paul Hasluck 
(1905-1993), we now know that by 1937 the Department of External Affairs had made at 
least one serious attempt to create an overall foreign policy in order to protect Australian 
interests.203 The Sino-Japanese War undermined the British interests in China. It damaged the 
interests of the British Empire in the region.204 Australia, as a British dominion, wanted to be 
treated as an equal partner to Britain, within the British Empire. Meanwhile, China also 
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wanted to be treated as an equal partner to the West. Thus, Sino-Australian relations were 
part of the process of Australians’ formation of their own independent foreign policies, while 
China was struggling to not only become a modern nation, but also to be treated as a 
respectful and equal partner to the West.  Australian politicians did not want to choose a side 
between these two Asian nations until 1942. On the one hand, the White Australia ideology 
was still extremely important for Australian politicians. On the other hand, they were worried 
about the expansion of Japan. Thus, Australia policy-makers tended to hesitate between 
ideology and realism.   
The Australian public, felt sympathy towards the Chinese people during the war, especially 
when the Japanese used chemical weapons.205  One Australian deserves special attention here. 
William Donald, although he was not a diplomat, was a special advisor to Chiang Kai-shek 
(1887-1975) and close friend to his wife, Soong Mei-ling. Thus, Donald was closely 
associated with China’s internal politics. However, unlike George Morrison, Donald did not 
have a close link with Australian politicians at the time. Thus, he did little to shape Sino-
Australian relations directly. Donald was disappointed that the Australian government 
refused to give China more help before 1941. Indeed, Chiang saw Donald as a friend of his. 
Further, Donald had bigger impacts on Chinese internal politics than on Sino-Australian 
relations.   
The internal Chinese political divisions and the Sino-Japanese War offered both challenges 
and opportunities for Sino-Australian relations.  China was largely divided politically in the 
1930s, which was one of the key factors ensuring that Japan was brave enough to attack 
China in the first place. Further, for Chiang Kai-shek, his priority was to regain and/or 
maintain his national leadership, over the defence of China, even though Chiang also tried to 
defend China.206 China faced enormous challenges both internally and externally. Indeed, 
China was a “broken nation” between 1931 and 1945.207   
Chiang’s regime needed support from Britain.  The British government welcomed a stable 
Chinese government, in order to protect the interests of the British Empire in China, 
especially in Shanghai. In 1928, according to the British ambassador in China, Britain and 
China signed a new taxation agreement. In the agreement, the British Empire enjoyed special 
trading preference in China. In return, the British government recognised the Nanking 
government as the only legitimate government in China, in order to keep their special trading 
preference in China.208 Australia, as part of the British Empire, enjoyed similar rights to the 
British in China. This provided Australian businessmen with some advantages while they 
were doing business with China or in China. 
Although the majority of nations recognised Chiang’s Nationalist government as the only 
official regime in China, some other regimes co-existed with the Nationalist government in 
the 1930s and 1940s.  This provided challenges for the Sino-Australian diplomacy, as we 
learnt from the story of Cai Tingkai earlier.  So how many regimes existed in China in 1941? 
This is a hard question. First, there was a regime under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, 
and it was based in Chongqing.209 It controlled the majority of areas of ‘free China’ (not 
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under the Japanese control). The areas included Chongqing, Xichuan province and 
Guangdong province. Chiang’s Republic of China was pro-USA diplomatically. Britain, the 
USA and the Soviet Union all recognised this regime as the only official and legitimate 
government in China. However, there were at least three other regimes within mainland 
China in 1941. Mao Zedong controlled Yan'an, and its nearby areas. Mao’s regime was a 
communist regime, and was pro-Soviet Union diplomatically at this time.  Mao’s communist 
regime was in alliance with Chiang’s Kuomintang, in order to fight the Japanese together. 
Puyi (1906-1967)—China’s last emperor, controlled Manchuria (the northeast of China) and 
part of Inner Mongolia in 1941. The state was called Manchukuo.210 It was a puppet regime 
which was established by the Japanese in 1932.211 Of course, Puyi’s regime was extremely 
pro-Japan. Wang Jingwei (1883-1944) was the President of the Republic of China (Nanjing 
regime) between 1940 and 1944. Wang spilt from Chiang’s government, and became a 
traitor.212 His regime included Shanghai, and the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. These are 
the richest areas of China. His regime was indeed pro-Japan as well. In other words, there 
were a number of regimes co-existing in China in 1941, and this offered the Australian 
policy-makers difficulties, as to which regime Australia should establish official diplomatic 
relations with?  
Australia recognised China’s Republic of China (in Chongqing, under the leadership of 
Chiang Kai-shek) as the official regime in 1941, but Australian politicians were increasingly 
worried about the expansion of the Chinese Communist Party.213  Australian politicians were 
worrying about the expansion of Japan in the Pacific, as well as the rise of Communism in 
China.  In 1941, Sir Frederic Eggleston, Australia’s first Minister to China, presented his 
credentials to President Lin Sen (who visited Australia in 1932) “at the Chinese National 
Government Building”.214 Further, the elaborate formality of the reception included “a guard 
of honour and a Chinese band playing the British National Anthem”.215 Since the national 
anthem was/is one of the symbols of a nation, this indicates that China still viewed Australia 
as a British dominion, and Australia was a semi-independent state in 1941.  
The international situations, namely the rise of Nazi Germany in Europe and expansion of 
Japan in the Pacific, offered unpredictable factors, which shaped Sino-Australian relations.  
Britain had to focus on Nazi Germany primarily, as the key interests of Britain lay in Europe. 
One of the turning points of WWII was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to 
Joseph W. Esherick, the December 1941 attack was a significant event, which fundamentally 
reshaped “the global strategic picture”.216 The fall of Singapore in early 1942 was another 
important historical event. Australian nationalist historian David Day reminds us that Lord 
Jellicoe, Britain’s former navy chief, had submitted a report on Australia’s defences in 1919, 
which had warned that the dominion could not depend upon a British fleet being sent to meet 
a threat in the Pacific if there was another conflict in Europe concurrently.217  
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The Australian government did not prepare for WWII sufficiently.218  When the war finally 
broke out in 1939 in Europe, Robert Menzies, then Australia’s Prime Minister, acted in strict 
accordance with his political view that, Britain being at war, Australia was also automatically 
at war.219 This shows the closeness between London and Canberra. Australians were willing 
to send troops to fight for the British Empire, just as they did in the First World War.  
However, for Australian politicians, Japan seemed a more direct threat to Australia than 
Germany in 1940. When Robert Menzies visited Britain in 1941, the Australian Prime 
Minister was still worrying about the Japanese expansion in the Pacific. On 4th March 1941, 
he met Quo Tai-chi, China’s ambassador to Britain, regarding the exchanges of ministers 
between China and Australia.220  Australia politicians would enable Australia to play its role 
in the security of the British Empire.221 However, the interests of Australia were not always as 
same as the interests of Britain. For example, the Australian government appointed John 
Latham as its first minister to Japan in 1940. This diplomatic move offended the British 
government greatly, as Japan was an ally of Germany, and Great Britain had been at war with 
Germany since 1939. Indeed, Australia’s security relied on British’s military protection. 
Australia could not afford to build a massive navy of its own, but Britain might not have the 
military capacity to protect Australia, either. Overall, the expansion of Japan in the Asia-
Pacific became an increasingly important factor potentially affecting the Sino-Australian 
relations.222 For the first time, the military situation in East Asia in the 1930s made Australian 
politicians realise Australia’s geographical closeness to Asia.223  
Conclusion 
In this thesis, I argue that Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to argue against the White 
Australia policy. In this chapter, I have shown that despite China and Australia’s 
disagreement over the White Australia policy, Australia’s desire to export its goods to China 
and China’s will to gain Australia as a potential partner to fight against Japan made both 
countries to realise their needs to work with each other in the 1930s.   
The decade of the 1930s was the first time that Australia has turned its attention to Asia 
(namely China and Japan), both politically and economically, at least at the official level. The 
Great Depression and the Second World War forced Australian policy-makers to reconsider 
Australia’s geo-political position in the world.224  Evidence suggest that Australian goods 
would go through Hong Kong to mainland China in the 1920s and 1930s.225  China (along 
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with Japan) was a market from which Australia made a lot of profits.  Meanwhile, the Sino-
Japanese War forced the Chinese leaders to seek help from the outside world; China was 
trying to gain Australia as a potential partner in the war, in order to fight Japan.226 Thus, the 
Sino-Japanese conflict made Australia more important to China than ever. 
Between 1921 and1941, there was always a tension between a community of culture (the 
White Australia policy) and community of interests (trade and security) in Sino-Australian 
relations, from an Australian perspective. On the one hand, white Australians wanted to 
exclude all non-European people, in order to maintain the British cultures and traditions. As 
we have learnt from Tung Wah Times newspaper reports, Chinese people became some of the 
major victims of this racist policy.227  They therefore knew their living conditions in Australia 
were closely intertwined with the destiny of China, because they believed a stronger China 
would help to improve their status.228 On the other hand, trade relations between Australia 
and Asia became increasingly important for Australia, especially during and after the Great 
Depression. Australia profited greatly from its trading with China and Japan.   
There was a key difference between various Chinese diplomats here. Song Faxiang (宋发祥) 
was the Chinese diplomat most critical of the White Australia policy, as he aggressively 
petitioned the Australian government to abolish the policy.  Other Chinese diplomats such as 
Dr Pao Chun-Jien (保君健) only requested Australian government to allow certain categories 
of Chinese to come to Australia freely. These three categories were: students, tourists, and 
businessmen.  Pao’s approach was more effective, as it was not realistic to ask the Australian 
government to give up the White Australia policy completely at this time. However, Song 
Faxiang was also the official who moved the Chinese consulate from Melbourne to Sydney in 
1929, and we should give credit to Song for doing this, as Sydney had become the centre of 
Chinese communities in Australia, as well as the major port, which conducted the trading 
between Australia and China.  
John Latham’s report to Joseph Lyons in 1934 suggests that the Australian government was 
keen to trade with China and Japan. Despite Australians realising the advantages of trading 
with China, especially during and after the Depression, Australian politicians were not ready 
to give up the White Australia policy, between 1921 and 1941.    
Even though the White Australia policy and trade were still the dominant factors affected 
Sino-Australian relations between 1921 and 1941, both China and Australia were growing 
aware of the expansion of Japan in the Pacific.  Australians felt sympathy towards China’s 
tragedy; however, the Australian government did not openly criticize Japan’s aggression in 
China. This is partly because, Australians were worried about a possible military attack from 
Japan, (some Australians, even believed it was good for Australia, as Japan was focusing on 
its expansion in China, and therefore would leave Australia alone229); partly because Australia 
did not have the military capacity to fight a powerful nation like Japan. China and Japan 
began a full-scale war in 1937, while Australia only declared war against Japan after the 
Attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Due to the imagined ‘migratory invasion’ from 
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China (this idea aligned with the White Australia policy perfectly) and a possible military 
attack from Japan as well as Australians’ struggle during the Great Depression, Australia paid 
increasing attention to China as a market for Australian goods.  
Although Australian foreign relations were strongly influenced by Britain’s relations with 
any one nation, my research suggests that Australia had its own independent foreign policies. 
Australia wanted to be an equal partner with Britain within this British Empire. There was 
one key difference between British and Australian foreign policies. Britain’s major interests 
lay in Europe, but Australia’s economy and security intertwined increasingly with Asia in the 
1930s. Similarly, China wanted to maintain its autonomy and be equal to the West.230 
Australia’s relation with China were part of this larger story. 
Despite the fact that Chinese diplomats were under strong financial pressure and lacked 
resources, they still tried their best to fight for the Chinese in Australia, and tried their best to 
protect the interests of this broken nation—China.  Chinese diplomats usually worked closely 
with Chinese community leaders (e.g. William Liu and Zhu Qingjun) in Australia. However, 
when the interests of the Kuomintang government (which they represented) clashed with the 
interests of the local Chinese community, the Chinese consulate chosen to protect the 
interests of their regime, over the interests of the local Chinese community in Australia.  The 
visit of General Cai Tingkai in 1935 was a good example of this. 
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Thesis Conclusion: From Enemy to Ally (1901-1941) 
This thesis has mainly focused on the economic and political/diplomatic aspects of the Sino-
Australian relations between 1901 and 1941.  It does not focus on the cultural and social 
perspective of the stories.1  This is the first detailed research that treats Chinese diplomats in 
Australia and Australian diplomats in China between 1901 and 1941 as key historical 
subjects.  Existing historiography focuses on the post-1949 Sino-Australian diplomatic 
relations.2   
In this thesis, I have tried to connect Chinese historiography to Australian historiography.  
Chinese scholars focus on Chinese diplomats’ experiences in Australia, and largely ignore the 
Australian diplomats’ experiences in China. Australian scholars focus on Australian 
diplomats in China and ignore the Chinese diplomats’ experiences in Australia. Thus, the 
lack of Chinese language abilities for Australian scholars and lack of accessing primary 
sources and secondary sources for scholars in China make their stories incomplete, as they 
tended to be either Euro-centric or Sino-centric.   
As early as 1893, Charles Pearson was one of the first people in the colonies to raise the 
alarm in predicting the rise of China and warning that the Chinese would eventually, “spread 
over new territory” such as Australia.3 What Pearson might not have known, however, was 
that his Chinese contemporaries shared a similar fear.  For Chinese intellectuals like Wei 
Yan, China too was in an extremely dangerous position, confronted by the more advanced 
Western powers and Japan during the second half of the nineteenth century.  For Pearson, his 
worry was concerned with China’s vast population and its massive potential to become a 
stronger nation.  For Wei Yan, his worry was the Western Empires, particularly the British 
Empire, and its more advanced military capabilities and modern scientific technologies.  Both 
intellectuals in China and Australian colonies harboured fears towards each other in the 
nineteenth century.4 
The unofficial relations between Australia and China began (at least) in the nineteenth 
century. Thousands of Chinese (mainly Cantonese) moved to Australia, because people 
discovered gold in Victoria earlier.  In 1901, six Australian colonies formed a federation.  
The Commonwealth of Australia established as a constitutional monarchy. Indeed, the year of 
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1901 was one of the turning points in Australian history.  The year of 1901 was also an 
important year in Chinese history.  Between 1899 and 1901, during the Boxer Rebellion, 
China declared war against the eight powerful states.  As the British Empire was fighting 
another war—the Second Boer War (1899-1902) in South Africa simultaneously, the British 
government requested Australian federation to send troops to China, in order to fight against 
the Chinese boxers.  Thus, Australia’s first war since Federation was fought was in China.  In 
other words, while the Chinese government established the first consulate in Melbourne in 
1909, Sino-Australian diplomatic relations started at a low point during this period.   
This thesis is on Australia’s diplomatic relations with China between 1901 and 1941. In this 
thesis, I have argued that Chinese diplomats used trade as a tool to fight against the White 
Australia policy, between 1909 and 1941.  I further suggest the decade of 1930s was the first 
time that Australian officials had turned its attention to Asia (namely China and Japan), both 
politically and economically.  Thus, I have shown that Australia was more intertwined and 
connected with Asia, in this period than the existing literature suggested.    
In Chapter One, I have focused on the early interactions between Chinese people and people 
in Australian colonies in the nineteenth century.  I have argued that in order to acknowledge 
the significance of the Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 1901 and 1941 as well as 
the challenges both Chinese diplomats and Australian diplomats face in the twentieth century, 
it is necessary to understand the early Sino-Australian contacts and British colonialism in 
China in the nineteenth century.  As other scholars have reminded us, British policy-makers 
used military conflict to push their commercial interests in China.5  Since Hong Kong became 
a British colony in 1842, it played a major role in China’s trade and diplomacy with the 
British Empire, including Australian colonies.   
During the 1910s and 1920s, the Chinese Consulate in Australia formed an alliance with the 
local Chinese business community.  Chinese diplomats used their diplomatic status to protect 
the rights of Chinese in Australia; in return, the local Chinese business communities 
supported the Chinese consulate financially. Between 1901 and 1921, Chinese diplomats 
worked hard with local Chinese communities and businesspersons in Australia to promote the 
trade between the two nations.  In 1909, China appointed Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋) as its first 
consul-general in Australia, to look after its interests and protect its expatriates.  Liang soon 
realised that it was difficult to ask Australian government to abolish the White Australia 
policy; instead, he proposed that Australian government should allow three categories of 
Chinese to come to Australia legally.6  These were students, merchants and tourists.  Between 
1909 and 1941, the majority of Chinese diplomats followed Liang’s strategy.   
I have suggested that in order to understand Sino-Australian diplomatic relations between 
1901 and 1921, we could not separate the political power to the economic power.  This is 
because that Chinese diplomats tended to use trade as a tool to argue Australia should relax 
its White Australia policy and recognise the regime the Chinese diplomats represented.  The 
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White Australia policy had influenced not only Chinese within Australia, but also influenced 
Australia’s relations with Asia nations, particularly China and Japan.  Since Japan’s victory 
over Russia during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Australia not only fearful of an influx of 
Asian migrants from China; but also a military invasion from Japan.  Despite Australian 
governments’ strong support of the White Australia policy, China maintained its official 
relations with Australia between 1909 and 1949.  In addition, although Australia sent 
voluntary soldiers in Europe during the World War One (WWI), to protect the interest of the 
British Empire and showed its support, its political leaders still paid close attention on the rise 
of Japan in the Pacific. Thus, Australia had its independent foreign policies.  In addition it 
suggests that despite the White Australia policy, Australia as a nation had never completely 
separated from its Asian neighbours. 
The Great Depression and the Second World War (WWII) made Australian policy-makers 
reconsider Australia’s geo-political position in the world.  In 1921, Billy Hughes appointed 
Edward Little as Australia’s first trade commissioner in Shanghai, China.7  Because 
Australian government wanted to improve its trading relations with not only China, but also 
other East Asian nations.  In addition, there was a considerable amount of trade between 
Australia and China through Hong Kong, in the 1920s and 1930s.8  As I have discussed in 
Chapter Three, scholars have previously assumed that Australia’s goods export to Hong 
Kong, went on British India or other parts within the British Empire.9  However, evidence 
suggest that many of these Australian products would go through Hong Kong, and eventually 
reached Shanghai, or other ports in coastal China.10  Indeed, countries viewed China as a key 
market in the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s.  Some of these nations were Britain, Germany, United 
States, Canada, and Japan.11  Thus, although China was a weak and semi-independent nation, 
it was still an important nation economically, because it had a huge population and the 
potential of becoming major trading nation.   
Although China was a weak and divided nation in the 1920s and 1930s, industrial nations 
(include Australia) regarded China as a key market for their goods. While China needed to 
gain technology, financial and political supports from the great powers, historians have 
understudied China’s diplomatic relations with regional (or middle) powers like Australia in 
the first half of the twentieth century.  Between 1925 and 1935, the Australian government 
relied on British diplomats to look after Australia’s interests in China, as Australia no long 
had any official representatives in China nor Singapore.12 In other words, China’s officials 
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with the British Empire as a whole influenced the Sino-Australian relations.13  Although there 
was no trade commissioner in China, the Australian government was increasingly realising 
the importance of trading with China in the 1930s.  In 1932, Dr Alexander Melbourne, visited 
China and Japan, in order to deepen Australia’s economic connections with these two Asian 
nations.14  Further, sources suggest that there was even a financial connection between China 
and Australia.15   For example, while Melbourne visited Shanghai in 1932, he intended to 
strengthen these financial and economic connections between the two. Only two years later, 
John Latham, then Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, also visited China and Japan. His 
mission was to enhance the Australian government’s understanding of these Asian nations, 
but also promoted the commercial relations between Australia with China, Japan and 
Netherlands East Indies.  Vivian Bowden was Australia’s trading commissioner in Shanghai, 
China between 1935 and 1941. During this time, since he was the highest Australian official 
in China, he was not only acting as a trade commissioner, but also acted as a diplomat trying 
to improve the relations between the two nations.  Further, my research has shown that 
Bowden also reported the economic and political situations in China, back to politicians in 
Australia so that they knew what was going on in East Asia.  Thus, Australia’s growing 
independence in its (foreign) policy-making during the 1930s is evident.16   
Meanwhile, the expansion of Japan in East Asia forced Chinese policy-makers to treat 
Australia as an independent polity (which was different to Britain) in the 1930s.  In other 
words, China took Australia seriously for the first time.  Previously Chinese officials 
generally viewed Australia as part of British Empire, and did not consider Australia a 
significant country.  In 1931, Lin Sen’s visit in Australia suggested that the Chinese 
government needed support from overseas Chinese, in order to fight against the Japanese 
expansion in Asia.   
This thesis has focused on China’s diplomatic relations with Australia; however, it mentioned 
little about China’s relations with New Zealand or other southern Pacific island-nations such 
as Fiji, between 1901 and 1941.17  Further, I have focused on Chinese diplomats’ experiences 
in Australia, but I have rarely discussed their professional experiences, either before their 
arrival in Australia or after their departure.  For example, I have discussed Huang 
Rongliang’s experience in Australia in Chapter Two.  Once he returned to China, he 
remained as an active diplomatic, and was involved other Chinese diplomatic missions in the 
1910s and 1920s.  Song Faxiang, however, had a less successful career after he left Australia 
in 1930.  Chinese consuls-general usually lived with their wives or partners when they were 
working in Australia.  Further research could be done on the roles that the wives of Chinese 
diplomats played in Australia.  As some Tung Wah Times reports have suggested, some 
partners of these Chinese diplomats (such as the wife of Song Faxiang) had closely relations 
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1902; 1911 - 1936), 18 October 1924, p.2.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 14 February 
1925, p.7. 
16 Honae H. Cuffed, “The ‘Near North’: Issues of Empire, Emerging Independence and Regionalism in 
Australian Foreign and Defence Policy, 1921-1937”, Flinders Journal of History and Politics, 2015, p.52. 
17 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 15 July 1922, p.7.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 
1902; 1911 - 1936), 26 May 1923, p.7.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 16 August 1930, 
p.5.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 22 February 1930, p.8. 
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with the local Chinese communities.18  They regularly participated in local Chinese activities, 
and were well-known figures in their own right, at least among Chinese communities.  
Chinese newspapers reports have also revealed that there were Chinese international students 
studying in Australia in the 1920s and 1930s.19  They started to form Chinese students 
associations in the early 1920s, and promoted the status of Chinese communities.20  In 
addition, the complicated relations between Chinese Kuomintang Party (the Chinese 
Nationalist Party in Australasia) and the Chinese Consulate is another intriguing research 
topic.21  
Chinese policy-makers and diplomats between 1901 and 1941 generally believed that their 
priority was to maintain China’s independence and unity.22  Chinese diplomats had to serve 
this goal when they were working in Australia.  Chinese diplomats worked hard to protect 
China’s national interests in Australia between 1909 and 1941. They tried to protect the rights 
of Chinese citizens in Australia; they encouraged Australia to buy more goods from China in 
the 1920s and 1930s.  Since 1931, they explained China’s position towards Japan, while 
attempted to gain support from Australian government and public. Chinese diplomats argued 
that both China and Australia were democracies; they shared similar values, so they should 
fight imperialist Japan together. Therefore, Australia was very important to China at this 
time. This is because China viewed Australia as one of few nations, which could provide 
China assistances during its military and political struggle against Japan.23  
The year of 1941 was one of the major turning points in Sino-Australian official relations. 
China established its embassy (or legation) in Canberra for the first time.  In the same year, 
Australia established its legation in Chongqing—China’s wartime capital.  The Sino-Japanese 
War (WWII) and later on Pearl Harbor were the main reasons behind this upgrading of 
relations.  Hsu Mo was China’s first Minister in Australia, and Australian government 
appointed Frederic Eggleston as its first Minister in China.  Both Hsu Mo (1893-1956) and 
Frederic Eggleston (1875-1954), played significant roles in shaping the wartime Sino-
Australian relations.  Hsu Mo (徐谟) provides a fresh perspective on the war years – 
Australia’s WWII from a Chinese point of view.  Though Australia and China were allies in 
WWII, the Australian government did not recognise PRC in 1949.  Despite the fact that 
Australia and PRC had not established official relations in the 1950s and 1960s, Australia 
continued to trade with China.  Further research need to be done on Sino-Australian 
diplomatic relations between 1941 and 1951.24 
Today, the White Australia policy no long exists in Australia, as the Australian governments 
eventually dismantled it in the 1970s.  Further, Australian government, under Gough 
Whitlam (1916-2014), established its formal diplomatic relations with PRC in 1972.  Since 
                                                          
18 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 16 August 1930, p.5. 
19 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 24 September 1921, p.7.; Tung Wah Times (Sydney, 
NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 5 February 1927, p.11.; please see also: Kuo, Mei-fen and John Fitzgerald, “Chinese 
students in White Australia: state, community, and individual responses to the Student Visa Program, 1920-
1925”, Australian Historical Studies, 2016, pp.259-277. 
20 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 5 July 1924, p.7. 
21 Tung Wah Times (Sydney, NSW: 1902; 1911 - 1936), 22 March 1924, p.7. 
22 Hong, Junpei (洪钧培), Diplomatic history on Republic government (国民政府外交史), Shanghai: Wenhai 
chubanshe, 1930, p.17. 
23 Shi, Yuanhua (石源华), 中华民国外交史 (Diplomatic History on the Republic of China era), 1994, p.497. 
24 As I have stated in the Introduction, scholars focus on the post-1949 relations between two nations. 
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then, Australian politicians paid increasingly attention to Asia.  Further, China is currently 
Australia’s biggest trading partner, and thousands of international Chinese students are 
studying in Australia.  As a nation, China appears more powerful today than at any other time 
in modern history.  However, race relations, trade, and security are still three key components 
effecting diplomatic relations, and the legacies of past tensions over these issues continue to 
shape Sino-Australian diplomacy to this day. 
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Arrival and departure dates of Chinese Diplomats’ in Australia 
Qing Period 1909-1911 
Consul-General 
Chinese Diplomat                                     Appointed679                                    Departure  
Liang Lanxun (梁澜勋)                              March 1909                               November 1910 
Tang Entong (唐恩桐)                             November 1910                               May 1911 
Huang Rongliang (黄荣良)680                       May 1911 
 
  Republic of China  
Chinese Diplomat                                     Appointed                                     Departure 
Huang Rongliang (黄荣良)                        May 1911681                                  November 1913 
Zeng Zhongjian (曾宗鉴)682                       November 1913                               August 1917 
Wei Zijing (魏子京)                                  August 1917                                        1927 
Song Faxiang (宋发祥)                                  1927                                                1930 
Gui Zhi (桂植)                                                1930 
Chen Wei-ping (陈维屏)                                                                                        1935? 
Bao Junjian 683 (保君健)                                         1935                                                1941 
 
Ministers/Ambassadors 
Hsu Mo (徐谟)                                           July 1941                                        March 1945 
Zheng Yitong (郑亦同)                              May 1945                                     February 1946 
Gan Naiguang (甘乃光)                             May 1948                                         May 1951 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
679 This is the appointed date, it is not the date of arrival. 
680 He was known as Hwang Yingliang. 
681 Huang arrived in Australia in June. 
682 He was known as Tseng Tsung Kien 
683 He was known as C. J. Pao in Australia. 
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Australian Diplomats in China 
1921-1941 
Edward Little                                                1921                                            1923 
(Trade commissioner) 
 
Alex Melbourne                                            1932                                            1932 
(Visiting Academic) 
 
John Latham                                                  1934                                            1934 
(Minister of External Affairs) 
 
Vivian Gordon Bowden                                1935                                             1941 
(Trade commissioner) 
 
1941-1949 
Ministers 
Frederic Eggleston                                  October 1941                                February 1944 
 
Keith Officer                                          February 1944                                October 1945 
 
Douglas Copland                                     January 1946                                   June 1948 
 
Ambassadors 
Osmond Charles Fuhrman                         June 1948                                  November 1948   
 
Keith Officer                                          November 1948                             October 1949 
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Appendix 1 
 
 [Immigration Restriction No. 17 of 1901] 
Source: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1901A00017, last accessed on 11 September 
2017. 
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Appendix 2 
 
[Immigration Restriction No. 17 of 1901] 
Source: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1901A00017, last accessed on 11 September 
2017. 
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